The Politics and Economics of Organized Crime and Terrorism in Europe

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“THE CRIME- TERROR NEXUS: HOW DOES IT REALLY WORK?”
A CONFERENCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, AND TERRORISM

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What’s at Stake?

The 1990s witnessed two disturbing processes that seemed in many cases to coincide and converge. First, “globalization” — the increasingly unimpeded flow of ideas, capital, goods, and people across borders — was matched by a transformation in the world of crime. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) have been around since long before capitalism. But during the 1990s new criminal organizations emerged displaying much greater degrees of complexity and sophistication than groups in the past. They were able to control large parts of local, national and even international economies. In some countries of the former Soviet bloc and the developing world, criminal groups managed to “colonize” significant parts of governments.

The second disturbing process was the rise of what has been called “new terrorism.” The typical “old terrorist” organization:

✓ Tended to root its demands and aspirations in political demands, most commonly ethnic separatism or Marxism-Leninism.
✓ Received backing or “sponsorship” — funding, training, material or logistical support — from outside states.
✓ Employed violence against innocent civilians in ways intended to attract mass publicity rather than inflict mass casualties.

“New terrorist” organizations differed in many crucial respects:

✓ Radical Islam supplanted secular communism and either replaced or supplemented ethnic nationalism as the driving ideological force.
✓ The nature of “state sponsorship” changed. Countries such as Iran and Syria still provided support for organizations such as HAMAS or Hizballah. But it would be difficult to demonstrate that these terrorist organizations were carrying out orders from their sponsors. Many new terrorist groups seemed to have no state sponsors at all, which required them to seek independent and often innovative sources of funding. In the case of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, it could be more accurate to view the Taliban before its toppling as a terrorist sponsored state.
✓ New terrorist groups seemed much more eager to carry out operations that would result in thousands rather than dozens of casualties. Terrorists obtaining and using chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons emerged as a very real threat in the 1990s. But weapons of mass destruction were not the only problem in this respect. The attacks of 9-11 confirmed what foiled or botched terrorist operations in the 1990s had revealed throughout the 1990s: new terrorist organizations were capable of imaging new and often counter-intuitive ways of producing large numbers of dead bodies.

These changes in terrorism and transnational organized crime seemed more apparent in Europe than in the United States. Europe’s geographic proximity to the crumbled Soviet bloc meant it saw on a daily basis the new criminal organizations that came from the East. Europe’s larger and more visible Muslim populations probably may have made European policymakers more conscious of rising radical Islamic extremism. By contrast,
American policymakers and experts in terrorism may have been distracted by two or
three coincidences, and thus before 9-11 did not appreciate the nature of threat facing the
US and its allies. First, because the first attack on the World Trade Center seemed to fail,
and especially because one of its perpetrators was caught in such a laughable way —
trying to claim the damage deposit on the truck used in the attack — it was easy to
dismiss Islamic extremists as a serious threat. Second, the fact that the one mass casualty
terrorist attack on American soil — Oklahoma City — was carried out by White
supremacists made many Americans assume the gravest threat would come from home-
grown militias. Reinforcing this belief, perhaps, were the large attacks on American
interests carried out in countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen. It was easy to
assume that foreign enemies of the US did not threaten the homeland.

While Europeans often claim they understood the dangers of “new terrorism” long before
the Americans’ attention was focused by the attacks of 9-11, several features of the
attacks forced Europeans to rethink many of their assumptions about terrorism. Most of
the hijackers had spent long periods of time in Europe, where important aspects of the
attacks were planned and organized. Because they gave no appearance of being drawn or
extremist Muslim groups, these individuals had not attracted very much attention from
authorities. Clearly, Europe was a crucial and heretofore unappreciated part of a global
network of Islamic extremists who were capable of unexpectedly harming any country,
even the world’s sole superpower.

Several things may make it appear that changes in European transnational organized
crime and terrorism are linked, perhaps even two sides of the same organizational
structure. Without state sponsorship, extremist political and religious organizations may
have to turn to illegal activities for funding. The symbiotic relation between guerrillas
and the drug industry in Colombia is a paradigmatic case. A very large percent of the
heroin consumed in Europe came from poppies grown in Afghanistan, where the Taliban
was known to tax the production and transportation of opium. Add to this the fact that
certain ethnic groups engaged in violent struggles for independence — Chechens, Kurds,
and Albanians — were also engaged in illegal activities and were mostly Muslims.

Some similarities between transnational crime organizations and terrorist groups do
indeed seem to indicate close linkages. Terrorist groups are almost by definition TCOs:
they are usually transnational, organized, and seek to carry out crimes. More specifically,
both types of transnational group not only operate in many countries; they also are often
drawn from ethnic or religious groups whose members live and work across national
borders. TCOs and terrorist groups resemble each other in the patterns of their
organization: they are structured as networks rather than hierarchies, and they form loose
alliances with other groups for particular operations or services. Both have quickly
adopted the most modern technologies. TCOs and terrorist groups both employ violence;
moreover, but neither are usually entirely criminal in their operations since both engage
in a mixture of legal and illegal activities.

These similarities lead law enforcement officials often to assume that the same methods
can be used to combat both organized crime and terrorism. It also may seem strategically
useful to equate the two in the public mind. Believers in the political cause espoused by extremist groups might be less inclined to support the group if extremists are not holy warriors but are instead little more than criminals, thugs seeking only dirty profits. This might be heightened when the dirty profits are seen as resulting from drugs, which are condemned by most religions. On the other hand, it may seem easier to mobilize public support for an attack on ordinary criminals if they can be portrayed as terrorists who threaten political stability and democracy itself.

But if the important differences between TCOs and extremist groups are not recognized, mistaken policies are all but guaranteed. Most important of these differences is that terrorist groups are striving for radical political changes; TCOs are usually much more conservative, preferring to preserve comfortable (and often corrupt) relations with politicians, seeking predictability and stability. Profits may be necessary for terrorist groups to achieve their political objectives, but they are a means to an end. For TCOs, profits are the end, the reason for being. Terrorist organizations and TCOs operate secretly, in the shadows. But terrorism is by its definition a dramatic act, intended to convey a very loud message to a very large audience (or more accurately, to convey several loud messages to multiple audiences). Organized crime groups use violence flamboyantly rather than dramatically: they seek to punish or deter their foes, not to send a broader message. While neither flinches from employing violence against innocents, the two types of organization often differ in how violence is used. Organized crime groups are seen to use violence more discriminately, terrorists indiscriminately.

A final point necessary to keep in mind when looking at terrorism in Europe is that not all terrorism is created equal. The hijackers on 9-11 weren’t Basques or Breton separatists. Our primary threat is from a global Islamic extremist movement that is able and willing to use mass violence to damage the vital interests of the United States and our allies. This isn’t the only thing worth addressing, of course. Terrorism and organized crime in Europe also pose secondary threats, including:

- Jeopardizing the stability of the new democracies in Eastern and Baltic Europe through governmental corruption or heightening ethnic tensions.
- Damaging the health of the economy of Europe and thus the economy of the world.
- Reopening the “black hole” of disorder and conflict in the Balkans that threatened the stability of Europe as a whole in the 1990s.
An Overview of Recent Patterns and Trends in European Organized Crime

Of the many large forces have reshaped organized crime in Europe the last five to ten years, none is more important than the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc. Consider only a few consequences:

- Most obvious (although not necessarily most important) has been the rise of Russian, East European, and post-Soviet organized groups of criminals. Crime, as they say, was the first industry to be privatized in virtually every country’s transition. These groups struggled for control over the post-communist space; moreover, because of the sudden removal of many barriers to trade and investment between East and West Europe these groups were able to establish a presence in the legal and illegal sectors of the West European economies.

- The fall of communism has contributed to a massive shift of populations from East to West, both legally and illegally. Crumbling economies at home combined with sometimes unrealistic dreams of good paying jobs in West Europe to drive hundreds of thousands of young men and women to the countries of the European Union. Even those who didn’t come to the West intending to work in illegal occupations found few other alternatives.

- The abrupt collapse of order in the Soviet bloc unleashed a torrent of good into illegal markets, ranging from non-ferrous metals to advanced weapons.

- The collapse of the Soviet Union opened the channels for a vast river of narcotics that now flow from Afghanistan and Central Asia, through Russia and Caucasus, through the Balkans and into West Europe.

A side effect of the collapse of communism that deserves separate mention is the Wars of Yugoslav Succession in the 1990s. The result was a flood of refugees into Western and Central Europe. Gangs based on ethnic Albanian clans from Kosovo and Macedonia as well as from Albania moved into the West European countries and established hold over much of the distribution of drugs and other illegal commodities and services. The fighting and economic sanctions on the fragments of Yugoslavia created opportunities for very large black market profits; those groups that so profited have translated in many cases their wealth into political power.

The political and economic unification of Europe has profoundly shaped the patterns of organized crime. It goes beyond the free movement of goods, services, and people within the EU, although that is of course very important. Union-wide regulatory and law enforcement institutions have not developed as quickly as criminals’ abilities to evade these institutions.

Despite an increasing ability for TCOs to operate throughout Europe, significant differences between countries and regions remain. The following is not a comprehensive overview of patterns the organized crime, but rather is meant to give a flavor for the different regions and a few particularly significant countries.

Western Europe
The members of the European Union have the best developed legal structures, and tend to be among the least corrupt governments in the world. Unlike the countries to the East, this means that the legal sectors of the economy are usually able to stay legal, untainted by TCOs (or at least criminal organizations are often forced to follow rules of legality and transparency when they operate in the legal sectors; financial institutions have tended not to track money that goes from being “dirty” to being “clean” … instead of making sure money is not laundered, they simply certify that the money is clean).

Many of the features that make the countries of West Europe attractive to legitimate businesses also appeal to criminal operations: excellent air- and seaports, the world’s best electronic and physical infrastructure, hundreds of millions of wealthy consumers, and so on.

As former empires, many West European countries maintain close ties to their former colonies. This allows a movement of goods and people from under-regulated and often chaotic countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Ethnic minorities nearly control many illegal markets. Among the most frequently cited groups are Turks and Kurds, Albanians and Serbs, and Russians and other post-Soviet ethnicities. Nevertheless, most observers note a greater willingness of ethnically-based groups and gangs to cooperate in networks and strategic alliances with groups of other ethnicities. As a result, the ethnic map of organized crime in Europe is more complex than it has ever been, as is the organizational structure.

Some examples of West European countries’ “specializations” in organized crime:

- Belgium has parlayed its status as former colonial power into being a major dealer of illegal arms to Africa; since diamonds are often used as payment, Antwerp has a large sub-industry dealing with “blood diamonds.” Belgian identity papers are easily forged and circulated.
- Because of lax enforcement of banking laws and (at least in the past) corruptible officials, France has been a preferred country for money laundering.
- In Northern Ireland, for years rival groups were funded by trading narcotics. This trade continues, with loyalist and republican groups leaving their causes for profit-making opportunities

The Balkans

As noted above, the disruptions of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession in the 1990s combined with the collapse of communism to allow criminal groups to obtain a stronger position than almost anywhere else … residents of the area refer to “Mafia Republics.” The region is an important route for the transshipment of drugs and human beings from East to West.

Central and Eastern Europe
To varying degrees, the countries of Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) have been cleaning their economies of the post-communist organized crime groups that flourished in the first part of the 1990s. It helps to have an open door to the European Union, a door that policymakers in these countries know could be closed if they fail to make reforms. Relatively permeable borders to the East mean Russian and other post-Soviet crime groups will use these countries as access points to the wealthy West.

**The Baltics**

The situation in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is similar to the Central European countries, although because of the closer geographic and cultural proximity to the rest of the former USSR it has been harder for the Balts to evict criminal groups that colonized parts of the economy and government. The current political crisis in Lithuania over the president’s relations to Russian TCOs illustrates how much farther all three have to go.
The Politics and Economics of Organized Crime in Europe

Terrorist Groups in Europe

Prior to 9-11, West Europe provided an even friendlier environment for many extremist and terrorist organizations than it did for TCOs. It offered excellent infrastructure for communicating with the entire world. Once inside Europe it was easy for anyone to travel freely. Large and relatively prosperous communities of ethnic minorities simplified fundraising. The high level of civil rights and freedoms meant that most groups that did not themselves engage in terrorist acts within particular countries could use those countries for recruiting, fundraising, and propaganda purposes.

The fact that so many of the 9-11 conspirators operated in Europe below the attention of authorities has forced a shift in perspective. Most had no apparent connections to known extremist organizations, certainly not to organized crime groups.

This means that the traditional way of viewing terrorist organizations in a region such as Europe may be of limited utility. Keeping track of existing groups is clearly important for the countries of Europe: the Spanish must worry about ETA, Northern Ireland and the UK must worry about the violent splinter groups on the sides of the republicans and the unionists, and so on. But there is a good chance that a mass casualty attack in the US or Europe will be conducted by individuals without a clear affiliation with any of these groups.

Below are the groups operating in Europe that were listed as “Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations” or “Other Terrorist Groups” in the US State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 report. These groups fall into four categories:

1. Subnational Groups Employing Terrorist Methods. Most are separatists (Irish republicans, Kurdish, Basque) or resist separatists (Irish unionists).
2. Ideologically Driven Groups Employing Terrorist Methods. Most of these groups are successors or remnants of the “old terrorist” Marxist movements of the 1970s and 1980s.
3. Outside Terrorist Groups with Targets in Europe.
4. Outside Terrorist Groups with Support Operations in Europe. These groups raise funds (usually among diasporas) and try to shape European opinion without engaging in terrorist actions on European soil.

1. Subnational European Groups that Employ Terrorist Methods

Real IRA (RIRA) a.k.a True IRA. Formed in early 1998 as clandestine armed wing of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement, a “political pressure group” dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. RIRA also seeks to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process. Despite internal rifts and calls by some jailed members—including the group’s founder Michael “Mickey” McKeivit—for a cease-fire and the group’s disbandment, the group pledged additional violence and has continued to conduct attacks. Many Real IRA members are former Provisional IRA members who left that organization following the Provisional IRA cease-fire and bring to RIRA experience...
in terrorist tactics and bomb-making. Targets have included civilians (most notoriously in the August 1998 Omagh bombing), the British military, the police in Northern Ireland and Northern Ireland Protestant communities. Since October 1999, RIRA has carried out more than 80 terrorist attacks. RIRA claimed responsibility for an attack in August at a London Army Base that killed a construction worker. Suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States and of attempting to buy weapons from US gun dealers. RIRA also is reported to have purchased sophisticated weapons from the Balkans

**Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)** a.k.a. Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna: Founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent Basque homeland based on Marxist principles in northern Spain and southwestern France. Primarily involved in bombings and assassinations of Spanish Government officials, security and military forces, politicians, and judicial figures; in December 2002, ETA reiterated its intention to target Spanish tourist areas. The group has killed more than 800 persons and injured hundreds of others since it began lethal attacks in the early 1960s. ETA finances its activities through kidnappings, robberies, and extortion.

**Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)** a.k.a. Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan. Founded in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group primarily composed of Turkish Kurds. The group’s goal has been to establish an independent, democratic Kurdish state in the Middle East. In the early 1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism. Turkish authorities captured Chairman Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya in early 1999; the Turkish State Security Court subsequently sentenced him to death. In August 1999, Ocalan announced a “peace initiative,” ordering members to refrain from violence and requesting dialogue with Ankara on Kurdish issues. The PKK/KADEK did not conduct a terrorist attack in 2002; however, the group periodically issues veiled threats that it will resume violence if the conditions of its imprisoned leader are not improved, and it continues its military training and planning. Has thousands of sympathizers in Turkey and Europe.

**Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA).** Terrorist splinter group formed in 1994 as the clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein (RSF), which split from Sinn Fein in 1986. “Continuity” refers to the group’s belief that it is carrying on the original IRA goal of forcing the British out of Northern Ireland. Cooperates with the larger Real IRA. Suspected of receiving funds and arms from sympathizers in the United States. May have acquired arms and materiel from the Balkans in cooperation with the Real IRA.

**Irish Republican Army (IRA)** a.k.a. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Provos (Sometimes referred to as the PIRA to distinguish it from RIRA and CIRA.) Dissension within the IRA over support for the Northern Ireland peace process resulted in the formation of two more radical splinter groups: Continuity IRA, in 1995 and the Real IRA in 1997. Until its July 1997 cease-fire, the Provisional IRA had sought to remove British forces from Northern Ireland and unify Ireland by force. In July 2002, the IRA reiterated its commitment to the peace process and apologized to the families of what it called “non-combatants” who had been killed or injured by the IRA. The IRA is organized into small, tightly knit cells under the leadership of the Army Council. Has in the past received aid from a variety of groups and countries and considerable training and arms from Libya and the PLO. Is suspected of receiving funds, arms, and other terrorist-
related materiel from sympathizers in the United States. Similarities in operations suggest links to ETA and the FARC. In August 2002, three suspected IRA members were arrested in Colombia on charges of assisting the FARC to improve its explosives capabilities.

**Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF):** An extreme loyalist group formed in 1996 as a faction of the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) but did not emerge publicly until 1997. Composed largely of UVF hardliners who have sought to prevent a political settlement with Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland by attacking Catholic politicians, civilians, and Protestant politicians who endorse the Northern Ireland peace process. LVF occasionally uses the Red Hand Defenders as a cover name for its actions but has called for the group’s disbandment. Bombings, kidnappings, and close-quarter shooting attacks. Finances its activities with drug money and other criminal activities.

**Red Hand Defenders (RHD):** Extremist terrorist group formed in 1998 and composed largely of Protestant hardliners from loyalist groups observing a cease-fire. Red Hand Defenders seeks to prevent a political settlement with Irish nationalists by attacking Catholic civilian interests in Northern Ireland. In January 2002, the group announced all staff at Catholic schools in Belfast and Catholic postal workers were legitimate targets. Despite calls in February by the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), and Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) to announce its disbandment, RHD continued to make threats and issue claims of responsibility. RHD is a cover name often used by elements of the banned UDA and LVF. In recent years, the group has carried out numerous pipe bombings and arson attacks against “soft” civilian targets such as homes, churches, and private businesses.

**Ulster Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF):** The Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the largest loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland, was formed in 1971 as an umbrella organization for loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). Today, the UFF constitutes almost the entire UDA membership.

2. Ideologically-Driven European Groups Employing Terrorist Methods

**Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) a.k.a. Revolutionary Cells.** Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) emerged from a broad range of antiestablishment and anti-US/NATO/EU leftist groups active in Greece between 1995 and 1998. The group is believed to be the successor to or offshoot of Greece’s most prolific terrorist group, Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA), which has not claimed an attack since January 1995. Indeed, RN appeared to fill the void left by ELA, particularly as lesser groups faded from the scene. RN’s few communiques show strong similarities in rhetoric, tone, and theme to ELA proclamations. RN has not claimed an attack since November 2000 nor has it announced its disbandment.

**Revolutionary Organization 17 November a.k.a. 17 November:** Radical leftist group established in 1975 and named for the student uprising in Greece in November 1973 that protested the ruling military junta. Anti-Greek establishment, anti-US, anti-Turkey, anti-NATO group that seeks the ouster of US Bases from Greece, the removal of Turkish military forces from Cyprus, and the severing of Greece’s ties to NATO and the
European Union (EU). Initially conducted assassinations of senior US officials and Greek public figures. Added bombings in the 1980s. Since 1990 has expanded its targets to include EU facilities and foreign firms investing in Greece and has added improvised rocket attacks to its methods. Supports itself largely through bank robberies. A failed 17 November bombing attempt in June at the Port of Piraeus in Athens coupled with robust detective work led to the first-ever arrests of this group; trials began in March 2003.

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) a.k.a. Devrimci Sol, Revolutionary Left, Dev Sol: Originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth). Renamed in 1994 after factional infighting; “Party” refers to the group’s political activities, while “Front” is a reference to the group’s militant operations. The group espouses a Marxist-Leninist ideology and is virulently anti-US, anti-NATO, and anti-Turkish Establishment. It finances its activities chiefly through armed robberies and extortion.

Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA) a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist Territorial Units: Clandestine leftist extremist group that first appeared in the Friuli region in Italy in 1995. Adopted the class struggle ideology of the Red Brigades of the 1970s-80s and a similar logo—an encircled five-point star—for their declarations. Seeks the formation of an “anti-imperialist fighting front” with other Italian leftist terrorist groups including NIPR and the New Red Brigades. Opposes what it perceives as US and NATO imperialism and condemns Italy’s foreign and labor policies.

First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) Grupo de Resistencia Anti-Fascista Primero de Octubre: Formed in 1975 as the armed wing of the illegal Communist Party of Spain during the Franco era. Advocates the overthrow of the Spanish Government and its replacement with a Marxist-Leninist regime. GRAPO is vehemently anti-US, seeks the removal of all US military forces from Spanish territory, and has conducted and attempted several attacks against US targets since 1977. The group issued a communiqué following the 11 September attacks in the United States, expressing its satisfaction that “symbols of imperialist power” were decimated and affirming that “the war” has only just begun. The group also bombed business and official sites, employment agencies, and the Madrid headquarters of the ruling Popular Party.

New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC) a.k.a. Brigate Rosse/Partito Comunista Combattente. This Marxist-Leninist group is a successor to the Red Brigades, active in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition to ideology, both groups share the same symbol, a five-pointed star inside a circle. The group is opposed to Italy’s foreign and labor policies and NATO. May finance its activities through armed robberies.


3. Outside Terrorist Groups with Targets in European Countries
Armed Islamic Group (GIA): An Islamic extremist group, the GIA aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. Since announcing its campaign against foreigners living in Algeria in 1993, the GIA has killed more than 100 expatriate men and women—mostly Europeans—in the country. The group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats. The GIA hijacked an Air France flight to Algiers in December 1994. In 2002, a French court sentenced two GIA members to life in prison for conducting a series of bombings in France in 1995.

Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM). The goals of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) reportedly include establishing an Islamic state in Morocco and supporting al-Qaeda’s jihad against the West. The group appears to have emerged in the late 1990s and comprises Moroccan recruits who trained in armed camps in Afghanistan. GICM members interact with other North African extremists, particularly in Europe. GICM members, working with other North African extremists, engage in trafficking falsified documents and possibly gunrunning.

The Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG): The Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), also known as the Jama’a Combattante Tunisienne, reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets US and Western interests. Probably founded in 2000 by Tarek Maaroufi and Saifallah Ben Hassine, the loosely organized group has come to be associated with al-Qaeda and other North African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots during the past two years. Belgian authorities continue to hold Maaroufi, whom they arrested in December 2001. Tunisians associated with the TCG are part of the support network of the broader international jihadist movement. According to European press reports, TCG members or affiliates in the past have engaged in trafficking falsified documents and recruiting for terror training camps in Afghanistan. Some TCG associates are suspected of planning an attack against the US, Algerian, and Tunisian diplomatic missions in Rome in January 2001.

4. Outside Terrorist Groups with Support Operations in Europe

Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement): Receives some funding from Iran but primarily relies on donations from Palestinian expatriates around the world and private benefactors in moderate Arab states. Some fundraising and propaganda activity take place in Western Europe and North America.


Al-Jihad a.k.a. Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad: Historically operated in the Cairo area, but most of its network is outside Egypt, including the United Kingdom.

Kahane Chai (Kach): Stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel. Kach (founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir Kahane) and its offshoot Kahane Chai, which means “Kahane Lives,” (founded by Meir Kahane’s son Binyamin following his father’s assassination in the United States) supported Baruch Goldstein’s attack in February 1994
on the al-Ibrahimi Mosque—Goldstein was affiliated with Kach—and verbally attack the Israeli Government. Receives support from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.

**Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous):** Collects donations from the Pakistani community in the Persian Gulf and United Kingdom, Islamic NGOs, and Pakistani and Kashmiri businessmen. The LT also maintains a Web site (under the name of its parent organization Jamaat ud-Daawa), through which it solicits funds and provides information on the group’s activities. The amount of LT funding is unknown. The LT maintains ties to religious/military groups around the world, ranging from the Philippines to the Middle East and Chechnya through the MDI fraternal network. In anticipation of asset seizures by the Pakistani Government, the LT withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer goods.

**Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)** Other known front organizations: World Tamil Association (WTA), World Tamil Movement (WTM), the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT), the Ellalan Force, the Sangilian Force. Founded in 1976, the LTTE is the most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka and uses overt and illegal methods to raise funds, acquire weapons, and publicize its cause of establishing an independent Tamil state. The LTTE began its armed conflict with the Sri Lankan Government in 1983 and has relied on a guerrilla strategy that includes the use of terrorist tactics. The LTTE also has a significant overseas support structure for fundraising, weapons procurement, and propaganda activities. The LTTE’s overt organizations support Tamil separatism by lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations. The LTTE also uses its international contacts to procure weapons, communications, and any other equipment and supplies it needs. The LTTE exploits large Tamil communities in North America, Europe, and Asia to obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri Lanka.

**The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC):** The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), an outgrowth of the GIA, appears to have eclipsed the GIA since approximately 1998, and is currently the most effective armed group inside Algeria. In contrast to the GIA, the GSPC has gained popular support through its pledge to avoid civilian attacks inside Algeria. Its adherents abroad appear to have largely co-opted the external networks of the GIA, active particularly throughout Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad, many residing in Western Europe, provide financial and logistic support.

**Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) a.k.a. Islamic Union:** Somalia’s largest militant Islamic organization rose to power in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime. Its aims to establish an Islamic regime in Somalia and force the secession of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia have largely been abandoned. Some elements associated with AIAI maintain ties to al-Qaeda. AIAI sponsors Islamic social programs, such as orphanages and schools, and provides pockets of security in Somalia. Receives funds from Middle East financiers and Western diaspora remittances and suspected training in Afghanistan.
Policy Implications of the Cross-Pollination of Organized Crime and Terrorism in Europe

The dangers of transnational organized crime organizations forming close partnerships with terrorist groups are perhaps overstated. The relation is likely to resemble a small business’s use of Kinkos: TCOs may be able to provide particular specialized services such as identity documents; but the risk of employing profit-oriented TCOs for crucial and dangerous operations creates too much danger of leakage.

TCOs in Europe are unlikely to employ terrorist methods except in very rare cases. The one case in Europe that approaches the use of terrorism by Colombian drug cartels was Italy in the early 1990s when bombings and assassinations were used to dissuade the Italian government from cracking down on Italian organized crime groups. These organized crime groups were so powerful, so deeply entrenched within the economy and society, that they believed (incorrectly) they would be able to withstand an all out crackdown by the Italian government. It is unlikely that other TCOs in Europe would think they would fare any better.

Two cases in Europe (and one in Russia) are as close to ideal for showing how TCOs and terrorist groups might collaborate closely with one another … and these show the limitations. Neither the ethnic Albanian gangs nor the Kurdish criminal organizations in Europe have targeted European interests to advance their peoples’ causes. Nor have there been signs that Islamic extremists have made inroads into the criminal gangs as they have among the Kurdish and Albanian political leaders (and even that has been limited).

The Chechens are slightly different. During the suspension of overt conflict with Russia in 1997-1999, radical Muslim organizers were able to gain significant influence in Chechnya. At the same time, Chechen gangs from around the former Soviet Union used the lawless republic as a safe haven for many of their activities. But when the fighting was launched again in 1999, the two groups seem to have barely cooperated with each other. In fact, the Chechen criminal organizations (as well as ordinary Chechens and other Caucasian people in Russia) bear the brunt of crackdowns by the Russian government whenever Chechen extremists are accused of terrorist actions. If the Chechens are unable to form a solid partnership, other groups should find it very difficult indeed.