

A Road Map for<br>Juvenile Justice Reform

# The Annie E. Casey Foundation <br> 2008 KIDS COUNT <br> DATA BOOK 

State Profiles of Child Well-Being

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The 2008 KIDS COUNT Data Book can be viewed, downloaded, or ordered on the Internet at www.kidscount.org.

## Outreach Partners

The Annie E. Casey Foundation wishes to thank our Outreach Partners for their support and assistance in promoting and disseminating the 2008 KIDS COUNT Data Book. With the help of our partners, data on the status and well-being of kids and families are shared with policymakers, advocates, practitioners, and citizens to help enrich local, state, and national discussions on ways to improve outcomes for America's most vulnerable children.

To learn more about the Annie E. Casey Foundation's 2008 KIDS COUNT Outreach Partners, please visit www.kidscount.org for a complete list of organizations.

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ESSAY

A Road Map for Juvenile Justice Reform

Our nation's juvenile justice systems are poised for a fundamental, urgently needed transformation-and not a moment too soon.

Among all of the policy areas affecting vulnerable children and families, juvenile justice has probably suffered the most glaring gaps between best practice and common practice, between what we know and what we most often do. Perhaps because it serves an unpopular and powerless segment of our society-behaviorally troubled, primarily poor, mostly minority teenagers-juvenile justice policy has been too long shaped by misinformation, hyperbole, and political prejudices.

The consequences have been both disturbing and costly: Our juvenile justice systems have become littered with poorly conceived strategies that often increase crime, endanger young people and damage their future prospects, waste billions of taxpayer dollars, and violate our deepest held principles about equal justice under the law.

These systems affect a wide swath of the U.S. youth population. Nationwide each year, police make 2.2 million juvenile arrests; 1.7 million cases are referred to juvenile courts; an estimated 400,000 youngsters cycle through juvenile detention centers; and nearly 100,000 youth
are confined in juvenile jails, prisons, boot camps, and other residential facilities on any given night. ${ }^{1}$ Young people who penetrate the systems deeply-those who end up confined in locked detention centers and training schoolssuffer some of the worst odds of long-term success of any youth cohort in our nation. Over their lifetime, they will achieve less educationally, work less and for lower wages, fail more frequently to form enduring families, experience more chronic health problems (including addiction), and suffer more imprisonment. ${ }^{2}$

That's the bad news. The good news is that over the past 20 years, a growing cadre of scholars, advocates, and hands-on juvenile justice practitioners has vastly expanded our understand ing of delinquency, as well as system reform. They've compiled powerful new evidence on what works in responding to delinquency, documented the harm and waste resulting from illinformed juvenile justice practices, devised and tested new intervention strategies, and begun putting this new knowledge of what works into widespread use. Promising reforms are now underway and expanding in many jurisdictions, and the foundation for deeper and more systemic change has been firmly established.

Having been intimately involved in this work, the Annie E. Casey Foundation is gratified to report that these combined efforts add up to a compelling road map for reform. There is now an increasingly clear route for moving juvenile justice away from counterproductive, dangerous, wasteful, but still commonplace, practices and toward a more effective, efficient, and just approach to addressing adolescent crime.

Given what we now know, and the terrible costs of retaining the status quo in juvenile justice, there no longer remains any reasonable excuse for inaction.

## A Noble Idea, Unrealized

One hundred twenty-three years after establishing the world's first representative democracy, the United States rang in another global revolution: the first court of law dedicated exclusively to children, founded in July 1899 by Cook County, Illinois, on Chicago's west side.

Until then, children were tried in criminal courts just like adults. In many parts of the country, children as young as 8 were imprisoned with adults and sentenced to hard labor. Along with a sister court in Denver, Cook County devised an entirely new system of justice based on the principle that children are inherently different from adults, less culpable for their acts, and more amenable to rehabilitation. Unlike adult criminal courts, accused youth would not be tried through a formal, open, and adversarial process. Rather, the new juvenile courts would operate as "a kind and just parent" to children, using closed and informal hearings to act in the best interests of the child. ${ }^{3}$ By 1915, 46 states and the District of Columbia had established their own juvenile courts, and many foreign nations quickly created children's courts of their own. ${ }^{4}$ Today, every state in the union, and virtually every nation on Earth, has a separate justice system for juveniles.

For young people, juvenile courts offered many advantages. They protected the privacy of young offenders and enabled them to enter adult life without the stain of a criminal record. The courts hired specially trained probation counselors, psychologists, and other staff to supervise and support young offenders. They also handled a substantial share of cases informally, without a court hearing.

From the very beginning, however, the implementation and practice of juvenile justice fell far short of its lofty ideals. The courts relied
heavily on "reformatories," later known as training schools, where conditions were often more severe and discipline far harsher than their rehabilitative mission implied. While most juvenile courts made probation the most common outcome of delinquency cases, the reality was that few jurisdictions hired enough probation officers or provided sufficient training or resources to deliver the intended individualized care in a meaningful way. Similarly, while the founding vision of the juvenile court revolved around a dedicated, specialized jurist, only half of the nation's juvenile judges in the 1960s had a college degree, nearly three in four devoted less than a quarter of their time to juvenile cases, and most allocated just 10 to 15 minutes to each juvenile hearing. ${ }^{5}$ Statutes granted extraordinary discretion to these judges, but few legal protections to youth: no advance notice of charges, no rules of evidence, no right to counsel, no right to confront witnesses, and no right to a jury trial.

This discretion and informality, which were intended to encourage flexible and creative responses, actually ended up producing enormous disparities. Even controlling for the offenses committed, poor and minority youth have consistently received harsher treatment than more affluent white youth. ${ }^{6}$ Moreover, many juvenile judges have used their discretion to apply heavy sanctions to youth accused of such acts as underage drinking, curfew violations, and truancy (i.e., status offenses) that would not have been illegal if committed by adults. In the mid-1970s, 40 percent of youth referred to the juvenile justice system nationwide, roughly half a million teens per year, were status offenders not accused of any crime. ${ }^{7}$

Partly in response to these practices, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a series of decisions in the 1960s and '70s granting youth more (but

> Combined with sensational media coverage and widely publicized (and ultimately inaccurate) predictions of a coming "tidal wave" of "juvenile superpredators," the spike in serious delinquency sparked a public policy panic.
not all) of the legal protections available to adults. In 1974, Congress enacted the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, sharply curtailing detention and incarceration for status offenders. New federal guidelines also pushed states to desist from holding juveniles in adult jails and to maintain "sight and sound" separation between juveniles and adult offenders at all times.

These overdue protections, however, soon collided with a shift in public policy toward punishment and deterrence and away from rehabilitation. During the 1980 s, many states began requiring incarceration for serious youth crimes, and several expanded the number of youth who could be tried as adults. These trends accelerated rapidly in the 1990s, when youth violence (and public concern over it) spiked to unprecedented levels. Between 1984 and 1994, the number of murders committed by youthful offenders nearly tripled, and the overall rate of juvenile violent crime nearly doubled. ${ }^{8}$ Combined with sensational media coverage and widely publicized (and ultimately inaccurate) predictions of a coming "tidal wave" of "juvenile superpredators," the spike in serious delinquency sparked a public policy panic. State legislatures enacted "get tough" juvenile policies at an unprecedented pace. Every state except Nebraska amended its juvenile code to expand the classes of accused youth who could be tried as adults. ${ }^{9}$ To further combat the perception that juvenile courts might be too lenient, many states began requiring minimum periods of incarceration for specific crimes.

Trends in other youth-serving systems also had a profound effect on youth involvement in juvenile justice in the 1990s. Many school systems across the country adopted "zero tolerance" policies. Even when students' behavior posed
minimal threats to public safety, the result was often a court referral for misbehavior previously handled within the schools. Resource shortages in the mental health and child welfare systems also served to turn many juvenile detention centers into default providers for youth with serious needs, even though the delinquency system lacked the funding and therapeutic environment needed for effective responses.

Today, youth advocates often decry the rush toward punitive policies in the 1990s as a fundamental break with history, a rejection of the very foundations of juvenile justice. However, a more careful reading reveals that the changes actually represented a continuation and acceleration of trends long apparent in juvenile courts and correctional systems: too many minors tried and punished as adults; too much reliance on incarceration, often in harsh or abusive conditions; pervasive disparities in the treatment of youth by race and ethnicity; disproportionate sanctions for minor and predictable misbehavior. All of these trends are deeply rooted in our juvenile justice history, and the punitive wave of the 1990s only exacerbated them.

## A Compelling Critique

Tragically, virtually all of these "get tough" practices violate what we know about youth development and behavior, and all are producing worse, rather than better, outcomes for youth, communities, and taxpayers. Together, they have helped perpetuate at least six commonplace deficiencies in the operations of our juvenile justice systems.

## 1. Trends in juvenile justice practice blur or ignore the well-established differences

 between youth and adults.For the first 70 or 80 years of juvenile delinquency courts' existence, their central premise-
or the aspiration at least-was that children need and deserve a form of justice that's different from that for adults. This principle was rooted primarily in assumptions about the nature of childhood and the meaning of justice. During the 1990s, a simplistic slogan helped shatter this long-standing consensus: "Adult time for adult crime." This refrain fueled a spate of new laws boosting the number of youth tried in adult courts and punished in adult corrections systems.

Ironically, this "Adult time for adult crime" mantra gained popularity just as new empirical evidence was revealing that it rested on false foundations and produced negative results.

Children and adolescents, researchers clarified, are not just smaller versions of adults. New brain imaging research revealed that "the brain systems that govern impulse control, planning, and thinking ahead are still developing well beyond age $18 .{ }^{10}$ Behavioral studies confirmed that adolescents remain far less able to gauge risks and consequences, control impulses, handle stress, and resist peer pressure. ${ }^{11}$ Finally, research revealed that perhaps the most important difference between adolescent and adult lawbreakers is that most youthful offenders will cease lawbreaking as part of the normal maturation process. ${ }^{12}$

In March 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court cited this new evidence in a groundbreaking ruling forbidding the imposition of capital punishment for any crime committed by a person under the age of 18. "Juveniles' susceptibility to immature and irresponsible behavior means their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult,"" the court declared in this Roper v. Simmons ruling. "The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to
conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character." ${ }^{13}$

While the Supreme Court outlawed the death penalty for juveniles, it did not ban life sentences without the possibility of parole, a disturbingly popular alternative. Worldwide, 2,388 prisoners are currently serving life sentences for crimes they committed before age 18 ; all but 7 are imprisoned in the United States. ${ }^{14}$ Given the diminished culpability of youthful offenders and their greater potential for rehabilitation, these sentences seem almost as difficult to defend as the death penalty. ${ }^{15}$

Each year now, as many as 200,000 youth under age 18 are tried in adult criminal courts nationwide. ${ }^{16}$ These underage defendants may reside in 1 of the 13 states that define the maximum age of the juvenile court's jurisdiction below 17; they may have their cases transferred from juvenile to adult court by judges or prosecutors; or they may be transferred to criminal court automatically, based on the severity of their charges. Twenty-nine states now transfer youth to criminal courts automatically for certain crimes. ${ }^{17}$

However, recent research on the impact of "criminalizing delinquency" finds that youth prosecuted and incarcerated in the adult justice system are actually more likely to re-offendand commit violent crimes-than youth retained in the juvenile justice system. In November 2007, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) concluded: "Transfer of youth to the adult criminal justice system typically results in greater subsequent crime, including violent crime, among transferred youth; therefore, transferring juveniles to the adult system is counterproductive as a strategy for preventing or reducing violence." Equally
significant, the CDC study also found no evidence that the threat of transfer to adult court either deters youth from committing crimes or lowers offending rates. ${ }^{18}$

In addition, youth in adult jails and prisons are far more likely to commit suicide, be sexually assaulted, or suffer beatings. ${ }^{19}$ And, while racial disparities persist at all stages of the juvenile justice process, they are especially severe in the transfer to adult court and corrections. Whereas African-American youth comprise 16 percent of the total youth population nationwide and 28 percent of all youth arrests, 58 percent of juveniles admitted to adult prisons nationwide are African American. ${ }^{20}$

Another group of youth increasingly subject to lifelong consequences for delinquent behavior are those involved in sex offenses. Enacted in 2006, the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act requires states to place youth as young as 14 on a sex offender registry if they are found guilty of specified sexual offenses. This law-and many similar state statutes-applies not only to predatory offenses, but also to those involving consensual sex, public exposure, or inappropriate touching. Placing youth on published registries compromises core premises of the juvenile court: that youth are less culpable and more amenable to treatment than adults and that they need and deserve confidentiality. Moreover, available evidence indicates that the vast majority of juveniles who commit a sexual offense never commit another. ${ }^{21}$ Meanwhile, research on the impact of sex offender registries does not show that such registries reduce the incidence of sexual offending. ${ }^{22}$

In addition to their<br>ineffectiveness, juvenile correctional facilities have shown a persistent propensity toward shocking and sometimes pervasive abuses against youth.

2. Indiscriminate and wholesale incarceration of juveniles is proving expensive, abusive, and bad for public safety.
In most states, the largest portion of the juvenile justice budget is spent on confining youth, most often in large correctional facilities, or in detention centers awaiting trial or pending placement. On any given day, nearly 100,000 young people nationwide are confined in juvenile institutions, residential "treatment" centers, or group homes by order of a juvenile court. ${ }^{23}$

Obviously, certain youth pose serious public safety risks and need to be confined. Many, however, do not: Just 24 percent of youth confined in 2003 were adjudicated for violent felonies, whereas more than 45 percent were guilty only of status offenses; probation violations; misdemeanors; or low-level felonies unrelated to violence, weapons, or drug trafficking. ${ }^{24}$

Research shows that reliance on these institutions neither effectively protects the public nor rehabilitates youth. In fact, recidivism studies routinely show that 50 to 80 percent of youth released from juvenile correctional facilities are rearrested within 2 to 3 years-even those who were not serious offenders prior to their commitment. Half or more of all released youth are later re-incarcerated in juvenile or adult correctional facilities. ${ }^{25}$ Meanwhile, correctional confinement typically costs $\$ 200$ to $\$ 300$ per youth per day, far more than even the most intensive home- and community-based treatment models.

In addition to their ineffectiveness, juvenile correctional facilities have shown a persistent propensity toward shocking and sometimes pervasive abuses against youth. In California, reports surfaced in 2004 showing that violence was epidemic in state juvenile facilities. Some
youth were being isolated as much as 23 hours per day, while others were locked inside mesh cages in their classrooms. ${ }^{26}$ In Texas, the state correctional agency remains in turmoil because of revelations about sexual abuses of youth by staff. ${ }^{27}$ Nationwide, 13,000 cases of abuse were reported in juvenile institutions from 2004 to $2007 .{ }^{28}$ In some cases, such abuses are the predictable result of shortsighted workforce policies-low wages, poor training, minimal supervision, no incentives - that contribute to high rates of turnover in very stressful jobs. But workforce issues are only part of the explanation. The disturbing frequency of abuses within youth correctional facilities across jurisdictions and over time begs the question whether these institutions are inherently prone toward abuse. The U.S. Department of Justice has filed suit to protest conditions of confinement at juvenile facilities in 11 states, and public interest lawyers have litigated conditions in many others.

Even when correctional facilities protect their wards from abuse, research shows that incarceration can seriously damage youth's chances for future success. A successful transition from adolescence to adulthood requires youth to acquire education and skills, build a social network, and develop self-discipline and personal autonomy. Incarceration undermines young people's opportunities to meet most of these challenges. According to a research network assembled by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, "Only 12 percent of formerly incarcerated youth had a high school diploma or GED by young adulthood.... Only about 30 percent were in either school or a job one year after their release... and they are more likely to be divorced and to bear children outside of marriage. ${ }^{" 29}$ Because Hispanic and, particularly, African-American youth are severely

overrepresented in the correctional population, these life-altering outcomes clearly affect youth of color disproportionately.

In addition to the 69,000 youth held daily in correctional placements, another 26,000 youth per night are confined in juvenile detention centers awaiting adjudication hearings or pending placement in a corrections facility or residential program. ${ }^{30}$ Less than one-third of these detainees are charged with serious violent offenses; two-thirds, however, are black and Hispanic. Being detained prior to adjudication increases the odds that a young person will be sentenced to a correctional facility. In the long run, detention limits young people's educational progress, jeopardizes their mental health, and lowers their future employment rate. ${ }^{31}$

## 3. Juvenile justice systems too often

 ignore the critical role of families
## in resolving delinquency.

Because youth are so influenced by peers, rapidly expanding their personal autonomy and asserting their independence, it is easy to assume that parents and families no longer exert a powerful influence on adolescents. Nothing could be farther from the truth. An overwhelming body of research and experience shows that parents and families remain crucial and that effectively engaging and supporting parents is pivotal to successful youth development.

Unfortunately, most juvenile justice systems are more inclined to ignore, alienate, or blame family members than to enroll them as partners. In a recent three-state survey of parents with court-involved children, many reported feeling blamed or looked down on by the juvenile justice systems. Surveyed parents complained about being excluded from legal decisions made on their children's behalf; alienated from the process
by complex language and court procedures; frustrated by the failure of probation officers to reach out and keep them informed; and disappointed in the lack of support when youth re-integrate into the community following confinement. ${ }^{32}$

This failure to engage parents is selfdefeating, given developmental psychologists' consistent findings that "caring, committed, and supportive parents... provide a mix of structure and freedom that facilitates adolescents' healthy psychosocial development and their transition to adulthood. ${ }^{33}$ For example, parental or family involvement is critical for youth with mental health problems, to facilitate consistent participation in counseling and appropriate medication. In addition, parents can play crucial roles in introducing their children to the labor market, a key milestone in the transition to adulthood.

Since 1996, the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence has examined research on more than 600 strategies for preventing and treating youth violence. Thus far, only 3 approaches aimed at already delinquent youth have been certified as "blueprint models," meaning that they've shown significant positive results in repeated scientific studies. All 3 interventions work intensively with parents and other family members, not just with youth themselves. Multisystemic Therapy and Functional Family Therapy both provide intensive short-term family therapy following strict research-driven protocols. Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care temporarily places troubled youth with specially trained foster families while counseling their parents. ${ }^{34}$ All 3 models have dramatically lowered recidivism and future incarceration rates in repeated trials over 20 years. All 3 cost far less than incarceration and return several dollars in benefits for every dollar spent to deliver services. ${ }^{35}$

## 4. The increasing propensity to

 prosecute minor cases in the juvenile justice system harms youth, with no benefit to public safety.Research indicates that some level of delinquent behavior is a normal and predictable part of adolescence, but the vast majority of youth grow out of their delinquency without any assistance, intervention, or punishment. Why, then, have more youth been ensnared in the formal justice system in recent years?

From 1995 to 2004, the national juvenile arrest rate for serious property and violent crimes declined 45 percent, and the homicide arrest rate plummeted 70 percent. ${ }^{36}$ Yet, in this same period, the numbers of youth adjudicated delinquent, placed into secure detention, and sentenced to probation all grew. ${ }^{37}$ Clearly, our juvenile courts are prosecuting many youth for misconduct that was previously handled informally. For example, more than twice as many youth were adjudicated for disorderly conduct in 2004 than in 1995. ${ }^{38}$

One factor propelling this dramatic increase in minor court cases has been "zero tolerance" policies in our nation's schools. ${ }^{39}$ Since these policies were implemented (and police officers were deployed at schools to enforce them), many courts have experienced substantial increases in delinquency cases originating in schools.

Increased reliance on juvenile courts to address relatively minor misbehavior is worrisome for three reasons. First, though most youth who enter the justice system for minor offenses are, at worst, initially sentenced to probation, they can easily wind up in a juvenile detention or corrections facility if they violate probation rules. Nationally, one of every nine youth in juvenile correctional centers in 2003 was committed for a technical (non-criminal) probation
violation. ${ }^{40}$ Second, involvement in the justice system can cause lasting psychological harm, lowering young people's sense of competence and their aspirations for the future, and leading them to gravitate more toward deviant peers. ${ }^{41}$ Third, once youth have a juvenile record, even for a minor offense, they are treated more harshly for future offenses, increasing the likelihood that they will spiral deeper into the juvenile corrections system. ${ }^{42}$

Like so many other strands of our nation's response to adolescent misbehavior, zero tolerance policies have affected students of color disproportionately. And, like so many other juvenile policies, the overwhelming evidence shows that such policies are counterproductive: After a comprehensive review, the American Psychological Association concluded in 2006 that zero tolerance policies are associated with more, not less, misbehavior; and lower, not higher, academic achievement. ${ }^{43}$

## 5. Juvenile justice has too often become a dumping ground for youth who should be served by other public systems.

Youth with mental health problems and learning disabilities, as well as those in foster care or with child welfare case histories, are increasingly being steered into the juvenile justice system, including its secure institutions. These youth face higher risks of delinquency related to their disability or disadvantage. For example, though estimates vary significantly, research suggests that court-involved teens are two to three times as likely to suffer mental health conditions as youth in the population at large. ${ }^{44}$ Yet, the dramatic overrepresentation of high-need youth in the juvenile justice system also reflects serious shortcomings in other child-serving systems and
a troubling propensity of those systems to abandon youth to juvenile justice.

As one leading mental health expert recently noted, "During the 1990 s, state after state experienced the collapse of public mental health services for children and adolescents.... The juvenile justice system soon became the primary referral for youths with mental health disorders." ${ }^{45}$ Similarly, a disproportionate share of public school students referred to juvenile justice under zero tolerance policies are youth with educational disabilities (and related behavior problems), suggesting that schools too often rely on court interventions in responding to the behavior problems of students with special needs. ${ }^{46}$

Child welfare agencies often terminate services to adolescents in foster care who get arrested or adjudicated delinquent, leading these youth to suffer harsher outcomes than other court-involved teens. In New York City, a 1998 study found that following arrest, foster youth were more likely to be detained than other youth. ${ }^{47}$ In Los Angeles, a 2007 study found that youth from the child welfare system are far more likely than their peers to be placed in residential facilities following a delinquency adjudication. ${ }^{48}$

The collective experience of girls provides a powerful case in point regarding the ways in which juvenile justice has become a default repository for low-risk, but high need, children. To an extraordinary extent, girls in juvenile justice are likely to be past victims of physical, sexual, and/or emotional abuse. Their family histories are often characterized by extreme stress and chaos. An alarming percentage suffer mental health conditions, ranging from depression to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); and many use drugs or alcohol to escape these troubled realities. Girls are far more likely than boys to be referred to juvenile justice for such behaviors
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How long would society<br>tolerate continued adherence to ill-conceived policies and discredited practices if the majority of the juvenile justice caseloads were not poor youth of color?

as running away or truancy, which, while risky and undesirable, pose primarily personal, rather than public safety, risks. During the 1990s, girls' admissions to secure detention rose 50 percent. Clearly, many courts are using detention to
"protect" or provide services to these girls, even though detention centers were neither designed nor equipped to offer meaningful treatment. ${ }^{49}$

## 6. System policies and practices have

## allowed unequal justice to persist.

During adolescence, youth of all races and ethnicities become involved in violence, property crimes, and other delinquent behaviors, with only modest differences in the frequency and severity of their lawbreaking. Specifically, confidential youth surveys show that compared with white youth, African-American teens commit slightly more violent crime ( 36 percent versus 25 percent of boys commit at least one violent offense by age 17 ), ${ }^{50}$ about the same amount of property crime, and less drug crime. ${ }^{51}$ Yet African-American youth are arrested at dramatically higher rates than white youth for all types of crime and, once arrested, they are...

- more likely to be detained;

■ more likely to be formally charged in juvenile court;

- more likely to be placed into a locked correctional facility (and less likely to receive probation), once adjudicated;
- more likely to be waived to adult court; and

■ more likely to be incarcerated in an adult prison, once waived to adult court. ${ }^{52}$

Because they are treated more harshly at each of these stages, African-American teens face an immense cumulative disadvantage. Whereas African Americans comprise just 16 percent of the total juvenile population nationwide, 38 percent of youth in juvenile correctional institutions and 58 percent of youth sentenced to prison are African American. ${ }^{33}$ Citing these data, a National Council on Crime and Delinquency study declared in 2007 that "while equal justice under the law is the foundation of our legal system, and is carved over the entrance to the U.S. Supreme Court, the juvenile justice system is anything but equal for all." ${ }^{34}$

Could these disproportionate outcomes really be just a function of higher offending rates by youth of color? Analyses over the past two decades have repeatedly discounted this explanation. For example, after reviewing more than 150 studies, one leading juvenile justice scholar found "incontrovertible" evidence that racial bias played a part in the overrepresentation of youth of color in the juvenile justice system.
"The issue is no longer simply whether whites and youths of color are treated differently," she wrote. "Instead, the preeminent challenge for scholars is to explain how these differences come about." ${ }^{\text {" }}$ "

Likewise in the mental health, special education, and child welfare systems, youth of color fare worse than white youth. They are more likely than their white peers to be suspended or expelled, and less likely to receive mental health treatment. And, racial and ethnic disparities in child welfare caseloads mean that youth of color suffer disproportionately when these agencies fail to sustain services to their courtinvolved clients.

The evidence of disparate treatment of youth of color in juvenile justice raises a funda-
mental question: Would we be prosecuting more youth in adult courts, confining them in unconstitutional facilities, disregarding the potential power of families to redirect their children, and dumping them into court or detention supposedly to receive treatment if the youth in question were white and privileged? Conversely, how long would society tolerate continued adherence to ill-conceived policies and discredited practices if the majority of the juvenile justice caseloads were not poor youth of color?

## A Road Map for Reform

Our nation's current approach to juvenile justice is costly, discriminatory, dangerous, and ineffective. Fortunately, alternative policies, practices, and programs have emerged that have the potential to fundamentally remake our juvenile justice systems and greatly improve the odds of success for troubled youth. Moreover, most of these alternatives have already been implemented effectively, providing a clear and compelling road map for reform.

## Implement Developmentally

## Appropriate Policies and Interventions

As we noted, virtually every state amended its laws during the 1990 s to increase the number of youth transferred to criminal court and tried as adults. They did so based on the assumptions that trying more youth as adults would reduce crime and that juvenile courts were incapable of handling serious youth offenders. Today, we know that these assumptions were incorrect. Youth tried and punished as adults are more likely to recidivate, and laws to transfer more youth to adult courts and corrections do not lead to lower juvenile crime rates.

Until recently, however, this evidence had not been sufficient to counter the conventional wisdom that, politically speaking, revising these
punitive policies would be unpopular with voters and expose elected officials to charges of being soft on crime. Fortunately, that is beginning to change.

In 2005, the Illinois legislature repealed a provision of its laws that required transfer to the adult system of all youth accused of drug crimes in or around public schools or housing projects. The law had shifted hundreds of 15 - and 16 -year-olds into adult courts. After public hearings revealed that two-thirds of these youth were low-level offenders, and 97 percent were youth of color, the legislature voted unanimously to repeal the mandatory transfer requirement and allow juvenile court judges to decide when transfer is merited in individual cases. ${ }^{56}$ Several other states, including Arizona, Delaware, and Virginia, have also enacted more limited transfer provisions (e.g., which offenses are excluded from juvenile court) during the past 2 years. ${ }^{57}$

In light of new evidence on brain and adolescent development showing that youth are still maturing as late as their early 20 s, some states are considering legislation to raise the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction. Until this year, 3 states (Connecticut, New York, and North Carolina) treated all 16-year-old offenders as adults, while 10 others prosecute and incarcerate 17-year-olds similarly. In a major breakthrough, Connecticut raised the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to 17 in 2007, joining the 37 other states already at this age limit. Because of Connecticut's change, nearly 8,000 accused youthful offenders will now be tried in juvenile courts and, if found delinquent and confined, placed in juvenile, rather than adult, correctional programs. ${ }^{58}$ Illinois and North Carolina are actively considering similar statutory changes.

At present, juveniles can be sentenced to die in prison (that is, serve life without parole) in 42 of 50 states. In 2006, Colorado changed its laws to preclude "life without possibility of parole" for juveniles. Now, several other states are considering similar reforms.

Looking forward, every state should embrace the evidence and sharply limit the number of youth transferred to adult courts. Like Illinois, states should reexamine automatic offense-based transfer provisions and either repeal them outright or at least eliminate those provisions that sweep many first-time or low-level offenders into the adult system. Following the logic applied by the U.S. Supreme Court to ban capital punishment for crimes committed before age 18, all states should consider banning life sentences without parole for crimes committed by juveniles. Finally, given the dire consequences of placing youth on sex offender registries and the lack of any crime prevention benefits, leaders at both the federal and state levels should either repeal rules requiring youth to be listed on permanent registries or-at the very least-limit these listing requirements to youth who've committed the most serious crimes of rape or violent sexual assault.

An effective justice system for youth requires more than reducing transfers to adult courts or raising the age of majority. It also demands more vigorous and comprehensive legal representation. As punishments meted out by juvenile courts have increased, the stakes for courtinvolved youth have gotten much higher. And, since adolescents do not have the same capacities as adults, many can't aid in their own defense or understand their rights as adults do. Finally, many youth in the delinquency court face legal or administrative issues beyond their delinquency cases. They may be in foster care, need special

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education advocacy, or be at risk of eviction from public housing because of an arrest.

Sadly, as the National Juvenile Defender Center has documented in recent reports, few jurisdictions provide adequate defense services for indigent youth in delinquency courts, much less the kind of holistic, sustained representation that these youth need. ${ }^{59}$ At a minimum, states should increase funding and raise their standards for juvenile defender services. Optimally, states and localities should study and emulate the Children and Family Justice Center at Northwestern University Law School, the Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, or Boston College Law School's Juvenile Rights Advocacy Project. These programs offer innovative, comprehensive representation for justiceinvolved youth.

## Reduce Reliance on Secure Confinement

More than 35 years ago, Massachusetts' youth corrections commissioner, Dr. Jerome Miller, grew convinced that large secure institutions were inherently abusive and unsafe, damaged the prospects of young wards, and failed miserably to improve public safery. Virtually overnight, Massachusetts released 1,200 confined youth to community supervision, treatment, and, in a few cases, alternative residential care. Subsequent evaluations revealed that this radical and sudden depopulation did not unleash the predicted juvenile crime wave. In fact, compared to other states, Massachusetts enjoyed equal or lower recidivism rates and significantly reduced public expenditures, years after its secure youth corrections facilities were shut down. ${ }^{60}$

Given their histories of abuse, high recidivism rates, poor youth development outcomes, and huge expense, continued heavy reliance on detention and corrections facilities makes
little objective sense. Only a minority of youth confined in juvenile facilities have offending histories that imply the need for locking them up. An analysis of more than 50,000 youth in 28 states during the 1990 s, for example, found that just 14 percent had committed serious violent offenses. ${ }^{61}$ More recently, a study of the District of Columbia youth corrections systems found that-prior to a major reform effort launched in 2005-just 17 percent of confined youth were serious violent offenders. ${ }^{62}$ Most important, from Massachusetts and a host of other jurisdictions, we now have proof that detention and corrections populations can be reduced substantially without jeopardizing public safely.

The Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) has been the Casey Foundation's flagship juvenile justice reform initiative for 15 years. Today, JDAI is being implemented in half the states and the District of Columbia, in almost 100 local jurisdictions, making it the most widely replicated juvenile justice reform initiative in decades.

Many JDAI sites have dramatically reduced the average daily population in secure detention, in some cases by as much as two-thirds. Employing objective risk-screening instruments, non-secure alternatives-to-detention programs, expedited case processing, and other strategies, local JDAI sites ensure that only those youth who pose significant public safety risks are detained, and only for the time needed to adjudicate their cases.

Many JDAI sites have been able to redeploy taxpayer dollars from detention facility operations to more positive community-based interventions. In Pierce County (Tacoma), Washington, for example, county officials closed 50 beds in their secure facility and allowed the juvenile department to use all of those funds to finance alternatives-to-detention programs.


Detention reform in JDAI sites has had a ripple effect on participating jurisdictions' overall use of confinement: As detention use decreased, so did the numbers of youth committed to state correctional facilities or other out-of-home placements. For example, Cook County (Chicago), Illinois, reduced the number of youth committed to state confinement from more than 900 in 1996 to 400 in 2006, and it slashed the population in group homes and other residential treatment centers from a monthly average of 426 in 1996 to just 10 youth in 2007.

Most JDAI sites have improved their public safety results while reducing confinement. How? They are now better able to identify which youth really pose significant risks, and they are focused on results-implementing policies and practices based on public safety outcomes, not just political rhetoric or programmatic hype.

Recently, a handful of states have sharply reduced their populations in youth corrections, without any noticeable uptick in juvenile crime. California is the most noteworthy example. In 1995, the California Youth Authority (CYA) confined more than 10,000 juveniles in 11 highly secure facilities. When abusive conditions in these facilities were publicly exposed in 2004, many California counties began to cut back on state commitments, with no evidence of sacrifices in public safery. In 2007, with CYA still unable to comply with court-ordered reforms and with costs soaring, the governor and state legislature approved a "realignment" law that precludes state commitments for all but those convicted of the most serious and violent offenses. As a result, by 2010, California's facilities will hold only about 1,500 youngsters, a reduction of 40 percent from 2007 levels and of more than 85 percent from the all-time high. The new law provides California counties with nearly $\$ 100$
million per year to support local programs for the youth who will no longer be committed to state institutions. ${ }^{63}$

In 2002, Louisiana's juvenile corrections agency held approximately 1,600 youth in juvenile facilities that the U.S. Department of Justice declared were "unlawful" and "endanger the health and welfare of the juveniles." An analysis by the Casey Strategic Consulting Group found that many incarcerated youth were low risk, that confinement rates varied widely across the state's parishes, and that youth of color were disproportionately punished. Through a series of reforms, Louisiana reduced its incarcerated population to only 600 youth in 2006 . Though the dislocations caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita make impact measurement complicated, there is no evidence that the decreased corrections population negatively affected Louisianas's juvenile crime rate.

## Increase Reliance on Effective

## Community-Based Services

A responsible reduction of reliance on confinement entails the creation of a continuum of communitybased youth development services and supervision options for delinquent youth. Although all jurisdictions offer probation, it too often amounts to perfunctory supervision and few positive youth development opportunities. Most jurisdictions have some programming, like anger management classes or community service. However, few sites offer an integrated continuum of resources to ensure that youth are placed in programs that improve the odds that they will desist from delinquency and progress personally. Indeed, in most jurisdictions, so-called alternative programs often "widen the net" of social control, rather than responsibly divert youth from confinement.

During the past two decades, a variety of program models have emerged that effectively
expand system options beyond the traditional mainstays of training schools or probation supervision. Most notable are the evidencebased programs: Multisystemic Therapy (MST), Functional Family Therapy (FFT), and Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC). These models have consistently produced far better results, such as lower recidivism and improved school performance, than traditional juvenile justice interventions. They are gradually spreading through state and local mental health and juvenile justice systems and now serve an estimated 40,000 delinquent and otherwise troubled youth per year. ${ }^{64}$ However, even in jurisdictions where such programs have been adopted, they often remain small-scale pilot projects in otherwise unreformed systems.

In addition to these evidence-based programs, an array of other non-residential alternative programs have been implemented over the past couple of decades. These include wraparound services and intensive case management and supervision services, such as those conducted in many jurisdictions by Youth Advocate Programs, Southwest Key, and North American Family Institute. Unfortunately, because the lion's share of juvenile justice funding remains committed to institutional care and traditional probation supervision, these programs typically operate at a modest scale, and they have not been subjected to rigorous evaluations.

Programs alone, however, are not enough. Appending even good programs to fundamentally unsound systems will not work. Alternative programs must be supported by smart decisions, timely case processing, accurate information systems, and quality supervision. An effective continuum of services must be designed strategically. Alternatives to detention, for example, should accomplish detention's main purposes:
maximizing court appearance and minimizing pretrial rearrest rates. Alternatives-to-incarceration programs should focus on a broader range of goals: addressing mental health and substance abuse treatment needs; fostering academic progress; providing youth development opportunities; and, of course, maintaining public safety.

To divert youth from pretrial detention, JDAI sites have demonstrated that a simple continuum of home supervision, day or evening reporting centers, and some shelter beds or foster homes (for youth who can't return home) can make a big difference. When data analyses revealed that many detention beds were occupied by youth who were not complying with their probation orders, Cook County contracted with community organizations to establish a network of evening reporting centers to divert probation violators from detention. The centers are open when youth are most likely to get into trouble (from 3 pm to 9 pm ) and are located in high-need neighborhoods where many courtinvolved youth reside. Cook County reports that about 9 out of 10 youth successfully complete their evening reporting center requirements.

Since launching Project Zero in 2003, the New York City Department of Probation has enrolled more than 1,700 court-involved youth in new alternatives-to-incarceration programs, and it has diverted thousands of misdemeanor offenders from formal prosecution in juvenile court. From 2004 to 2007, the number of incarcerated New York City youth declined 23 percent, and most youth in the new community supervision programs are remaining crime-free and avoiding subsequent placements. Project Zero has saved city taxpayers $\$ 11$ million. ${ }^{65}$ New York City's Administration for Children and Families also launched a new Juvenile Justice Initiative in 2007 to steer
foster youth facing delinquency charges into evidence-based community programs, rather than correctional facilities. Preliminary reports indicate that fewer than 35 percent of the initiative's first 275 youth have been rearrested or violated probation. ${ }^{66}$

Because girls come to juvenile justice through different pathways and have needs different from boys, providing effective genderspecific services is an increasingly important challenge for community programming today. While still an evolving area of practice, some promising models have emerged. One of the earliest and now most experienced agencies, PACE Center for Girls, Inc., uses a strength-based approach and reports positive results, including reduced recidivism and improved school success, employment, and self-sufficiency. PACE believes that one secret to its success is "understanding the relationship between victimization and female juvenile crime, then creating a safe, nurturing environment for these girls." ${ }^{" 7}$ PACE offers education, gender-specific life management skills, and support for strengthening intergenerational ties, plus 3 years of follow-up services.

San Francisco's Center for Young Women's Development (CYWD) is led entirely by young women and works extensively with detained and incarcerated girls. CYWD conducts weekly workshops in juvenile hall, provides case management and courtroom advocacy services to those with active cases, offers reentry seminars and employment opportunities, and provides health and wellness services as part of its overall healing environment. Since its founding, CYWD has served several thousand juvenile justice-involved girls in the Bay Area. Ninety-two percent of participants in CYWD's post-release support groups (known as Sister Circles) did not reenter the juvenile justice system. ${ }^{68}$

A responsible reduction of reliance on confinement entails the creation of a continuum of communitybased youth development services and supervision options for delinquent youth.
In some jurisdictions, family participation in juvenile justice decision making is being ramped up, creating opportunities for system personnel to better understand and take advantage of family strengths in case planning and intervention.

Effective community-based programming is also crucial for youth returning home following a correctional placement. Indeed, this "aftercare" period is one of acute vulnerability, as youth are again exposed to the negative influences that initially led them astray. Yet, in most jurisdictions, meaningful transition support is scarce. Experience shows that even where offered, aftercare services seldom succeed unless they engage families and begin well before the young person exits the correctional facility.

One successful model, Family Integrated Transitions (FIT), serves youth offenders with substance abuse and mental health problems in six Washington state counties. FIT combines the evidence-based, family-focused Multisystemic Therapy model with additional outreach and treatment support both for youth and their families. The program begins working with youth 2 months prior to release and continues for 4 months after release. A 2004 evaluation found that youth who participated in FIT were one-third less likely ( 41 percent versus 27 percent) to be reconvicted of a felony within 18 months of release than youth in a comparison group. The evaluation estimated that FIT saved taxpayers $\$ 3.15$ for every $\$ 1.00$ invested. ${ }^{69}$

## Ensure Safe, Healthy, Constructive

## Conditions of Confinement

No matter how successful the efforts to reduce reliance on secure juvenile detention and corrections facilities or to realign juvenile justice systems, there will remain some youth, and some crimes, requiring some period of confinement. For those youth, and for the staff responsible for their custody and care, we have an obligation to ensure that conditions inside these facilities meet constitutional requirements. Moreover, they should be places where none of
us would fear for the safety and well-being of our own children, were they to be incarcerated.

Given the dismal record compiled by juvenile institutions over the past century, claims for their therapeutic value should always be viewed with skepticism. However, one youth corrections system stands out from the others-the Missouri Division of Youth Services. All of Missouri's facilities are small, most with fewer than 40 beds, and feature "normalized" environments: no cells, no uniforms, no shackles or handcuffs. Youth workers are highly motivated and well trained; most have a college degree; and each youth is assigned a case manager who oversees the case from admission through discharge, ensuring continuity of care and increased accountability for youth outcomes. The network of regional facilities keeps youth close to their families and allows case managers to engage families from the moment of commitment, rather than waiting until shortly before discharge (as is the case in many states). A series of communitybased programs, including day treatment and proctor homes, allow for gradual transitions from institutional care to home life. ${ }^{70}$

With this approach, about 70 percent of Missouri's former wards avoid recommitment to any correctional setting 3 years after discharge, far better than most states, even though Missouri spends less per child on youth corrections than most others. Finally, unlike many states, Missouri's facilities have not been the subject of litigation since the closure of its 650-bed training school more than 25 years ago. ${ }^{71}$ Based on these results, the District of Columbia, Louisiana, and several other jurisdictions have begun implementing the "Missouri model."

Local detention centers, which hold youth for short periods prior to adjudication, face different challenges. To improve these facili-
ties, Casey's JDAI sites have implemented a "self-assessment" approach that combines high standards, increased transparency, and broad stakeholder oversight to identify (or prevent) shortcomings in conditions of confinement. ${ }^{72}$ This new, localized approach to monitoring and addressing conditions of confinement has yet to be carefully evaluated, but its potential seems self-evident: If a broader range of interested parties regularly oversee conditions, it is less likely that the circumstances in detention centers will become dangerous or unhealthy.

Another promising approach to improving conditions of confinement in juvenile institutions involves Performance-based Standards $(\mathrm{PbS})$. Developed by the Council of Juvenile Corrections Administrators (CJCA), PbS is now being implemented in 184 facilities in 28 states. ${ }^{73} \mathrm{PbS}$ is a management tool that provides youth corrections administrators with frequent feedback on key aspects of facility operations. It differs from previous approaches because it focuses on actual performance-what's going on in the facilities-rather than written policies or procedures. PbS tracks key indicators, like the use of restraints or isolation, to monitor what is happening to kids and staff behind the walls, and it gives facility administrators tools and encouragement to continually improve conditions and programming. In 2004, PbS won a prestigious Innovations in American Government Award from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government.

## Strengthen and Empower Families

## to Help Youth Succeed

One of juvenile justice's most self-defeating shortcomings is its disconnection from the families of the youth it serves. The majority of juvenile justice interventions focus only
on the young person, ignoring family context. Systems have long operated as if a 10 -minute office visit, twice a month, could influence a child's behavior more than family members' support and reinforcement.

Fortunately, this situation might be changing. A growing number of jurisdictions are implementing evidence-based programs (MST, FFT, and MTFC) that focus on the family context, seeking to modify youth behavior through changes in family environment and relationships

In some jurisdictions, family participation in juvenile justice decision making is being ramped up, creating opportunities for system personnel to better understand and take advantage of family strengths in case planning and intervention. In Santa Cruz County, California, for example, the local probation agency is using a form of family conferencing, the Placement Screening Committee, to develop dispositional plans in its most serious cases. Families identify their (and their child's) strengths and issues and discuss victim impact and public safety concerns. Then, families receive lists of appropriate resources to develop a comprehensive plan for their children. Santa Cruz personnel report that family-driven dispositional plans are more comprehensive and more likely to be implemented than staff-driven plans. Between 1996 and 2005, Santa Cruz reduced state commitments and residential placements by 71 percent using this type of innovative family-focused planning.

Recently, Santa Cruz began hiring Family Partners to help families navigate the juvenile court and probation systems. Family Partners, all of whom have had children in the juvenile justice system, explain court and probation expectations and procedures, conduct outreach to community programs, and assist families participating in court conferences, among other activities.

In Louisiana, parents have organized themselves to influence that state's juvenile justice reform agenda. A nonprofit organizationFamilies and Friends of Louisiana's Incarcerated Children (FFLIC)—initiated as part of the campaign to close the notoriously dangerous Tallulah Youth Corrections Center, conducts outreach to families; investigates complaints about conditions of confinement; and, most important, serves as the collective voice of parents who otherwise are rarely heard by policymakers or system administrators. FFLIC members routinely testify before government bodies and participate in reform initiatives like JDAI. They also demonstrate; conduct petition campaigns; and generally agitate as needed to bring attention to abuses, injustice, or plain old poor practice.

## Keep Youth Out of the System

Far too many youth end up in the juvenile justice system inappropriately or unnecessarily, either because their needs are not addressed by public systems better positioned to serve them, or because they are prosecuted for relatively minor, common adolescent misbehaviors. What can be done to minimize these inappropriate referrals?

In Bernalillo County (Albuquerque), New Mexico, the juvenile detention center became the de facto service venue for youth with serious emotional and behavioral disorders because the county lacked treatment alternatives. The situation became so acute that half the youth in detention-including many low-level offenders who posed little threat to public safetywere receiving psychotropic medications. Detention director Thomas Swisstack mobilized local leaders, who convinced state officials to amend New Mexico's Medicaid plan and negotiated with a behavioral health managed care provider to establish an outpatient clinic-the Children's


Community Mental Health Clinic-where these youth could be served more appropriately. The clinic is open to all Medicaid-eligible children in the community; however, its greatest impact has been on court-involved youth. The mental health services helped Bernalillo reduce its detention population by 45 percent from 2000 to 2006 . And the money saved by closing detention housing units previously devoted to mental health cases has been reallocated to sustain the clinic.

Though it remains uncommon, a number of localities have demonstrated the benefits of effective coordination between juvenile justice and child welfare agencies. Before the Vera Institute of Justice and the Administration for Children's Services launched Project Confirm in New York City, foster care youth were far more likely than other youth to be detained following arrest. By assigning staff to review new delinquency cases, Project Confirm identified foster care youth early in their detention and took immediate steps to find them new placements. As a result, among those accused of less serious offenses, the disparity in detention rates for foster care and other youth disappeared completely. ${ }^{74}$ In both Tarrant (Fort Worth) and Bexar (San Antonio) counties, in Texas, a Child Protective Services liaison worker is stationed at the local probation office to coordinate services for youth currently in foster care, as well as those with histories of abuse and neglect. They expedite release from detention when no adult appears to take custody of a youth, and they work with court and probation staff to develop appropriate service plans for foster youth who might otherwise penetrate deeper into the justice system. ${ }^{75}$

To prevent youth with special education needs from being pushed out of schools as a result of behavioral problems, the Cook County

Circuit Court's Juvenile Probation and Court Services Department established an Educational Advocacy Unit to help parents receive appropriate individualized education plans for their court-involved children. The unit also monitors cases to ensure that schools are complying with the plans as mandated under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

In five Washington state counties, a legal advocacy project called TeamChild is also reducing inappropriate referrals to juvenile justice. TeamChild staff document the mental health, special education, and other needs of youth at risk of delinquency referrals and help break down any barriers preventing them from accessing services. An early evaluation of TeamChild found that participants were 20 percent less likely than a control group to be arrested for a felony by age $25 .^{76}$

Clayton County, Georgia, a JDAI site, employs an interagency planning process to reduce court involvement and pre-adjudication detention for youth with unmet needs. F.A.S.T. Panels (Finding Alternatives for Safety \& Treatment) comprise juvenile court personnel, service providers, and other stakeholders, who meet each morning. Before detention hearings commence, they review the cases of youth appearing in court that day and determine the supervision, services, and supports needed to safely release youth from secure custody. Parents participate in these conferences, which helps reveal unmet needs and ensure that adults at home are actively monitoring their children's behavior. Release rates at initial detention hearings doubled once the F.A.S.T. Panels started, and Clayton County has reduced its average daily detention population by more than 50 percent.

Clayton County juvenile justice officials have also worked effectively with area schools

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to reduce delinquency referrals. Between 1995 and 2003, school-originated delinquency cases increased tenfold (from fewer than 100 to approximately 1,100 ) as a result of zero tolerance policies. Presiding Juvenile Court Judge Steven Teske presented data to school officials documenting this dramatic caseload growth and demonstrating how court-involved students were more likely to recidivate than those whose disciplinary problems were addressed informally. To help school officials respond to student misbehavior, the judge offered to place probation officers at their facilities and train school personnel in restorative justice interventions. In 2004, the juvenile court and the schools formally established the School Referral Reduction Program. School referrals to the delinquency court have decreased by 68 percent since then.

Finally, though status offenders are now far less likely to be prosecuted in juvenile courts, many jurisdictions continue to bring these cases to court and then detain or incarcerate youngsters who violate court orders. In Multnomah County, Oregon, for instance, law enforcement officers were bringing almost 1,400 legally nondetainable cases to the local detention center each year because they had no other place to take them. To remedy the problem, a local nonprofit youth-serving organization worked with the county Department of Community Justice and police to establish a Juvenile Reception Center. Here, caseworkers, rather than court or probation personnel, address these cases. At the Juvenile Reception Center, youth are reunited with their families and referred to appropriate services, generally without formal court intervention. The center's convenient downtown location enables police officers to quickly return to patrol duties, freeing them from transportation and supervision of misbehaving youth.

## Reduce Racial Disparities

Perhaps the most troubling characteristic of our nation's juvenile justice system is the shameful overrepresentation of youth of color. The problem is pervasive, and has often seemed intractable. Despite two decades of federally funded efforts to reduce "disproportionate minority confinement" and "disproportionate minority contact," most jurisdictions have made little progress beyond repeated documentation of the obvious.

However, through its participation in JDAI, Multnomah County, Oregon, became the first jurisdiction to produce substantial reductions in racial disparities within its juvenile justice system. When Multnomah began JDAI in the mid-1990s, youth of color were approximately 30 percent more likely than white youth to be detained following a delinquency arrest ( 42 percent versus 32 percent). By 2000, detention reforms and persistent leadership had reduced the odds of detention to 22 percent for all youth. ${ }^{77}$

Multnomah County's progress was not accidental. First, the site rigorously implemented a variety of data-driven reforms-such as objective risk screening of arrestees, expedited case processing, and structured responses to probation violations-to eliminate unnecessary or inappropriate use of detention. Next, by repeatedly reviewing system data, disaggregated by race and ethnicity, local leaders identified decision points where racial disparities were prominent and examined the underlying policies and practices that might contribute to them. When structural bias or the exercise of individual discretion placed youth of color at a disadvantage, they made changes, increased quality assurance, and introduced positive reinforcement to emphasize their commitment to racial equity. In addition, Multnomah officials report that determined leadership was critical
in breaking the status quo that perpetuated racial imbalances. ${ }^{78}$

In Santa Cruz County, California, another JDAI site, Latino youth stayed in detention considerably longer than their white counterparts at the project's outset. By examining case processing data, local officials determined that the absence of culturally appropriate dispositional programs for Latino youth was causing the delays. ${ }^{79}$ Once probation officials had built partnerships with Latino organizations to provide relevant dispositional programming, lengths of stay began to equalize, and the average number of Latino youth in detention dropped from 34 in 1998 to 17 in $2007 .{ }^{80}$

Efforts to combat racial inequalities in juvenile justice got a significant boost in 2002 when longtime juvenile justice advocate and civil rights attorney James Bell established the W. Haywood Burns Institute for Juvenile Justice Fairness and Equity, to help jurisdictions eliminate racial disparities in juvenile justice. The Burns Institute has worked in 30 sites nationwide to help local leaders analyze data, determine underlying drivers of disparities, and identify concrete actions to increase cultural competencies and eliminate the structural causes of disparities.

In their efforts to reduce racial disparities through detention reform, JDAI and the Burns Institute have learned a key lesson: To eliminate the disproportionate representation of youth of color in juvenile justice requires disciplined and sustained focus from a broad cross section of leaders (including champions of racial justice and community participants), all committed to reviewing every facet of the juvenile justice process-and every proposed reform strategythrough the lens of racial equity. What does this mean? Implementing data-driven policies and programs, for example, requires statistical
analyses disaggregated by race and ethnicity. Objective screening instruments must be tested for unintended bias. Alternative programs should be geographically placed to enable participation by youth in segregated neighborhoods and operated by culturally competent organizations able to relate to distinct populations. Even conditions of confinement should be examined through this lens lest the staff, services, and physical environment of facilities remain alienating and unfamiliar to the youth in custody. For example, are there bilingual, bicultural staff members? Does the selection of food, personal hygiene products, reading materials, and program activities reflect the diverse backgrounds of all confined youth?

Local officials must also make specific changes to ensure that their systems are culturally attuned to the youth they serve. Our nation's population has grown increasingly diverse, but the workforce serving those youth has not changed similarly. Youth for whom English is not their family's primary language, for example, are disadvantaged when navigating a system that is not multilingual. ${ }^{81}$ Santa Cruz County confronted this very problem when it began detention reform. Today, their probation workforce resembles its client population in race, ethnicity, and language. ${ }^{82}$

Similar efforts must be made to strengthen the legal representation of youth. Youth of color are most likely to be represented by understaffed, underpaid, and undertrained public defenders. Absent effective legal guardians, teenagers cannot exercise their rights, mount strong cases, or advocate effectively for alternatives to incarceration.

## Conclusion

After detailing the dire gaps between evidence and practice in our nation's juvenile justice sys-
tems, we have tried in the second half of this essay to spell out a series of reforms that could advance our nation's approach to juvenile justice. The case for each reform is compelling, but long lists can often be daunting, and their specifics sometimes mask the larger challenges that real change poses. Where to begin?

At the state and local levels, the crucial first ingredients are political will and leadership. Genuine progress requires real champions, as well as a broad commitment from multiple stakeholders and agencies. Otherwise, the narrow interests of individual bureaucracies and political partisanship are likely to prevent agreement on goals, strategies, and results.

Next, leaders must identify a starting point for their efforts. The reforms presented here would be difficult to implement en masse. In participating jurisdictions, our own JDAI has demonstrated the power of an "entry point" strategy: Focus on a particular system problem or issue, whose solution requires the adoption of principles, policies, and practices that can subsequently influence other components of the system. Indeed, one of JDAI's most promising developments has been the momentum it has generated for systemic changes well beyond detention reforms.

Third, change requires a strengthened focus on achieving results and on collecting and analyzing the data required to hold systems accountable for them. In too many jurisdictions, juvenile justice systems are not judged by the progress of their youth or the safety of communities. Funds and staff are provided even when youth recidivate at high rates, facilities remain unsafe, or children encounter racially disparate treatment. Many jurisdictions do not even bother to measure results. When they do, system officials may blame lousy outcomes on the kids,

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disowning responsibility for the policies and practices so often at the heart of system failures. A results focus can change this dynamic, but it often requires investments in information technology and the analytical expertise necessary to use data to inform program improvement and innovation.

Though the policy, practice, and program reforms suggested here are ambitious and complex, they need not be costly. The real challenge in juvenile justice budgeting is not the size of the investments, but rather the quality. For instance, by redeploying existing resources in favor of more cost-effective strategies that produce better results, many JDAI sites have introduced multiple detention reforms without raising their total budgets. Many, in fact, have saved substantial sums.

Success in juvenile justice reform also requires focused efforts to strengthen the juvenile justice workforce. Be they probation officers, detention counselors, or public defenders, juvenile justice workers assume huge responsibilities, often without sufficient training, adequate compensation, or appropriate supports. We cannot substantially improve outcomes for vulnerable children and families if we don't first take the steps needed to recruit, train, and retain a qualified, motivated workforce.

While the "action" in juvenile justice occurs largely at the state and local levels, the federal government can and should make a crucial contribution. Many states and localities lack the financial resources and technical know-how required to embrace needed reforms. They look to the federal government for guidance on how best to tackle juvenile justice challenges.

Since youth crime receded and the September 11 th attacks transfixed the nation, the federal government's role in juvenile justice has
suffered from inattention and drift. Funding levels have dropped precipitously; many remaining resources have been allocated to pet projects, rather than innovative programs; and the output of meaningful new federally funded research has slowed to a trickle. State plans, regardless of logic or outcomes, often fit easily under the broad umbrella of federal funding rules.

Fortunately, the key federal law guiding juvenile justice policy-the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) -is due to be reauthorized this year, offering a timely opportunity for political leaders to rethink and reinvigorate the federal government's role. As they draft the reauthorization, legislators should expand the federal government's efforts to disseminate evidence about, and encourage state implementation of, effective programs and practices.

Federal funding for juvenile justice should be substantially increased, and it should be targeted to support successful strategies and costeffective programs. In addition, JJDPA should require meaningful outcome measurements for all programs financed with federal dollars; ban the use of federal funds to support models that have been proven ineffective; support state and local research and evaluation efforts; and encourage all states to measure recidivism of youth released from correctional facilities in a consistent manner. The federal government should also study the feasibility of a uniform data collection system to provide juvenile justice researchers and policymakers with information essential to good planning and practice.

Next, the federal government should promote aggressive efforts to reverse the persistent injustice of disproportionate treatment of minority youth and to reduce the alarming levels of abuse in correctional custody. The core mandate in JJDPA for states to "address" disproportionate
treatment should be strengthened and clarified, requiring states to analyze each stage of the juvenile court process and develop corrective action plans to reduce disparate outcomes. Federal legislation that currently inhibits litigation over conditions of confinement in juvenile institutions should also be changed. A strengthened federal juvenile justice act might require states to collect and report data on violent incidents inside youth corrections facilities, submit to outside monitoring, and adhere to performancebased standards.

Finally, Congress should reinforce its commitment to the original core protections of the JJDPA—deinstitutionalization of status offenders, separation of juveniles from adult offenders and adult facilities-and expand efforts to strengthen the juvenile justice workforce.

Whatever role the federal government plays in promoting reform, however, the ultimate responsibility lies with the state and local leaders who operate our nation's juvenile courts and corrections systems, along with their partnering community agencies and organizations. Only state and local leaders can seize the opportunities offered by our new knowledge about delinquency and its causes, our new insights into what works and doesn't work, and our new understanding of how to replicate model programs and accomplish major systems reforms. Only they can put this wealth of information to use and finally, more than a century after the founding of the juvenile court, realize the court's noble vision as a place where youth receive a measure of justice worthy of the name.

## Douglas W. Nelson

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1. Data on juvenile arrests, court referrals, and youth in confinement taken from the website of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Statistical Briefing Book, available at http://ojijdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/ index.html (accessed 4/8/08). Data on the number of youth detention centers annually is derived by combining official statistics on the number of youth initially assigned to pretrial detention (taken from the OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book) with an experience-based estimate on he number of youth placed into detention facilities at later stages of the juvenile court process for purposes of assessment, hort-term confinement pending or court-ordered detent facility ronse to proderion. and failures to appear in court.
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SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

The broad array of data we present each year in the KIDS COUNT Data Book is intended to illuminate the status of America's children and to assess trends in their well-being. By updating the assessment every year, KIDS COUNT provides ongoing benchmarks that can be used to see how states have advanced or regressed over time. Readers can also use KIDS COUNT to compare the status of children in their state with those in other states across several dimensions of child well-being.

Athough the 10 measures used in KIDS COUNT to rank states can hardly capture the full range of conditions shaping kids' lives, we believe these indicators possess three important attributes: (1) They reflect a wide range of factors affecting the well-being of children, such as health, adequacy of income, and educational attainment. (2) They reflect experiences across a range of developmental stages-from birth through early adulthood. (3) They permit legitimate comparisons because they are consistent across states and over time. Research shows that the 10 KIDS COUNT key indicators capture most of the yearly variation in child well-being reflected in other indices that utilize a much larger number of indicators. For more information about the criteria used to select KIDS COUNT indicators, see page 190.

The 10 indicators used to rank states reflect a developmental perspective on childhood and underscore our goal to build a world where pregnant women and newborns thrive; infants and young children receive the support they need to enter school prepared to learn; children succeed in school; adolescents choose healthy behaviors; and young people experience a successful transition into adulthood. In all of these stages of development, young people need the economic and social assistance provided by a strong family and a supportive community.

As the KIDS COUNT Data Book has developed over time, some of the indicators used to rank states have changed because we replaced weaker measures with stronger ones. Consequently, comparing rankings in the 2008 Data Book to rankings in past Data Books does not always provide a perfect assessment of change over time. However, Appendix 2 shows how states would have ranked in past years if we had employed the same 10 measures used in the 2008 Data Book. The table in Appendix 2 is the best way to assess state changes over time in overall child well-being.

## Variations in Child Well-Being

## by Race and Ethnicity

Not all children have the same opportunities to succeed. Some children, particularly children of color, face greater barriers to achieving success as they move through childhood and adolescence. Table 1 provides national statistics for five large racial and ethnic groups on each of the 10 measures of child well-being used to rank states. Over the next year, we will be working to include state-level data for these racial and ethnic groups for our 10 key indicators at the KIDS COUNT Data Center (www.kidscount.org/datacenter).
table 110 Key Indicators of Child Well-Being by Race and Hispanic Origin Status: 2005/2006

| Key Indicators |  | National AVERAGE | NONHISPANIC WHITE | BLACK/ AFRICAN AMERICAN | ASIAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER | AMERICAN ALASKAN native | HISPANIC/ LATINO |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Percent low-birthweight babies | 2005 | 8.2 | 7.3 | 13.6 | 8.0 | 7.4 | 6.9 |
| Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) | 2005 | 6.9 | 5.7 | 13.7 | 3.8 | 8.0 | 5.8 |
| Child death rate (deaths per 100,000 children ages $1-14$ ) | 2005 | 20 | 18 | 29 | 15 | 29 | 18 |
| Teen death rate (deaths per 100,000 teens ages 15-19) | 2005 | 65 | 60 | 84 | 34 | 94 | 67 |
| Teen birth rate (births per 1,000 females ages 15-19) | 2005 | 40 | 26 | 62 | 17 | 53 | 82 |
| Percent of teens who are high school dropouts (ages 16-19)* | 2006 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 11 | 12 |
| Percent of teens not attending school and not working (ages 16-19)* | 2006 | 8 | 6 | 12 | 4 | 16 | 11 |
| Percent of children living in families where no parent has full-time, year-round employment* | 2006 | 33 | 27 | 50 | 29 | 53 | 37 |
| Percent of children in poverty (income below \$20,444 for a family of two adults and two children in 2006)* | 2006 | 18 | 11 | 35 | 12 | 35 | 28 |
| Percent of children in single-parent families* | 2006 | 32 | 23 | 65 | 16 | 49 | 37 |

[^0]Nationally, the differences in child wellbeing across racial and ethnic lines vary by indicator. Our ability to progress as a nation depends on the degree to which we can create opportunities for all children to succeed. In fact, nationally, since 2000, gaps in the differences in child well-being along racial and ethnic lines have decreased in some areas-most notably the high school dropout rate. However, on the whole, non-Hispanic white children continue to have greater opportunities for better outcomes compared with most other racial and ethnic groups. Comparative data from 2000 for the information contained in Table 1 can be found at the KIDS COUNT Data Center (www.kidscount.org/datacenter).

## KIDS COUNT State Indicators

In the pages that follow, the most recent figures are compared with corresponding data from 2000 to assess the trends over time in each state. To provide a fuller picture of children's lives and a framework for better understanding the 10 key indicators of child well-being used to rank states, several background measures are provided for each state, including measures that reflect children in the juvenile justice system.

The 10 key indicators of child well-being used here are all derived from federal government statistical agencies and reflect the best available state-level data for tracking yearly changes in each indicator. However, it is important to recognize that many of the indicators used here are derived from samples, and like all sample data, they contain some random error. Other measures (the Infant Mortality Rate and the Child Death Rate, for example) are based on relatively small numbers of events in some states and may exhibit some random fluctuation
from year to year. Therefore, we urge readers to focus on relatively large differences-both across states and over time within a state. Small differences, within a state over time or between states, may simply reflect random fluctuations, rather than real changes in the well-being of children. Assessing trends by looking at changes over a longer period of time is more reliable. Yearly data since 2000 for each state are presented in Appendix 1.

We include data for the District of Columbia in the Data Book, but we do not include the District in our state rankings because it is so different from any state that the comparisons are not meaningful. It is more useful to look at changes within the District of Columbia since 2000, or to compare the District with other large cities. As of January 2008, data for many child well-being indicators for the 50 largest cities (including the District) are available at the KIDS COUNT Data Center (www.kidscount.org/datacenter). This year's KIDS COUNT Data Book also includes data for Puerto Rico (see page 36). Information for the U.S. Virgin Islands was not available in time to be included in this year's publication, but limited information is available at the KIDS COUNT Data Center.

## National Trends in Child Well-Being

The data on the following pages present a rich but complex picture of American children. Some dimensions of well-being improved, some worsened, and some showed little change. However, the overriding picture that these 10 indicators present is one of little change since 2000. (See the USA Profile on page 62.) At the national level, 5 of the 10 indicators of child well-being showed that conditions improved since 2000,
while child well-being worsened on 4 indicators and stayed the same on 1 indicator. It should be noted, however, that many of these changes were very small and may be random fluctuations in the data. The portrait of child well-being varies among states, and state-level measures often mask important differences within a state. Additional information on child well-being for cities, counties, school districts, and other levels of geography can be found at the online data systems available at www.kidscount.org, including the KIDS COUNT Data Center (www.kidscount.org/datacenter) and the Community-Level Information on Kids System, or CLIKS (www.kidscount.org/cliks).

The portrait of change in child well-being since 2000 stands in stark contrast to the period just prior to 2000. Between 1996 and 2000, 8 of the 10 key indicators used in KIDS COUNT improved, and several improved dramatically. The improvement was experienced by every major racial group and in nearly all of the states.

Pre- and post-2000 trends are clearly illustrated by changes in the rate of child poverty since the mid-1990s. Between 1994 and 2000, the child poverty rate fell by 30 percent. This was the largest decrease in child poverty since the 1960s. Since 2000, however, improvements have stalled. In fact, the child poverty rate has increased by 6 percent, meaning 1 million more children in poverty in 2006 than in 2000.

Table 2 provides a summary of results from this year's KIDS COUNT Data Book and highlights the enormous variation among the states. The rates of the worst states are approximately two to four times those of the best states on every indicator.

The importance of reporting state-level data is underscored by the fact that most measures in most states are statistically significantly different from the national value for each measure. In other words, the national value for a measure does not tell you much about most states. Tables showing the statistical significance of differences among states and changes over time are provided through the KIDS COUNT Data Center (www.kidscount.org/datacenter).

The KIDS COUNT Data Book utilizes rates and percentages because that is the best way to compare states to each other and to assess changes over time within a state. However, our focus on rates and percentages may mask the magnitude of some of the problems that are examined in this report. The number of events or number of children reflected in each of the national rates for the 10 key indicators used to rank states are provided on corresponding indicator pages. These data underscore the fact that thousands of children die every year, and millions are at risk because of poverty, family structure, lack of parental employment, or risky behavior. Similar data showing the numbers behind the state rates are offered in Appendix 1 and at the KIDS COUNT Data Center.

## table 2 Highest and Lowest Ranking States

| Key Indicators |  | HIGHEST <br> RANKING VALUE | HIGHEST <br> RANKING <br> STATE(S) | LOWEST Ranking VALUE | LOWEST <br> RANKING STATE(S) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Percent low-birthweight babies | 2005 | 6.1 | Alaska, Oregon, Washington | 11.8 | Mississippi |
| Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) | 2005 | 4.5 | Utah | 11.3 | Mississippi |
| Child death rate (deaths per 100,000 children ages $1-14$ ) | 2005 | 8 | New Hampshire | 34 | Louisiana |
| Teen death rate (deaths per 100,000 teens ages 15-19) | 2005 | 37 | Hawaii | 103 | Lovisiana, Wyoming |
| Teen birth rate (births per 1,000 females ages 15-19) | 2005 | 18 | New Hampshire | 62 | New Mexico, Texas |
| Percent of teens who are high school dropouts (ages 16-19) | 2006 | 3 | North Dakota | 11 | Lovisiana |
| Percent of teens not attending school and not working (ages 16-19) | 2006 | 4 | Hew Hampshire | 12 | Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico |
| Percent of children living in families where no parent has full-time, year-round employment | 2006 | 24 | North Dakota | 43 | Lovisiana |
| Percent of children in poverty (income below $\$ 20,444$ for a family of two adults and two children in 2006) | 2006 | 10 | Maryland, New Hampshire | 30 | Mississippi |
| Percent of children in single-parent families | 2006 | 18 | Utah | 45 | Mississippi |

Beginning in 2007, data on child well-being for children living on the island of Puerto Rico have been included in the KIDS COUNT Data Book. The data for Puerto Rico come from the same data sources as the information we include for the 50 states and the District of Columbia. As data have only been available recently for all 10 indicators, we are unable to include information on trends in this year's Data Book. In addition, we do not include Puerto Rico in our state rankings, as comparisons with states are not meaningful on many indicators. Currently, data for these indicators are not available for the U.S. Virgin Islands, although we hope to have information from the Virgin Islands Community Survey for inclusion in the future.

- In 2006, there were an estimated 1 million children on the island of Puerto Rico. This represents a larger child population than that of about half of the states in the United States.
- On 8 of the 10 key measures of child wellbeing, these children face higher levels of risk overall than the U.S. average.
- The child poverty rate for Puerto Rico (56 percent) is more than three times the level in the United States as a whole ( 18 percent).
- Babies born in Puerto Rico are far more likely to be of low birthweight (12.8 percent) and born to teen mothers ( 61 births per 1,000 females ages 15 to 19) than in the U.S. overall ( 8.2 percent and 40 per 1,000 , respectively).
- However, the rate of deaths among children ages 1 to $14(13$ per 100,000$)$ and teens ages 15 to 19 ( 63 per 100,000 ) are both lower than the national rates.
table 310 Key Indicators of Child Well-Being in Puerto Rico: 2005/2006

| Key Indicators |  | PUERTO RICO NUMBER | PUERTO R RATE | U.S. RATE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Percent low-birthweight babies | 2005 | 6,470 | 12.8 | 8.2 |
| Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) | 2005 | 466 | 9.2 | 6.9 |
| Child death rate (deaths per 100,000 children ages 1-14) | 2005 | 107 | 13 | 20 |
| Teen death rate (deaths per 100,000 teens ages $15-19$ ) | 2005 | 188 | 63 | 65 |
| Teen birth rate (births per 1,000 females ages 15-19) | 2005 | 8,968 | 61 | 40 |
| Percent of teens who are high school dropouts (ages 16-19) | 2006 | 20,223 | 9 | 7 |
| Percent of teens not attending school and not working (ages 16-19) | 2006 | 33,637 | 14 | 8 |
| Percent of children living in families where no parent has full-time, year-round employment | 2006 | 561,220 | 55 | 33 |
| Percent of children in poverty (income below $\$ 20,444$ for a family of two adults and two children in 2006) | 2006 | 555,375 | 56 | 18 |
| Percent of children in single-parent families | 2006 | 435,563 | 47 | 32 |

## Ranking States on Composite Index

Data from all 10 key indicators are used to develop a composite index of child well-being for each state. The Overall Rank Table and Map show how states rank, based on the 10-item index.

The state that ranks highest (best), based on the composite index, is New Hampshire. Minnesota ranks second, and Massachusetts ranks third. The three states at the bottom of the ranking are Mississippi, Louisiana, and New Mexico.

The Overall Rank Map also reflects a couple of regional overtones. The New England states and a group of states in the Northern Plains all rank relatively high. Except for Maine and Rhode Island, all of the New England states rank in the top 10. In the Northern Plains, lowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wisconsin are all ranked in the top 12 .

At the other end of the spectrum, states in the South and Southwest dominate the lower part of the ranking. Except for West Virginia, the 10 states with the lowest Overall Rank in terms of child well-being are all located in the South or Southwest.


| Rank | State | Rank | State |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | New Hampshire | 27 | Michigan |
| 2 | Minnesota | 28 | Colorado |
| 3 | Massachusetts | 29 | Montana |
| 4 | Connecticut | 30 | Ohio |
| 5 | Utah | 31 | Alaska |
| 6 | New Jersey | 32 | Missouri |
| 7 | North Dakota | 33 | Delaware |
| 8 | lowa | 34 | Indiana |
| 9 | Nebraska | 35 | Florida |
| 10 | Vermont | 36 | Nevada |
| 11 | Washington | 37 | Texas |
| 12 | Wisconsin | 38 | North Carolina |
| 13 | Hawaii | 39 | Arizona |
| 14 | Idaho | 40 | Georgia |
| 15 | Virginia | 41 | Kentucky |
| 16 | Maine | 42 | Tennessee |
| 17 | Oregon | 43 | Oklahoma |
| 18 | Kansas | 44 | West Virginia |
| 19 | Maryland | 45 | Arkansas |
| 20 | New York | 46 | South Carolina |
| 21 | Rhode Island | 47 | Alabama |
| 22 | California | 48 | New Mexico |
| 23 | Pennsylvania | 49 | Louisiana |
| 24 | Illinois | 50 | Mississippi |
| 25 | South Dakota | N.R. | District of |
| 26 | Wyoming |  | Columbia |

## Percent Low-Birthweight Babies

| Percent Low-Birth Race and Hispan | $005$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| National Average | 8.2 |  |
| Non-Hispanic White | 7.3 |  |
| Black/African American |  | 13.6 |
| Asian and Pacific Islander | 8.0 |  |
| American Indian and Alaskan Native | 7.4 |  |
| Hispanic/Latino | 6.9 |  |
| NOTE: Data for Blacks/African Americans, Asians and Pacific Islanders, and American Indians and Alaskan Natives include those who are also Hispanic/Latino. |  |  |

Newborn babies remind us of the potential that exists in every new generation. Yet, some newborns face stiffer odds than other babies to thrive. Babies weighing less than 2,500 grams (about 5.5 pounds) at birth have a high probability of experiencing developmental problems. Low-birthweight infants are at greater risk of dying within the first year of life and of experiencing both short- and long-term disabilities than those with a higher birthweight. Although recent increases in multiple births have strongly influenced the rise in rates of low-birthweight babies, rates have also been higher among singleton deliveries.

- Nationally, 338,565 babies were born weighing less than 2,500 grams in 2005. Low-birthweight babies were 8.2 percent of all births in 2005, compared to 7.6 percent in 2000. This represents an 8 percent increase in low-weight births over the 2000 to 2005 period and is now at the highest level in nearly 40 years.
- Between 2000 and 2005, the percent of lowbirthweight babies worsened in 47 states and improved in only 1 state, Arizona, and in the District of Columbia. The indicator did not change in Idaho and North Dakota.
- Of the low-birthweight babies born in 2005, 61,788 were very low-birthweight (less than 1,500 grams, or 3.25 pounds). These babies are among the most vulnerable as nearly one out of four babies born very low-birthweight did not survive their first year of life in 2004 .
■ Between 2000 and 2005, the level of lowbirthweight babies rose for all five of the largest racial and ethnic groups.

For more information
on low-birthweight babies,
visit the Indicator Briefs
and Definitions sections at
www.kidscount.org/datacenter.

## Percent Low-Birthweight Babies: 2005*

More than $20 \%$ better than state median ( 6.6 and lower)
Up to $20 \%$ better than state median (6.7 to 8.2)

Up to $20 \%$ worse than state median (8.3 to 9.8)
More than $20 \%$ worse than state median ( 9.9 and higher)

* Babies weighing less than 2,500 grams (5.5 pounds) at birth.

| Rank | State | Rate | Rank | State | Rate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Alaska | 6.1 | 27 | Indiana | 8.3 |
| 1 | Oregon | 6.1 | 27 | Michigan | 8.3 |
| 1 | Washington | 6.1 | 27 | Nevada | 8.3 |
| 4 | Vermont | 6.2 | 27 | New York | 8.3 |
| 5 | North Dakota | 6.4 | 27 | Texas | 8.3 |
| 6 | Minnesota | 6.5 | 32 | Pennsylvania | 8.4 |
| 7 | Montana | 6.6 | 33 | Illinois | 8.5 |
| 7 | South Dakota | 6.6 | 33 | New Mexico | 8.5 |
| 9 | Idaho | 6.7 | 35 | Wyoming | 8.6 |
| 10 | Maine | 6.8 | 36 | Florida | 8.7 |
| 10 | Utah | 6.8 | 36 | Ohio | 8.7 |
| 12 | Arizona | 6.9 | 38 | Arkansas | 8.9 |
| 12 | California | 6.9 | 39 | Kentucky | 9.1 |
| 14 | Nebraska | 7.0 | 39 | Maryland | 9.1 |
| 14 | New Hampshire | 7.0 | 41 | Colorado | 9.2 |
| 14 | Wisconsin | 7.0 | 41 | North Carolina | 9.2 |
| 17 | lowa | 7.2 | 43 | Delaware | 9.5 |
| 17 | Kansas | 7.2 | 43 | Georgia | 9.5 |
| 19 | Rhode Island | 7.8 | 43 | Tennessee | 9.5 |
| 20 | Massachusetts | 7.9 | 46 | West Virginia | 9.6 |
| 21 | Connecticut | 8.0 | 47 | South Carolina | 10.2 |
| 21 | Oklahoma | 8.0 | 48 | Alabama | 10.7 |
| 23 | Missouri | 8.1 | 49 | Lovisiana | 11.5 |
| 24 | Hawaii | 8.2 | 50 | Mississippi | 11.8 |
| 24 | New Jersey | 8.2 | N.R. | District of |  |
| 24 | Virginia | 8.2 |  | Columbia | 11.2 |

## Infant Mortality Rate



Since the first year of life is more precarious than later years of childhood, negative social conditions (such as poverty and an unhealthy physical environmentt have a bigger impact on newborns. The number of children who die before their first birthday is reflected in the Infant Mortality Rate, defined as the number of deaths to persons less than 1 year old per 1,000 live births during the year. After several decades of constantly falling infant mortality rates, improvement has stalled. The Infant Mortality Rate in 2005 is the same as it was in 2000. In fact, between 2001 and 2002, the Infant Mortality Rate increased for the first time in nearly 50 years.

- During 2005, 28,440 infants under age 1 died in the United States, about 78 each day. This represents 6.9 deaths per 1,000 live births.
- Between 2000 and 2005, the Infant Mortality Rate improved in 25 states, was unchanged in 2 others, and deteriorated in 23 states and the District of Columbia.
- Among the states, the Infant Mortality Rate in 2005 ranged from a low of 4.5 in Utah to a high of 11.3 in Mississippi. However, some rates are based on a relatively small number of infant deaths and may not be a very good gauge of the underlying risk of death.
- According to a recent report by UNICEF's Innocenti Research Center, the United States has the second highest Infant Mortality Rate among all economically advanced nations. The Infant Mortality Rate for AfricanAmerican children in 2005 ( 13.7 deaths per 1,000 births) is on par with such countries as Uruguay, Serbia, and Panama.

For more information on infant
mortality, visit the Indicator
Briefs and Definitions sections
at www.kidscount.org/datacenter.

## Infant Mortality Rate (deaths per 1,000 live births): 2005

More than $20 \%$ better than state median ( 5.4 and lower)
Up to $20 \%$ better than state median ( 5.5 to 6.8 )

Up to $20 \%$ worse than state median (6.9 to 8.2)
More than $20 \%$ worse than state median ( 8.3 and higher)

| Rank | State | Rate | Rank | State | Rate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Utah | 4.5 | 26 | Maine | 6.9 |
| 2 | Minnesota | 5.1 | 28 | Montana | 7.0 |
| 2 | Washington | 5.1 | 29 | Florida | 7.2 |
| 4 | Massachusetts | 5.2 | 29 | South Dakota | 7.2 |
| 4 | New Jersey | 5.2 | 31 | Maryland | 7.3 |
| 6 | California | 5.3 | 31 | Pennsylvania | 7.3 |
| 6 | lowa | 5.3 | 33 | Illinois | 7.4 |
| 6 | New Hampshire | 5.3 | 33 | Kansus | 7.4 |
| 9 | Nebraska | 5.6 | 35 | Missouri | 7.5 |
| 10 | Connecticut | 5.8 | 35 | Virginia | 7.5 |
| 10 | Nevada | 5.8 | 37 | Arkansas | 7.9 |
| 10 | New York | 5.8 | 37 | Michigan | 7.9 |
| 13 | Alaska | 5.9 | 39 | Indiana | 8.0 |
| 13 | Oregon | 5.9 | 40 | Oklahoma | 8.1 |
| 15 | North Dakota | 6.0 | 40 | West Virginia | 8.1 |
| 16 | Idaho | 6.1 | 42 | Georgia | 8.2 |
| 16 | New Mexico | 6.1 | 43 | Ohio | 8.3 |
| 18 | Colorado | 6.4 | 44 | North Carolina | 8.8 |
| 19 | Hawaii | 6.5 | 45 | Tennessee | 8.9 |
| 19 | Rhode Island | 6.5 | 46 | Delaware | 9.0 |
| 21 | Kentucky | 6.6 | 47 | Alabama | 9.4 |
| 21 | Texas | 6.6 | 47 | South Carolina | 9.4 |
| 21 | Wisconsin | 6.6 | 49 | Louisiana | 10.1 |
| 24 | Vermont | 6.7 | 50 | Mississippi | 11.3 |
| 25 | Wyoming | 6.8 | N.R. | District of |  |
| 26 | Arizona | 6.9 |  | Columbia | 14.1 |

## Child Death Rate



The Child Death Rate (deaths per 100,000 children ages 1-14) has fallen steadily for the past several years, in large part because of advances in medical care. The general decrease in deaths from motor vehicle accidents, which accounted for one out of five child deaths in 2005, also has contributed to a declining Child Death Rate.

The leading cause of death for children ages 1 to 14 is unintentional injury. However, the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control reports that for each injury-related death in 2005, there were more than 1,400 injury-related emergency room visits and about 23 hospital admissions for children who survived their injuries.

Many young children die in automobile accidents because they are not wearing a seat belt. Nearly half of the children under age 15 who died in traffic crashes were not wearing a seat belt or other restraint.

- During 2005, 11,358 children between the ages of 1 and 14 died in the United States, an average of 31 deaths per day.
■ The Child Death Rate inched downward from 22 out of every 100,000 children in this age range in 2000 , to 20 deaths per 100,000 in 2005.
- Between 2000 and 2005, the Child Death Rate decreased in 35 states and the District of Columbia, while increasing in 11 states. In 4 states, the rate was unchanged.
- The Child Death Rate in 2005 ranged from 8 in New Hampshire to 34 in Louisiana.
- The Child Death Rates for American Indians and Alaskan Natives and African Americans (29 deaths per 100,000) are the highest of all major racial and ethnic groups.

For more information on
child death, visit the Indicator
Briefs and Definitions sections
at www.kidscount.org/datacenter.
More than $20 \%$ better than state median (17 and lower)
Up to $20 \%$ better than state median (18 to 21)
Up to $20 \%$ worse than state median (22 to 25 )
More than $20 \%$ worse than state median (26 and higher)

| Rank | State | Rate | Rank | State | Rate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | New Hampshire | 8 | 27 | Florida | 22 |
| 2 | Massachusetts | 10 | 27 | Georgia | 22 |
| 3 | Connecticut | 14 | 27 | Nebraska | 22 |
| 3 | New Jersey | 14 | 27 | Utah | 22 |
| 5 | Minnesota | 15 | 31 | Idaho | 23 |
| 6 | Hawaii | 16 | 31 | Kansas | 23 |
| 6 | Maryland | 16 | 31 | North Dakota | 23 |
| 6 | New York | 16 | 34 | Alaska | 24 |
| 6 | Washington | 16 | 34 | Arizona | 24 |
| 10 | California | 17 | 34 | Nevada | 24 |
| 10 | Illinois | 17 | 34 | Tennessee | 24 |
| 12 | Delaware | 18 | 38 | Indiana | 25 |
| 12 | Maine | 18 | 38 | Kentucky | 25 |
| 12 | Oregon | 18 | 38 | Montana | 25 |
| 15 | lowa | 19 | 38 | South Carolina | 25 |
| 15 | Pennsylvania | 19 | 42 | Alabama | 26 |
| 15 | Virginia | 19 | 42 | Vermont | 26 |
| 18 | Ohio | 20 | 42 | West Virginia | 26 |
| 18 | Rhode Island | 20 | 45 | Oklahoma | 28 |
| 18 | Wisconsin | 20 | 46 | Arkansas | 29 |
| 18 | Wyoming | 20 | 46 | South Dakota | 29 |
| 22 | Colorado | 21 | 48 | New Mexico | 31 |
| 22 | Michigan | 21 | 49 | Mississippi | 33 |
| 22 | Missouri | 21 | 50 | Lovisiana | 34 |
| 22 | North Carolina Texas | 21 21 | N.R. | District of Columbia | 24 |

## Teen Death Rate



Islanders, and American Indians and Alaskan Natives include
those who are also Hispanic/Latino.

As people move into their middle and late teenage years, they encounter many new risks that can cost them their life. The Teen Death Rate reflects deaths among 15- to 19-year-olds (per 100,000 teens in this age group) from all causes. It is worth noting that deaths from accidents, homicides, and suicides accounted for 75 percent of all deaths in this age group in 2005 .

Accidents continue to account for at least three times as many teen deaths as any other single cause, including homicide. Most of the lethal accidents are automobile accidents. In 2005, 6,616 teens died due to accidents ( 4,967 deaths were due to motor vehicle accidents), 2,076 teen deaths were due to homicide, and 1,613 teen deaths were due to suicide.

- In 2005, 13,703 adolescents ages 15 to 19 died, and this is the equivalent of the number of passengers on 39 jumbo jets. Virtually all of these deaths were preventable.
- The Teen Death Rate inched downward from 67 deaths per 100,000 teens in 2000 to 65 deaths in 2005. The Teen Death Rate had been steadily declining between 1990 and about 1998, when progress began to slow. In 2005, the Teen Death Rate was only slightly lower than in 1998.

■ Between 2000 and 2005, the Teen Death Rate declined in 32 states, increased in 13 states (and the District of Columbia), and remained unchanged in 5.

- Among the states, the Teen Death Rate in 2005 ranged from a low of 37 in Hawaii to a high of 103 in Louisiana and Wyoming.
- The Teen Death Rate for American Indians and Alaskan Natives is 45 percent higher than the national average.

[^1]
## Teen Death Rate (deaths per 100,000 teens ages 15-19): 2005

More than $20 \%$ better than state median ( 53 and lower)
Up to $20 \%$ better than state median ( 54 to 66 )
Up to $20 \%$ worse than state median ( 67 to 79 )
More than $20 \%$ worse than state median ( 80 and higher)

| Rank | State | Rate | Rank | State | Rate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Hawaii | 37 | 24 | Texas | 66 |
| 2 | Rhode Island | 39 | 28 | Pennsylvania | 67 |
| 3 | Massachusetts | 41 | 29 | Vermont | 68 |
| 4 | Connecticut | 43 | 30 | North Carolina | 70 |
| 5 | New Jersey | 45 | 31 | Georgia | 71 |
| 5 | New York | 45 | 32 | Florida | 75 |
| 7 | Minnesota | 49 | 32 | Nevada | 75 |
| 8 | Oregon | 51 | 34 | Tennessee | 79 |
| 9 | Washington | 53 | 35 | North Dakota | 80 |
| 10 | New Hampshire | 55 | 36 | Alaska | 83 |
| 11 | Idaho | 56 | 36 | Kentucky | 83 |
| 11 | Utah | 56 | 38 | Missouri | 84 |
| 13 | Michigan | 57 | 38 | South Carolina | 84 |
| 13 | Virginia | 57 | 40 | Arizona | 87 |
| 15 | Delaware | 58 | 40 | Montana | 87 |
| 16 | California | 60 | 40 | New Mexico | 87 |
| 16 | Colorado | 60 | 40 | West Virginia | 87 |
| 18 | Ohio | 61 | 44 | Alabama | 88 |
| 19 | Illinois | 62 | 45 | Oklahoma | 90 |
| 20 | Maine | 63 | 46 | Arkansas | 94 |
| 21 | Indiana | 64 | 47 | South Dakota | 96 |
| 21 | Wisconsin | 64 | 48 | Mississippi | 101 |
| 23 | Nebraska | 65 | 49 | Lovisiana | 103 |
| 24 | lowa | 66 | 49 | Wyoming | 103 |
| 24 | Kansus <br> Maryland | 66 66 | N.R. | District of Columbia | 173 |

## Teen Birth Rate



As Americans, we believe that every child should have a shot at achieving their full potential: getting a good education, securing a job that pays well, and raising a family of their own. But not all children have these opportunities. Teenage childbearing can have long-term negative effects on both the adolescent mother and the newborn. Babies born to teen mothers are at higher risk of being low-birthweight and preterm. They are also far more likely to be born into families with limited educational and economic resources.

Nationally, the Teen Birth Rate fell from 48 births per 1,000 females ages 15 to 19 in 2000 to a record-low 40 births per 1,000 teen females in this age range in 2005. Teen pregnancy rates and teen abortion rates have been falling as well. Although large gaps still exist, the decline in the Teen Birth Rate over this period was reflected among every major racial and ethnic group. It is worth noting, however, that preliminary data for 2006 show the possibility of an increase in the Teen Birth Rate for the first time in a decade.

- In 2005, there were 414,593 babies born to females ages 15 to 19 . That averaged to about 1,136 births to teens each day.
- The 2005 rate of 40 births per 1,000 teens represents a drop of 17 percent from 2000. However, the United States still has one of the highest adolescent fertility rates among economically advanced nations.
- Between 2000 and 2005, the Teen Birth Rate decreased in 47 states, was unchanged in South Dakota, and increased only in North Dakota, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia.
- Among the states, the Teen Birth Rate in 2005 ranged from a low of 18 in New Hampshire to a high of 62 in New Mexico and Texas.

[^2]
## Teen Birth Rate (births per 1,000 females ages 15-19): 2005

More than $20 \%$ better than state median ( 30 and lower)
Up to $20 \%$ better than state median ( 31 to 38 )

Up to $20 \%$ worse than state median ( 39 to 46)
More than $20 \%$ worse than state median (47 and higher)

## Percent of Teens Who Are High School Dropouts



NOTE: Data for Non-Hispanic Whites, Blacks/African Americans,
Natives are for persons who selected only one race.

As America moves further into the 21 st century, advanced skills and technical knowledge will be required for a healthy economy. We have a responsibility to ensure that our future workforce can compete on a global scale. Graduating from high school is critical for obtaining post-secondary education and getting a good job. Adolescents who don't complete high school will find it difficult to achieve financial success in adulthood.

- Nationwide in 2006, there were about 1.1 million teens between the ages of 16 and 19 who were not in school and had not graduated from high school.
■ The dropout rate in 2006 (7 percent) was 4 percentage points lower than the 11 percent rate in 2000. It should be noted that between 2000 and 2006, the group quarters population was added to the estimate so some caution must be used in making comparisons between the 2 reference years. However, 2006 estimates follow the same declining trend as evidenced over the past several years.
- Between 2000 and 2006, the dropout rate fell in 44 states (and the District of Columbia) and was unchanged in 4 others. The rate rose in only 2 states, Hawaii and Montana.
■ In 2006, the high school dropout rate ranged from a low of 3 percent in North Dakota to a high of 11 percent in Louisiana.
- Although large gaps still exist, more teens across all five large racial and ethnic groups stayed in school and obtained a high school diploma or GED in 2006 than in 2000.

For more information on high
school dropouts, visit the Indicato school dropouts, visit the Indicator
Briefs and Definitions sections Briefs and Definitions sections
at www.kidscount.org/datacenter.

## Percent of Teens Who Are High School Dropouts (ages 16-19): 2006

More than $20 \%$ better than state median ( 5 and lower)
Up to $20 \%$ better than state median (6)

Up to $20 \%$ worse than state median (7)
More than $20 \%$ worse than state median (8 and higher)

## Percent of Teens Not Attending School and Not Working



Ensuring that all adolescents have the opportunity to make a successful transition to adulthood is a key to a healthy society in the future. The Percent of Teens Not Attending School and Not Working (sometimes called "Idle Teens") reflects young people ages 16 to 19 who are not engaged in either of the core activities that usually occupy people during this crucial period in their lives. While those who have dropped out of school are clearly vulnerable, many young persons who have finished school but are not working are also at a disadvantage in achieving economic success in adulthood.

- In 2006, nearly 1.4 million teens between the ages of 16 and 19 were neither enrolled in school nor working.
- Nationwide, the share of 16 - to 19 -year-olds who were idle dropped slightly from 9 percent in 2000 to 8 percent in 2006.
- Between 2000 and 2006, the share of Idle Teens fell in 31 states and the District of Columbia, increased in 9 states, and remained unchanged in 10 others. It should be noted that between 2000 and 2006, the group quarters population was added to the estimate so some caution must be used in making comparisons between the 2 reference years.
- Among the states, the Percent of Teens Not Attending School and Not Working in 2006 ranged from a low of 4 percent in New Hampshire to a high of 12 percent in Louisiana, Mississippi, and New Mexico.

For more information on teens
not attending school and not
working, visit the Indicator
Briefs and Definitions sections
at www.kidscount.org/datacenter.

## Percent of Teens Not Attending School and Not Working (ages 16-19): 2006

More than $20 \%$ better than state median ( 6 and lower)
Up to $20 \%$ better than state median (7)
Up to $20 \%$ worse than state median (8)
More than $20 \%$ worse than state median (9 and higher)

| Rank | State | Rate | Rank | State | Rate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | New Hampshire | 4 | 27 | Alaska | 8 |
| 2 | Connecticut | 5 | 27 | California | 8 |
| 2 | lowa | 5 | 27 | Colorado | 8 |
| 2 | Maine | 5 | 27 | Indiana | 8 |
| 2 | Massachusetts | 5 | 27 | Maryland | 8 |
| 2 | Minnesota | 5 | 27 | Michigan | 8 |
| 2 | North Dakota | 5 | 27 | Montana | 8 |
| 2 | Vermont | 5 | 27 | North Carolina | 8 |
| 9 | Hawaii | 6 | 27 | Oregon | 8 |
| 9 | Idaho | 6 | 36 | Arizona | 9 |
| 9 | Kansas | 6 | 36 | Arkansas | 9 |
| 9 | Nebraska | 6 | 36 | Florida | 9 |
| 9 | South Dakota | 6 | 36 | Georgia | 9 |
| 9 | Utah | 6 | 36 | Oklahoma | 9 |
| 9 | Virginia | 6 | 36 | Tennessee | 9 |
| 9 | Wisconsin | 6 | 36 | Texas | 9 |
| 9 | Wyoming | 6 | 43 | Kentucky | 10 |
| 18 | Delaware | 7 | 43 | South Carolina | 10 |
| 18 | Illinois | 7 | 43 | West Virginia | 10 |
| 18 | Missouri | 7 | 46 | Alabama | 11 |
| 18 | New Jersey | 7 | 46 | Nevada | 11 |
| 18 | New York | 7 | 48 | Lovisiana | 12 |
| 18 | Ohio | 7 | 48 | Mississippi | 12 |
| 18 | Pennsylvania | 7 | 48 | New Mexico | 12 |
| 18 18 | Rhode Island Washington | 7 7 | N.R. | District of Columbia | 10 |

## Percent of Children Living in Families Where No Parent Has Full-Time, Year-Round Employment



NOTE: Data for Non-Hispanic Whites, Blacks/African Americans, Asians and Pacific Islanders, and American Indians and Alaskan Natives are for persons who selected only one race.

Children thrive when parents have the opportunity to earn income sufficient to support their family. In 2006, 24.3 million children had no parent in the household who worked full-time, year-round. This measure is sometimes referred to as "lack of secure parental employment." In addition to having higher poverty rates, these children are more likely to lack access to the health and family benefits that a stable job provides. We found that 14 percent of children living in families where no parent had a full-time, year-round job lacked health insurance, compared to 9 percent in other families. Although there are significant benefits when a parent works, having one parent employed full-time, year-round is not a guarantee for economic security. Among children living in families maintained by two parents who were living below the poverty line, 57 percent had at least one parent working year-round, full-ime.

- Nationally, the Percent of Children Living in Families Where No Parent Has Full-Time, Year-Round Employment increased from 32 percent in 2000 to 33 percent in 2006.
- During that period, this measure improved in 12 states, got worse in 31 others (plus the District of Columbia), and was unchanged in 7 states.
- Among the states, the 2006 figures ranged from a low of 24 percent in North Dakota to a high of 43 percent in Louisiana.
- Although significant gaps still exist, the rate of children living without a securely employed parent has decreased across all major racial and ethnic groups over the past several decades.

For more information on children
living in families where no
parent has full-time, year-round
employment, visit the Indicator
Briefs and Definitions sections
at www.kidscount.org/datacenter.

Percent of Children Living in Families Where No Parent Has Full-Time, Year-Round Employment: 2006
More than $20 \%$ better than state median ( 26 and lower)
Up to $20 \%$ better than state median (27 to 32 )
p to $20 \%$ worse than state median ( 33 to 38 )
More than $20 \%$ worse than state median ( 39 and higher)

| Rank | State | Rate | Rank | State | Rate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | North Dakota | 24 | 27 | Montana | 33 |
| 2 | Utah | 25 | 27 | Wyoming | 33 |
| 3 | Nebraska | 26 | 29 | Georgia | 34 |
| 3 | New Hampshire | 26 | 29 | Maine | 34 |
| 5 | lowa | 27 | 29 | New York | 34 |
| 5 | Virginia | 27 | 29 | North Carolina | 34 |
| 7 | Connecticut | 28 | 29 | Ohio | 34 |
| 7 | Kansas | 28 | 29 | Oregon | 34 |
| 7 | Maryland | 28 | 29 | Texas | 34 |
| 7 | Minnesota | 28 | 29 | Washington | 34 |
| 7 | New Jersey | 28 | 37 | California | 35 |
| 7 | Wisconsin | 28 | 37 | Hawaii | 35 |
| 13 | South Dakota | 29 | 37 | Michigan | 35 |
| 14 | Delaware | 30 | 40 | Alabama | 36 |
| 14 | Massachusetts | 30 | 40 | Arkansas | 36 |
| 14 | Nevada | 30 | 40 | Oklahoma | 36 |
| 14 | Vermont | 30 | 40 | South Carolina | 36 |
| 18 | Colorado | 31 | 40 | Tennessee | 36 |
| 18 | Idaho | 31 | 45 | Kentucky | 37 |
| 18 | Illinois | 31 | 46 | New Mexico | 38 |
| 18 | Pennsylvania | 31 | 47 | West Virginia | 39 |
| 22 | Arizona | 32 | 48 | Alaska | 42 |
| 22 | Florida | 32 | 48 | Mississippi | 42 |
| 22 | Indiana | 32 | 50 | Louisiana | 43 |
| 22 | Missouri Rhode Island | 32 32 | N.R. | District of Columbia | 46 |

## Percent of Children in Poverty



NOTE: Data for Non-Hispanic Whites, Blacks/African Americans,
Asians and Pacific Islanders, and American Indians and Alaskan
Asians and Pacific Islanders, and American Indians and Alaskan
Natives are for persons who selected only one race.

Given current economic conditions, our nation cannot ensure that all children have the opportunity to become productive members of our society. The Percent of Children in Poverty is perhaps the most global and widely used indicator of child well-being. Poverty is closely linked to many undesirable outcomes in such areas as health, education, emotional welfare, and delinquency. Our data are based on the official poverty measure as determined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. The measure consists of a series of income thresholds based on family size and composition. The 2006 poverty line was $\$ 20,444$ for a family of two adults and two children.

Despite our nation's enormous wealth, a UNICEF Innocenti Research Center report shows that more children are living in relative poverty in the United States than in any other economically advanced nation. This gap partly reflects differences in private-sector income, but differences in governmental efforts to alleviate child poverty greatly accentuate the disparities.

■ In 2006, 18 percent of children ( 13.3 million) were poor, up from 17 percent in 2000. This represents about 1 million more children living in poor households in 2006 than in 2000.

- Between 2000 and 2006, child poverty increased in 32 states (plus the District of Columbia), decreased in 14 states, and was unchanged in 4.
- Among the states, the child poverty rate for 2006 ranged from a low of 10 percent in Maryland and New Hampshire to a high of 30 percent in Mississippi.
- Although gaps remain, the poverty rate for children of color has declined, relative to that of non-Hispanic white children, over the past several decades.

For more information on childre
in poverty, visit the Indicator
in poverty, visit the Indicator
Briefs and Definitions sections
at www.kidscount.org/datacenter.

## Percent of Children in Poverty (income below \$20,444 for a family of two adults and two children in 2006): 2006

More than $20 \%$ better than state median (14 and lower)
Up to $20 \%$ better than state median ( 15 to 17 )

Up to $20 \%$ worse than state median (18 to 20 )
More than $20 \%$ worse than state median ( 21 and higher)

| Rank | State | Rate | Rank | State | Rate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Maryland | 10 | 24 | Oregon | 17 |
| 1 | New Hampshire | 10 | 24 | Pennsylvania | 17 |
| 3 | Connecticut | 11 | 24 | South Dakota | 17 |
| 3 | Hawaii | 11 | 30 | California | 18 |
| 5 | Massachusetts | 12 | 30 | Indiana | 18 |
| 5 | Minnesota | 12 | 30 | Maine | 18 |
| 5 | New Jersey | 12 | 30 | Michigan | 18 |
| 5 | Utah | 12 | 34 | Missouri | 19 |
| 5 | Virginia | 12 | 34 | Ohio | 19 |
| 5 | Wyoming | 12 | 36 | Arizona | 20 |
| 11 | North Dakota | 13 | 36 | Georgia | 20 |
| 11 | Vermont | 13 | 36 | New York | 20 |
| 13 | lowa | 14 | 36 | North Carolina | 20 |
| 13 | Nebraska | 14 | 40 | South Carolina | 22 |
| 13 | Nevada | 14 | 41 | Alabama | 23 |
| 16 | Alaska | 15 | 41 | Kentucky | 23 |
| 16 | Idaho | 15 | 41 | Tennessee | 23 |
| 16 | Rhode Island | 15 | 44 | Arkansas | 24 |
| 16 | Washington | 15 | 44 | Oklahoma | 24 |
| 16 | Wisconsin | 15 | 44 | Texas | 24 |
| 21 | Colorado | 16 | 47 | West Virginia | 25 |
| 21 | Delaware | 16 | 48 | New Mexico | 26 |
| 21 | Kansas | 16 | 49 | Louisiana | 28 |
| 24 | Florida | 17 | 50 | Mississippi | 30 |
| 24 | Illinois | 17 | N.R. | District of |  |
| 24 | Montana | 17 |  | Columbia | 33 |

## Percent of Children in Single-Parent Families



Asians and Par Non-Hispanic Whites, Blacks/African Americans, Natives are for persons who selected only one race.

Much of the public interest in family structure is linked to the fact that children growing up in single-parent families typically do not have the same economic or human resources available as those growing up in two-parent families. In 2006, 33 percent of single-parent families with related children had incomes below the poverty line, compared to 6 percent of married-couple families with children. Only about one-third of female-headed families reported receiving any child support or alimony payments in 2006. The U.S. Census Bureau defines singleparent families as those families headed by an unmarried adult.

- About 22 million children lived in single-parent families in 2006.
- Nationwide, there was a slight increase in the percent of children living in single-parent families, from 31 percent in 2000 to 32 percent in 2006.
- During this period, 7 states and the District of Columbia recorded a decrease in the percent of children living in single-parent families, 10 states reported no change in this measure, while the situation worsened in 33 states.
- In 2006, the Percent of Children in SingleParent Families ranged from a low of 18 percent in Utah to a high of 45 percent in Mississippi.
- Nearly two-thirds (65 percent) of AfricanAmerican children lived in single-parent families, compared to a little more than one-third ( 37 percent) for Latinos and slightly less than one-fourth (23 percent) for nonHispanic whites.

[^3]
## Percent of Children in Single-Parent Families: 2006

More than $20 \%$ better than state median ( 25 and lower)
Up to $20 \%$ better than state median (26 to 31)
Up to $20 \%$ worse than state median ( 32 to 37 )
More than $20 \%$ worse than state median ( 38 and higher)

| Rank | State | Rate | Rank | State | Rate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Utah | 18 | 23 | West Virginia | 31 |
| 2 | Idaho | 21 | 28 | Indiana | 32 |
| 3 | North Dakota | 24 | 28 | Maryland | 32 |
| 4 | Minnesota | 25 | 28 | Michigan | 32 |
| 4 | Montana | 25 | 28 | Missouri | 32 |
| 4 | Nebraska | 25 | 32 | Arizona | 33 |
| 4 | New Hampshire | 25 | 32 | Kentucky | 33 |
| 8 | lowa | 26 | 32 | Ohio | 33 |
| 9 | Hawaii | 27 | 32 | Texas | 33 |
| 9 | South Dakota | 27 | 36 | Delaware | 34 |
| 9 | Wyoming | 27 | 36 | Nevada | 34 |
| 12 | Colorado | 28 | 36 | New York | 34 |
| 12 | Connecticut | 28 | 36 | Oklahoma | 34 |
| 12 | Kansas | 28 | 40 | Arkansas | 35 |
| 12 | Massachusetts | 28 | 40 | Florida | 35 |
| 12 | New Jersey | 28 | 40 | North Carolina | 35 |
| 12 | Wisconsin | 28 | 40 | Rhode Island | 35 |
| 18 | Oregon | 29 | 40 | Tennessee | 35 |
| 18 | Vermont | 29 | 45 | Georgia | 36 |
| 18 | Virginia | 29 | 46 | Alabama | 37 |
| 18 | Washington | 29 | 46 | New Mexico | 37 |
| 22 | Alaska | 30 | 48 | South Carolina | 40 |
| 23 | California | 31 | 49 | Lovisiana | 41 |
| 23 | Illinois | 31 | 50 | Mississippi | 45 |
| 23 | Maine | 31 | N.R. | District of |  |
| 23 | Pennsylvania | 31 |  | Columbia | 62 |




PROFILES

$\square$

## United States



$\square$

## Alabama



[^4]
$\square$

## Alaska



[^5]

| 7 | 39 |
| :--- | :--- |

## Arizona



[^6]


## Arkansas



[^7]


## California



[^8]


## Colorado



[^9]

## Connecticut



[^10]
$\square$

## Delaware



[^11]
$\square$

## District of Columbia



[^12]N.R.=Not Ranked.

$\square$

## Florida



[^13]
$\square$

## Georgia



[^14]
$\square$

## Hawaii



[^15]


## Idaho



[^16]
$\square$

## Illinois



[^17]
$\square$

## Indiana



[^18]


[^19]


## Kansas



[^20]
$\square$

## Kentucky



[^21]| Background Information | Demographic Data |  |  | Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Number of Children: 2006 |  |  | 4th grade students who scored at or above proficient reading level: 2007 | $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text { STATE } \\ 20 \% \end{array}\right.$ | NATIONAL$32 \%]$ | 8th grade students who scored at or above proficient reading level: 2007 |  | $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text { STATE } \\ 19 \% \end{array}\right.$ |  | NATIONAL <br> $29 \%$ |
|  |  | NUMBER | PERCENT |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Total children under age 18 | [1,090,001 | $25 \%]$ | 4th grade students who scored at or above proficient math level: 2007 | $[24 \%$ | $39 \%]$ | 8th grade students who scored at or above proficient math level: 2007 |  | $[19 \%$ |  | 31\% |
|  | Total youth ages 10-17 | [494,747 | 45\% $]$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Race and Hispanic Origin of Youth (ages 10-17): 2006 |  |  | Economics |  |  | Juvenile Justice** |  |  |  |  |
|  | White* | $\left[\begin{array}{c} \text { NUMBER } \\ 275,304 \end{array}\right.$ | $\left.\begin{array}{c} \text { PERCENT } \\ 56 \% \end{array}\right]$ | Median income of families with children: 2006 | $\begin{gathered} \text { STATE } \\ \$ 43,100 \end{gathered}$ | NATIONAL $\$ 54,500]$ | Estimated daily count of detained and committed youth in custody: 2006 |  | $\left[\begin{array}{c} \text { STATE } \\ 1,200 \end{array}\right]$ |  |  |
|  | Black/African American* | [189,327 | 38\% $]$ | Children in extreme poverty (income below 50\% of poverty level): 2006 | [ $13 \%$ | $8 \%$ ] | Rate of detained and committed youth in custody (per 100,000 youth ages 10-15): 2006 |  |  |  |  |
|  | American Indian/ Alaskan Native* | $[3,251$ | $1 \%]$ | Children in low-income families (income below 200\% of poverty level): 2006 | [ $50 \%$ | 40\% $]$ | Lousiana |  |  |  | 149 |
|  | Asian and Pacific Islander* | [6,770 | $1 \%]$ | Children in low-income families that spend more than $30 \%$ of their income on housing: 2006 | [ $56 \%$ | 66\% $]$ | United States |  |  | 125 |  |
|  | More than one race* | [ 5,754 | $1 \%]$ | Child Health |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | , | Percent of children without health insurance: 2005 | $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text { STATE } \\ 10 \% \end{array}\right.$ | $\begin{array}{\|cc} \hline \text { NATIONAL } \\ 11 \% & \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Ratio of rates of youth of color to white ${ }^{*}$ youth in custody: 2006 |  | $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text { STATE } \\ 4: 1 \end{array}\right.$ |  | NATIONAL3:1 |
|  | Hispanic/Latino | [14,341 | $3 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Find the most recent data available | Children in Immigrant Families: 2006 |  |  | Number of children without health insurance: 2005 | [114,000 | 8,144,000 $]$ | Percent of youth in custody for non-violent offenses: 2006 |  | [ 67 | 67\% | 66\% |
| Definitions and Data Sources can be found on page 186, or visit www.kidscount.org for detailed information. | Percent of children in immigrant families | $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text { STATE } \\ 4 \% \end{array}\right.$ | NATIONAL $22 \%]$ | Percent of children with special health care needs: 2005-2006 | [ 15\% | 14\% $]$ | Juvenile violent crime arrest rate (arrests per 100,000 youth ages 10-17): 2005 |  | [ 394 | 394 | 283 |

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## Louisiana



[^22]


## Maine



[^23]


## Maryland



[^24]

## Massachusetts



[^25]
$\square$

## Michigan



[^26]

## Minnesota



[^27]
$\square$

## Mississippi



[^28]

## Missouri



[^29]
$\square$

## Montana



[^30]
$\square$

## Nebraska



[^31]


## Nevada



[^32]| Background Information | Demographic Data |  |  | Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Number of children: 2006 |  |  | 4th grade students who scored at or above proficient reading level: 2007 | $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text { STATE } \\ 41 \% \end{array}\right.$ | NATIONAL$32 \%]$ | 8th grade students who scored at or above proficient reading level: 2007 |  | $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text { STATE } \\ 37 \% \end{array}\right.$ |  | NATIONAL29\% |
|  |  | NUMBER | PERCENT |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Total children under age 18 | $[297,625$ | $23 \%]$ | 4th grade students who scored at or above proficient math level: 2007 | $[52 \%$ | $39 \%$ | 8th grade students who scored at or above proficient math level: 2007 |  |  | 38\% | 31\% |
|  | Total youth ages 10-17 | [146,461 | $49 \%]$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Race and Hispanic Origin of Youth (ages 10-17): 2006 |  |  | Economics |  |  | Juvenile Justice** |  |  |  |  |
|  | White* | $\left[\begin{array}{c} \text { NUMBER } \\ 136,021 \end{array}\right.$ | $\left.\begin{array}{c} \text { PERCENT } \\ 93 \% \end{array}\right]$ | Median income of families with children: 2006 | $\left[\begin{array}{c} \text { STATE } \\ \$ 71,600 \end{array}\right.$ | NATIONAL $\$ 54,500]$ | Estimated daily count of detained and committed youth in custody: 2006 |  |  | $\left[\begin{array}{c} \text { STATE } \\ 189 \end{array}\right]$ |  |
|  | Black/African American* | [1,444 | $1 \%]$ | Children in extreme poverty (income below 50\% of poverty level): 2006 | $[4 \%$ | $8 \%$ | Rate of detained and committed youth in custody (per 100,000 youth ages 10-15): 2006 |  |  |  |  |
|  | American Indian/ Alaskan Native* | [ 334 | ${ }_{\substack{\text { less than } \\ 0.5 \%}}$ | Children in low-income families (income below 200\% of poverty level): 2006 | [ $23 \%$ | 40\% $]$ | New HampshireUnited States | - | 67 | 125 |  |
|  | Asian and Pacific Islander* | [ 2,288 | $2 \%]$ | Children in low-income families that spend more than $30 \%$ of their income on housing: 2006 | [ $79 \%$ | 66\% $]$ |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | More than one race* | [2,128 | 1\% | Child Health |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | Percent of children without health insurance: 2005 | $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text { STATE } \\ 6 \% \end{array}\right.$ | $\left.\begin{array}{c} \text { NATIONAL } \\ 11 \% \end{array}\right]$ | Ratio of rates of youth of color to white* youth in custody: 2006 |  |  | STATE <br> 4:1 | NATIONAL$3: 1$ |
|  | Hispanic/Latino | [4,246 | $3 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Children in Immigrant Families: 2006 |  |  | Number of children without health insurance: 2005 | [19,000 | 8,144,000 $]$ | Percent of youth in custody for non-violent offenses: 2006 |  |  | 52\% | 66\% |
| Find the most recent data available at www.kidscount.org/datacenter. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Definitions and Data Sources can be found on page 186, or visit www.kidscount.org for detailed information. | Percent of children in <br> immigrant families <br> *Non-Hispanic/Latino |  |  | Percent of children with special health care needs: 2005-2006 | $[17 \%$ | 14\% $]$ | Juvenile violent crime arrest rate (arrests per 100,000 yout ages 10-17): 2005 |  |  | 95 | 283 |

## New Hampshire



[^33]


## New Jersey



[^34]

## New Mexico



[^35]


## New York



[^36]
$\square$

## North Carolina



[^37]


## North Dakota



[^38]


[^39]
$\square$

## Oklahoma



[^40]


[^41]


## Pennsylvania



[^42]
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## Rhode Island



[^43]
$\square$

## South Carolina



[^44]


## South Dakota



[^45]

## Tennessee



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## Utah



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## Vermont



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$\square$

## Virginia



[^50]


## Washington



[^51]

## West Virginia



[^52]


## Wisconsin



[^53]


## Wyoming



[^54]


## APPENDICES

Multi-Year State Trend Data for KIDS COUNT Key Indicators

This Appendix provides the rate for each of the 10 KIDS COUNT key indicators used to rank states for each year since 2000 . Data are available for 2006 for some measures, but only through 2005 for others. The raw data behind the most recent rate are also provided. In addition, this table provides the state's rank by indicator for each year. Raw data based on estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) are rounded to the nearest 1,000 .

Key Indicators

| Percent low-birthweight babies | Rate |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |  |
| Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) | Rate |
|  | Rank |
|  | 2005 raw data |
| Child death rate <br> (deaths per 100,000 children ages 1-14) | Rate |
|  | 2005 raw data |
| Teen death rate(deaths per 100,000 teens ages 15-19) | Rate |
|  | Rank |
|  | 2005 raw data |
| Teen birth rate <br> (births per 1,000 females ages 15-19) | Rate |
|  | ${ }_{2005 \text { raw data }}^{\text {Rank }}$ |
| Percent of teens who are high school dropouts (ages 16-19) | Rate |
|  | Rank |
|  | 2006 raw data |
| Percent of teens not attending school and not working (ages 16-19) | Rate |
|  | Rank |
|  | 2006 raw data |
| Percent of children living in families where no parent has full-time, year-round employment | Rate |
|  | Rank |
|  | 2006 raw data |
| Percent of children in poverty (income below $\$ 20,444$ for a family of two adults and two children in 2006) | Rate |
|  | Rank |
|  | 2006 raw data |
| Percent of children in single-parent families | Rate |
|  | Rank |
|  | 2006 raw data |



[^55]

| CA |  |  |  |  |  |  | CO |  |  |  |  |  |  | CT |  |  |  |  |  |  | DE |  |  |  |  |  |  | DC |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | ¢ | $\stackrel{\text { + }}{\text { ¢ }}$ | \% | ঃ |  | Ö뭉 | ત્ઠે | ồ | $\stackrel{\text { ® }}{\text { ¢ }}$ | Nì | o | $\stackrel{\text { ¢ }}{\text { ¢ }}$ | 잉 | ત్ర | Ồ | $\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\circ}$ | ત̀ | - | Oi | 흠 | ® | Ò Ò | $\begin{aligned} & \text { +i } \\ & \text { N } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ñ } \\ & \stackrel{i}{8} \end{aligned}$ | - | ষ্ণী | ö̀ | Ö | $\stackrel{\sim}{\circ}$ | $\stackrel{\text { + }}{\text { + }}$ |  | - |
| 6.2 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 6.7 | 6.9 | N.A. | 8.4 | 8.5 | 8.9 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 9.2 | N.A. | 7.4 | 7.4 | 7.8 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 8.0 | N.A. | 8.6 | 9.3 | 9.9 | 9.4 | 9.0 | 9.5 | N.A. | 11.9 | 12.1 | 11.6 | 10.9 | 11.1 | 11.2 | N.A. |
| 8 | 7 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 12 | N.A. | 40 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 39 | 41 | N.A. | 22 | 21 | 23 | 19 | 19 | 21 | N.A. | 41 | 46 | 46 | 45 | 39 | 43 | N.A. |  | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.r. | N.A. |
| 37,630 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6,325 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3,317 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1,106 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 888 births |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.3 | N.A. | 6.2 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 6.4 | N.A. | 6.6 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.8 | N.A. | 9.2 | 10.7 | 8.7 | 9.4 | 8.6 | 9.0 | N.A. | 12.0 | 10.6 | 11.3 | 10.5 | 12.0 | 14.1 | N.A. |
| 5 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | N.A. | 13 | 10 | 15 | 18 | 20 | 18 | N.A. | 19 | 16 | 21 | 8 | 9 | 10 | N.A. | 48 | 50 | 43 | 49 | 43 | 46 | N.A. |  | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.r. | N.A. |
| 2,930 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 444 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 243 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 105 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 112 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 17 | 17 | N.A. | 22 | 22 | 21 | 21 | 17 | 21 | N.A. | 15 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 | N.A. | 27 | 22 | 27 | 14 | 29 | 18 | N.A. | 31 | 33 | 23 | 27 | 36 | 24 | N.A. |
| 12 | 9 | 9 | 11 | 9 | 10 | N.A. | 22 | 21 | 19 | 20 | 9 | 22 | N.A. | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 3 | N.A. | 39 | 21 | 42 | 3 | 44 | 12 | N.A. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.r. | N.A. |
| 1,275 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 190 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 90 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 27 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 21 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 53 | 58 | 58 | 61 | 59 | 60 | N.A. | 60 | 71 | 74 | 66 | 76 | 60 | N.A. | 47 | 54 | 48 | 40 | 43 | 43 | N.A. | 74 | 70 | 65 | 76 | 74 | 58 | N.A. | 108 | 149 | 168 | 151 | 188 | 173 | N.A. |
| 9 | 11 | 10 | 15 | 16 | 16 | N.A. | 12 | 30 | 30 | 21 | 33 | 16 | N.A. | 3 | 9 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 4 | N.A. | 28 | 28 | 19 | 32 | 31 | 15 | N.A. | N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.A.47 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1,583 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 193 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 106 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 33 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 47 | 44 | 41 | 40 | 39 | 39 | N.A. | 51 | 47 | 47 | 44 | 44 | 43 | N.A. | 31 | 28 | 26 | 25 | 24 | 23 | N.A. | 48 | 47 | 46 | 45 | 44 | 44 | N.A. | 53 | 64 | 69 | 60 | 67 | 63 | N.A. |
|  | 28 | 28 | 27 | 25 | 26 | N.A. | 35 | 33 | 36 | 34 | 33 | 32 | N.A. | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | N.A. | 30 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 33 | 36 | N.A. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.A. |
| 50,034 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6,646 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2,813 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1,225 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 852 births |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 11 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 12 | 12 | 10 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 13 | 14 | 12 | 6 | 10 | 8 | 7 |
| 22 | 30 | 18 | 15 | 13 | 16 | 15 | 30 | 45 | 39 | 15 | 32 | 27 | 41 | 30 | 7 | 5 | 30 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 37 | 41 | 33 | 15 | 32 | 36 | 27 | N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R.2,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 141,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 23,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 8,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 9 | 10 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 7 |  | 14 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 8 | 10 |
| 20 | 29 | 22 | 16 | 18 | 19 | 27 | 6 | 22 | 22 | 29 | 27 | 9 | 27 | 20 | 7 | 10 | 11 | 18 | 1 | 2 | 26 | 29 | 10 | 6 | 12 | 31 | 18 |  | N.r. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. |
| 174,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 21,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 10,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 35 | 35 | 36 | 35 | 36 | 36 | 35 | 34 | 27 | 29 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 26 | 25 | 28 | 28 | 27 | 29 | 28 | 25 | 26 | 30 | 29 | 30 | 29 | 30 | 44 | 49 | 49 | 54 | 52 | 49 | 46 |
|  | 42 | 42 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 37 | 35 | 12 | 11 | 20 | 16 | 16 | 18 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 13 | 5 | 11 | 7 |  | 9 | 15 | 15 | 14 | 11 | 14 |  | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. |
| 3,312,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 361,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 229,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 61,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 53,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 18 | 10 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 14 | 16 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 14 | 11 | 12 | 14 | 14 | 16 |  | 32 | 28 | 36 | 34 | 32 | 33 |
|  | 33 | 34 | 34 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 3 | 11 | 8 | 13 | 18 | 11 | 21 | 7 |  | 2 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 8 |  | 5 | 5 | 14 | 11 | 21 | 37,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1,697,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 180,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 89,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 32,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 30 | 31 | 30 | 30 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 27 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 27 | 26 | 27 | 29 | 27 | 29 | 28 | 35 | 32 | 34 | 33 | 35 | 34 | 34 |  | 67 | 62 | 63 | 68 | 65 | 62 |
| 24 | 33 | 28 | 25 | 20 | 21 | 23 | 15 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 12 | 16 | 11 | 15 | 19 | 12 | 16 | 12 | 44 | 37 | 42 | 37 | 41 | 39 | 36 | N.R. | N.r. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. | N.R. |
| 2,733,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 309,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 216,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 64,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 63,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |



| HI |  |  |  |  |  |  | ID |  |  |  |  |  |  | IL |  |  |  |  |  |  | IN |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | તે તે무 | \％ | ＋ | î̀ | ঃ. |  |  | તָò | ò | ＋ | 合 | O | 合 |  |  | ò ì | － | 合 | － | 甋 | تָ | ત્ઠ ત્ત | ồ | ষ্ণ | 合 | － | ه্તী | 힘 | ત̃ | $\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\mathrm{O}}$ | ＋ | 合 | － |
| 7.5 | 8.1 | 8.3 | 8.6 | 7.9 | 8.2 | N．A． | 6.7 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 6.8 | 6.7 | N．A． | 7.9 | 8.0 | 8.2 | 8.3 | 8.4 | 8.5 | N．A． | 7.4 | 7.6 | 7.6 | 7.9 | 8.1 | 8.3 | N．A． | 6.1 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 7.0 | 7.2 | N．A． |
| 25 | 35 | 34 | 36 | 21 | 24 | N．A． | 15 | 9 | 4 | 6 | 10 | 9 | N．A． | 31 | 32 | 32 | 31 | 34 | 33 | N．A． | 22 | 22 | 21 | 22 | 26 | 27 | N．A． | 5 | 9 | 12 | 10 | 13 | 17 | N．A． |
| 1，468 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，538 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 15，265 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 7，232 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2，814 births |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8.1 | 6.2 | 7.3 | 7.5 | 5.7 | 6.5 | N．A． | 7.5 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.1 | N．A． | 8.5 | 7.7 | 7.4 | 7.7 | 7.5 | 7.4 | N．A． | 7.8 | 7.5 | 7.7 | 7.6 | 8.0 | 8.0 | N．A． | 6.5 | 5.6 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 5.1 | 5.3 | N．A． |
| 37 | 18 | 29 | 32 | 15 | 19 | N．A． | 32 | 18 | 15 | 19 | 19 | 16 | N．A． | 41 | 36 | 30 | 35 | 31 | 33 | N．A． | 36 | 34 | 36 | 34 | 37 | 39 | N．A． | 17 | 8 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 6 | N．A． |
| 116 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 141 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，328 death |  |  |  |  |  |  | 698 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 210 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 21 | 16 | N．A． | 22 | 25 | 23 | 26 | 26 | 23 | N．A． | 20 | 22 | 20 | 19 | 19 | 17 | N．A． | 25 | 22 | 22 | 20 | 24 | 25 | N．A． | 22 | 23 | 21 | 22 | 21 | 19 | N．A． |
| 3 | 5 | 6 | 9 | 20 | 6 | N．A． | 22 | 36 | 26 | 41 | 36 | 31 | N．A． | 12 |  | 13 | 11 | 14 | 10 | N．A． | 33 | 21 | 23 | 16 | 32 | 38 | N．A． | 22 | 29 | 19 | 26 | 20 | 15 | N．A． |
| 36 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 65 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 418 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 304 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 99 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 50 | 42 | 54 | 40 | 37 | N．A． | 63 | 88 | 74 | 72 | 68 | 56 | N．A． | 68 | 68 | 65 | 68 | 63 | 62 | N．A． | 76 | 74 | 73 | 63 | 68 | 64 | N．A． | 77 | 59 | 57 | 58 | 45 | 66 | N．A． |
| 2 | 4 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 1 | N．A． | 16 | 42 | 30 | 27 | 28 | 11 | N．A． | 23 | 25 | 19 | 23 | 20 | 19 | N．A． | 30 | 33 | 28 | 19 | 28 | 21 | N．A． | 33 | 14 | 8 | 13 | 3 | 24 | N．A． |
| 32 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 61 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 559 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 288 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 138 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 42 | 38 | 37 | 36 | 36 | N．A． | 43 | 41 | 39 | 39 | 39 | 38 | N．A． | 48 | 46 | 42 | 40 | 40 | 39 | N．A． | 49 | 47 | 45 | 43 | 44 | 43 | N．A． | 34 | 33 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 33 | N．A． |
|  | 26 | 21 | 23 | 20 | 22 | N．A． | 23 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 25 | 24 | N．A． | 30 |  | 29 | 27 | 28 | 26 | N．A． | 32 | 33 | 33 | 31 | 33 | 32 | N．A． | 10 | 10 | 10 | 13 | 13 | 16 | N．A． |
| 1，480 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2，015 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 17，041 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 9，508 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3，330 births |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 7 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 13 | 14 | 13 | 11 | 13 | 9 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 4 |
|  | 14 | 18 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 15 | 22 | 30 | 30 | 15 | 13 | 36 | 27 | 17 | 30 | 18 | 30 | 13 | 16 | 15 | 40 | 45 | 47 | 45 | 50 | 36 | 36 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 15 | 1 | 4 | 2 |
| 4，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 41，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 28，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 8，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 13 | 12 | 13 | 10 | 8 | 6 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 5 |
|  | 48 | 45 | 48 | 34 | 19 | 9 | 35 | 29 | 35 | 16 | 12 | 9 | 9 |  | 22 | 10 | 16 | 18 | 19 | 18 | 32 | 14 | 30 | 16 | 34 | 19 | 27 |  | 2 | 2 | 11 | 3 | 6 | 2 |
| 4，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 56，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 29，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 9，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 33 | 35 | 33 | 36 | 34 | 35 | 30 | 33 | 32 | 35 | 36 | 33 | 31 | 29 | 31 | 31 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 31 | 27 | 27 | 30 | 30 | 33 | 32 | 32 | 23 | 24 | 28 | 26 | 25 | 26 | 27 |
|  | 33 | 36 | 28 | 36 | 26 | 37 | 19 |  |  | 36 | 36 | 23 | 18 | 17 |  |  | 25 | 19 | 20 | 18 | 11 |  | 15 | 17 | 25 | 20 | 22 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| 103，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 123，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，010，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 512，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 191，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 14 | 13 | 11 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 18 | 20 | 18 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 16 | 17 | 14 | 13 | 15 | 14 | 15 | 17 | 18 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 12 | 12 | 14 | 14 |
|  | 16 | 12 | 23 | 14 | 8 | 3 | 19 | 22 | 24 | 30 | 34 | 26 | 16 | 24 | 22 | 24 | 25 | 23 | 22 | 24 | 19 | 11 | 20 | 16 | 18 | 23 | 30 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 5 | 6 | 11 | 13 |
| 33，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 58，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 543，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 277，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 96，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 24 | 27 | 29 | 32 | 28 | 27 | 27 | 22 | 24 | 20 | 20 | 23 | 23 | 21 | 31 | 30 | 29 | 29 | 28 | 30 | 31 | 29 | 29 | 31 | 29 | 28 | 30 | 32 | 25 | 25 | 26 | 25 | 24 | 26 | 26 |
| 6 | 16 | 21 | 33 | 16 | 8 | 9 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |  |  | 21 | 19 | 16 | 21 | 23 | 21 | 25 | 33 | 19 | 16 | 21 | 28 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 8 |
| 74，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 80，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 939，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 476，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 176，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |


|  | Key Indicators |  | USA |  |  |  |  |  |  | KS |  |  |  |  |  |  | KY |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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|  |  |  | 잇 |  | ત્ત |  |  | へ̂̀ | － | Oi | 힝 |  | \％ | O | へิ | -্ণী | ò | ̈ㅣㅇ | ત̛̀ | \％ | ＋ | へิ | 읏 |
|  | Percent low－birthweight babies | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 7.7 N．R． \％65 bi | 7.8 <br> N．R． <br> irths | $\begin{gathered} 7.9 \\ \text { N.R. } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 8.1 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.2 \\ \text { N.R. } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | 6.9 17 2,86 | $\begin{aligned} & 7.0 \\ & 17 \end{aligned}$ $0 \text { birtl }$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.0 \\ 16 \\ \text { ihs } \end{gathered}$ | 7.4 18 | 7.3 17 | 7.2 17 | N.A. N.A. | $\begin{aligned} & 8.2 \\ & 37 \\ & 5,126 \end{aligned}$ | $8.3$ $37$ <br> 6 birth | $\begin{gathered} 8.6 \\ 38 \\ \text { h5 } \end{gathered}$ | 8.7 38 | 8.8 38 | $\begin{aligned} & 9.1 \\ & 39 \end{aligned}$ | N．A． |
|  | Infant mortality rate （deaths per 1，000 live births） | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 6.8 N．R． 40 dea | 7.0 <br> N．R． <br> aths |  | $\begin{aligned} & 6.8 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 6.9 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | 6.8 24 294 | $7.4$ $31$ <br> death | $\begin{aligned} & 7.1 \\ & 27 \end{aligned}$ | 6.6 22 | 7.2 29 | 7.4 33 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 7.2 \\ & 29 \\ & 375 \end{aligned}$ | 5.9 <br> 13 <br> deaths | $7.2$ | 6.9 | $\begin{aligned} & 6.8 \\ & 27 \end{aligned}$ | $6.6$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Child death rate <br> （deaths per 100，000 children ages $1-14$ ） | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 22 N．R． 58 deat | 21 <br> N．R． <br> aths | $\begin{aligned} & 21 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 20 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 20 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | 25 33 120 | 24 33 deaths | $\begin{aligned} & 25 \\ & 38 \end{aligned}$ | 24 30 | 26 36 | 23 31 | N.A. N.A. | $\begin{aligned} & 23 \\ & 27 \\ & 191 \end{aligned}$ | 28 <br> 40 <br> deaths | $\begin{aligned} & 25 \\ & 38 \end{aligned}$ | 25 36 | 24 32 | 25 38 | N.A. N.A. |
|  | （deaths per 100，000 teens ages 15－19） | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  | 67 N．R． 03 dea | 68 <br> N．R． <br> aths | $\begin{gathered} 66 \\ \text { N.R. } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \quad 66 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 65 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | 78 35 133 | 80 <br> 38 <br> deaths | $\begin{aligned} & 70 \\ & 25 \end{aligned}$ | 71 26 | 57 13 | 66 24 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ |  | 73 <br> 31 <br> deaths | $\begin{aligned} & 85 \\ & 39 \end{aligned}$ | 75 31 | 95 44 | 83 36 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Teen birth rate （births per 1，000 females ages 15－19） | $\begin{array}{r} \begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \end{array} \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 45 N．R． 593 bi | 43 <br> N．R． <br> irths | $\begin{aligned} & 42 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | ${ }^{41}$ | 40 N．R． | N．A． N．A． | 46 25 4,05 | 44 28 | $\begin{aligned} & 43 \\ & 30 \end{aligned}$ | 41 29 | 41 29 | 41 29 | N．A． | $\begin{aligned} & 55 \\ & 37 \\ & 6,726 \end{aligned}$ | 52 37 6 birth | $\begin{gathered} 51 \\ 37 \\ 37 \end{gathered}$ | 50 38 | 49 | 49 38 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Percent of teens who are high school dropouts （ages 16－19） | $\begin{array}{r} \begin{array}{c} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \end{array} \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 10 <br> N．R． <br> 0，000 | 9 <br> N．R． <br> teens | $\begin{aligned} & 8 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | 8 <br> N．R． | 7 <br> N．R． | 7 <br> N．R． <br> l | 10 22 7,0 | 7 7 teen | $9$ | 5 | 7 20 | 6 | 2 | 10 22 20,0 | 10 30 00 tee | $\begin{gathered} 11 \\ 39 \\ \text { ens } \end{gathered}$ | 37 | 10 41 | 9 36 |  |
|  | Percent of teens not attending school and not working （ages 16－19） | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ | 1，358 |  | 9 <br> N．R． <br> teens | $\begin{aligned} & 9 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | ${ }^{9}$ N．R． | 8 <br> N．R． | 8 N．R． | 9，0 | 7 7 teen | $\begin{aligned} & 7 \\ & 10 \end{aligned}$ | 16 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 12 43 23,0 | 11 38 00 tee | $\begin{array}{r} 12 \\ 45 \\ \text { ens } \end{array}$ | 12 46 | 11 42 | 11 45 | 10 43 |
|  | Percent of children living in families where no parent has full－time，year－round employment | $\begin{array}{r} \begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \end{array} \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  | 31 <br> N．R． <br>  <br> 175000 | 33 <br> N．R． <br> 0 child | 33 <br> N．R． <br> ren | 33 | 34 N．R． | 33 <br> N．R． | 22 <br> 2 <br> 192 | 23 2 000 ch | 29 <br> 11 <br> hildren | 27 | 27 5 | 28 | 28 7 | $\begin{aligned} & 34 \\ & 35 \\ & 366,0 \end{aligned}$ | 33 33 000 ch | 35 36 cildren | 39 46 | 38 45 | 38 44 | 37 45 |
|  | Percent of children in poverty （income below \＄20，444 for a family of two adults and two children in 2006） | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  | $17$ N.R. $886,000$ | 18 <br> N．R． <br> 0 child | 18 <br> N．R． <br> ren | 18 | 19 <br> N．R． | 18 N．r． | 12 8 107 | 13 11 ，00 ch | 16 24 iildren | 14 16 | 12 | 15 16 | 16 21 | 22 43 223, | 19 36 000 ch | 21 41 cildren | 24 44 | 25 | 22 41 | 23 41 |
| N．A．$=$ Not Available． N．R．$=$ Not Ranked． | Percent of children in single－parent families | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ | 31 $N$ 22 | 31 N．R． 28,000 | 31 <br> N．R． <br> childr | 31 <br> N．R． <br> ren | 31 N．R． | 32 N．R． | 32 N．R． | 27 <br> 16 <br> 184 | 25 9 000 ch | 26 10 cildren | 27 10 | 24 | 27 8 | 28 12 | 30 <br> 24 <br> 304,0 | 27 16 000 ch | 30 28 cildren | 30 25 | 30 25 | 31 26 | 33 32 |


| LA |  |  |  |  |  |  | ME |  |  |  |  |  |  | MD |  |  |  |  |  |  | MA |  |  |  |  |  |  | MI |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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|  |  | ત̃ō | ¢ | ＋ | 合 | $\stackrel{\circ}{\text { ® }}$ |  |  | ત્ઠે |  | $\stackrel{\text { ® }}{\text { ¢ }}$ | 会 | － |  |  | Ö | Ồ | $\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\circ}$ | Nî̀ | $\stackrel{\circ}{\circ}$ | Oì |  | ® | Ò Ò | ষ্ণ | へٌ | $\stackrel{\circ}{\text { ® }}$ | O. 犬 | ઠ্ট | તò | － | $\stackrel{\text { ¢ }}{\text { ¢ }}$ | へิ | － |
| 10.3 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 10.7 | 10.9 | 11.5 | N．A． | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.3 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.8 | N．A． | 8.6 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 9.1 | 9.3 | 9.1 | N．A． | 7.1 | 7.2 | 7.5 | 7.6 | 7.8 | 7.9 | N．A． | 7.9 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.2 | 8.3 | 8.3 | N．A． |
| 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | N．A． | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 10 | N．A． | 41 | 44 | 42 | 44 | 43 | 39 | N．A． | 19 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 19 | 20 | N．A． | 31 | 32 | 27 | 29 | 30 | 27 | N．A． |
| 6，987 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 957 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6，844 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6，063 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 10，615 births |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9.0 | 9.8 | 10.3 | 9.3 | 10.5 | 10.1 | N．A． | 4.9 | 6.1 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 5.7 | 6.9 | N．A． | 7.6 | 8.1 | 7.5 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 7.3 | N．A． | 4.6 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 5.2 | N．A． | 8.2 | 8.0 | 8.1 | 8.5 | 7.6 | 7.9 | N．A． |
| 46 | 48 | 49 | 47 | 50 | 49 | N．A． | 2 | 16 | 1 | 4 | 15 | 26 | N．A． | 33 | 39 | 32 | 40 | 41 | 31 | N．A． | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | N．A． | 39 | 38 | 38 | 43 | 34 | 37 | N．A． |
| 613 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 97 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 547 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 396 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，012 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 32 | 33 | 35 | 28 | 34 | 34 | N．A． | 21 | 16 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 18 | N．A． | 21 | 22 | 20 | 20 | 21 | 16 | N．A． | 15 | 15 | 15 | 13 | 12 | 10 | N．A． | 22 | 22 | 22 | 21 | 19 | 21 | N．A． |
| 45 | 47 | 49 | 44 | 47 | 50 | N．A． | 19 | 5 | 13 | 20 | 27 | 12 | N．A． | 19 | 21 | 13 | 16 | 20 | 6 | N．A． | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | N．A． | 22 | 21 | 23 | 20 | 14 | 22 | N．A． |
| 299 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 38 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 175 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 113 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 414 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 85 | 97 | 100 | 96 | 96 | 103 | N．A． | 63 | 65 | 58 | 53 | 60 | 63 | N．A． | 71 | 73 | 73 | 77 | 67 | 66 | N．A． | 40 | 43 | 42 | 51 | 46 | 41 | N．A． | 64 | 62 | 63 | 55 | 65 | 57 | N．A． |
| 40 | 49 | 46 | 47 | 45 | 49 | N．A． | 16 | 21 | 10 | 6 | 18 | 20 | N．A． | 24 | 31 | 28 | 34 | 25 | 24 | N．A． | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 3 | N．A． | 18 | 19 | 17 | 10 | 22 | 13 | N．A． |
| 349 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 59 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 266 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 174 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 428 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 62 | 59 | 58 | 56 | 56 | 49 | N．A． | 29 | 27 | 25 | 25 | 24 | 24 | N．A． | 41 | 38 | 35 | 33 | 32 | 32 | N．A． | 26 | 25 | 23 | 23 | 22 | 22 | N．A． | 40 | 38 | 35 | 34 | 34 | 32 | N．A． |
| 43 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 38 | N．A． | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 6 | N．A． | 20 | 17 | 14 | 15 | 13 | 14 | N．A． | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | N．A． | 19 | 17 | 14 | 16 | 17 | 14 | N．A． |
| 8，151 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，112 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6，282 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 4，540 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 11，809 births |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 11 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 |
|  |  | 43 | 49 | 41 | 27 | 50 |  | 7 | 18 | 15 | 7 | 16 | 2 | 30 |  | 18 | 10 | 20 | 16 | 15 | 12 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 32 | 4 | 2 | 22 | 14 | 9 | 10 | 20 | 16 | 15 |
| 31,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 21，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 15，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 36，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 13 | 10 | 12 | 4 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 5 | 5 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| 49 | 44 | 49 | 50 | 50 | 40 | 48 | 1 | 7 | 35 | 4 | 12 | 9 | 2 | 26 | 22 | 10 | 16 | 12 | 19 | 27 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 16 | 27 | 1 | 2 |  | 14 | 5 | 11 | 18 | 19 | 27 |
| 32,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 4，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 26，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 18，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 46，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 39 | 39 | 39 | 40 | 40 | 42 | 43 | 34 | 29 | 33 | 31 | 32 | 35 | 34 | 28 | 24 | 28 | 27 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 31 | 28 | 30 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 30 | 31 | 31 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 35 | 35 |
| 47 | 47 | 48 | 48 | 49 | 49 | 50 | 35 | 18 | 26 | 20 | 19 | 30 | 29 | 14 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 23 | 16 | 15 | 20 | 16 | 16 | 14 | 23 | 27 | 30 | 35 | 27 | 30 | 37 |
| 469，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 96,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 379,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 434，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 863，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 27 | 27 | 27 | 30 | 30 | 28 | 28 | 12 | 11 | 16 | 13 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 14 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 12 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 18 | 19 | 18 |
| 50 | 50 | 48 | 50 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 8 | 5 | 24 | 13 | 23 | 23 | 30 | 12 |  | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 19 | 9 | 8 | 5 | 10 | 11 | 5 | 19 |  | 24 | 25 | 27 | 30 | 30 |
| 298，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 48，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 130，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 178，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 445，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 40 | 40 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 42 | 41 | 24 | 26 | 29 | 27 | 33 | 31 | 31 | 33 | 30 | 32 | 33 | 33 | 32 | 32 | 29 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 29 | 29 | 28 | 32 | 31 | 30 | 30 | 31 | 31 | 32 |
| 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 50 | 49 | 49 | 6 | 11 | 21 | 10 | 34 | 26 | 23 | 36 | 29 | 36 | 37 | 34 | 31 | 28 | 21 | 20 | 17 | 16 | 20 | 16 | 12 | 32 |  | 28 | 25 | 29 | 26 | 28 |
| 417，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 83,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 413,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 385，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 737，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |


|  | Key Indicators |  | USA |  |  |  |  |  |  | MN |  |  |  |  |  |  | MS |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 잇 | ઠે | ત્ત |  | 䓂 | Nò | - | Oì | 힝 | ત્ઠ તે | ồ | - | Nò | -্ণী | $\begin{aligned} & \text { O} \\ & \text { di } \end{aligned}$ | Ö | ત̛̀ | \% | + | ה | 읏 |
|  | Percent low-birthweight babies | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 7.7 <br> N.R. <br> 565 bi | 7.8 <br> N.R. <br> irths | $\begin{aligned} & 7.9 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 8.1 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.2 \\ \text { N.R. } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 6.1 \\ & 5 \end{aligned}$ $4,62$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.3 \\ 7 \\ 8 \text { birth } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 6.3 \\ & 5 \\ & \text { ths } \end{aligned}$ | 6.2 | 6.5 | 6.5 6 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 10.7 \\ & 50 \\ & 5,016 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 10.7 \\ & 50 \\ & 6 \text { births } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11.2 \\ & 50 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11.4 \\ & 50 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11.6 \\ & 50 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11.8 \\ & 50 \end{aligned}$ | N.A. N.A. |
|  | Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 6.8 N.R. 40 dea | 7.0 <br> N.R. <br> aths |  | $\begin{aligned} & 6.8 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 6.9 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 5.6 \\ & 7 \end{aligned}$ $362$ | 5.3 <br> 4 <br> deaths | $\begin{aligned} & 5.4 \\ & 6 \\ & 15 \end{aligned}$ | 4.6 2 | 4.7 | 5.1 2 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | 10.7 50 481 | 10.5 49 <br> deaths | $10.3$ $49$ | 10.7 50 | $\begin{aligned} & 9.8 \\ & 49 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11.3 \\ & 50 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Child death rate <br> (deaths per 100,000 children ages $1-14$ ) | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 22 N.R. 58 deat | 21 <br> N.R. <br> aths | $\begin{aligned} & 21 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 20 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 20 \\ \text { N.R. } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | 18 9 143 | 17 7 deaths | $\begin{aligned} & 23 \\ & 26 \end{aligned}$ | 18 | 18 12 | 15 | N.A. N.A. | $\begin{aligned} & 37 \\ & 50 \\ & 190 \mathrm{de} \end{aligned}$ | 35 <br> 50 <br> deaths | $\begin{aligned} & 37 \\ & 50 \end{aligned}$ | 33 | $31$ | $33$ | N.A. N.A. |
|  | (deaths per 100,000 teens ages 15-19) | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  | 67 N.R. 03 dea | 68 <br> N.R. <br> aths | $\begin{aligned} & 66 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 66 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 65 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 52 \\ & 6 \end{aligned}$ $182$ | 50 <br> 4 <br> deaths | $\begin{gathered} 57 \\ 8 \\ 8 \end{gathered}$ | 59 14 | 52 10 | 49 7 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | 103 49 219 | 89 <br> 44 <br> deaths | $100$ | 89 44 | $\begin{aligned} & 102 \\ & 48 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 101 \\ & 48 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Teen birth rate (births per 1,000 females ages 15-19) | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 45 <br> N.R. <br> 593 bi | 43 <br> N.R. <br> irths | $\begin{aligned} & 42 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 41 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | 40 N.R. | N.A. N.A. | 30 6 4,78 | 28 6 0 birth | $\begin{aligned} & 27 \\ & 6 \\ & \text { ths } \end{aligned}$ | 27 | 27 | 26 | N.A. N.A. | 70 50 6,411 | 67 <br> 50 <br> births | $\begin{array}{r} 65 \\ 50 \\ 50 \end{array}$ | 63 48 | 62 49 | $\begin{aligned} & 61 \\ & 48 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Percent of teens who are high school dropouts (ages 16-19) | $\begin{array}{r} \begin{array}{c} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \end{array} \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 10 <br> N.R. <br> 0,000 | 9 <br> N.R. <br> teens | $\begin{aligned} & 8 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\stackrel{8}{\mathrm{~N}_{1} . \mathrm{R} .}$ | 7 <br> N.R. | 7 <br> N.R. | $12,0$ | 5 2 00 tee | ens | 15 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 15 45 19,00 | 15 <br> 50 <br> 00 teen | $\begin{array}{r} 12 \\ 43 \\ 43 \end{array}$ | 11 | $\begin{aligned} & 10 \\ & 41 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 9 \\ & 36 \end{aligned}$ |  |
|  | Percent of teens not attending school and not working (ages 16-19) | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ | 1,358 |  | 9 <br> N.R. <br> teens | $\begin{aligned} & 9 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 9 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | 8 N.R. d | 8 N.R. l | 14, | 4 2 a tee | ens | 4 1 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 11 35 22,00 | 13 <br> 48 <br> 00 teen | $\begin{array}{r} 10 \\ 35 \\ \text { ens } \end{array}$ | 12 46 | 12 46 | 11 45 | 12 48 |
|  | Percent of children living in families where no parent has full-time, year-round employment | $\begin{array}{r} \begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \end{array} \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  | 31 <br> N.R. <br> 275,000 | 33 <br> N.R. <br> 0 child | 33 <br> N.R. <br> ren | $\begin{gathered} 33 \\ \text { N.R. } \end{gathered}$ | 34 N.r. | 33 <br> N.R. | 23 3 348 | 26 9 000 | 26 4 children | 26 4 | 29 11 | 27 | 28 7 | 36 <br> 44 <br> 317,0 | 40 <br> 49 <br> ,000 chil | 40 <br> 49 <br> ildren | 41 50 | 39 48 | 43 50 | 42 48 |
|  | Percent of children in poverty (income below \$20,444 for a family of two adults and two children in 2006) | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  | $17$ N.R. $886,000$ | 18 <br> N.R. <br> 0 child | 18 <br> N.R. <br> ren | $\begin{aligned} & 18 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | 19 <br> N.R. | 18 <br> N.r. | 152 | 11 5 | 12 8 children | 2 | 11 | 12 5 | 12 5 | 26 47 220,0 | 26 <br> 49 <br> 000 chil | $\begin{aligned} & 29 \\ & 50 \end{aligned}$ hildren | 29 49 | 31 50 | 31 50 | 30 50 |
| N.A. $=$ Not Available. N.R. $=$ Not Ranked. | Percent of children in single-parent families | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ | 31 $N$ 22 | 31 <br> N.R. <br> 28,00 | 31 <br> N.R. <br> 0 childr | 31 N.R. ren | $\begin{aligned} & 31 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | 32 N.R. | 32 N.R. | 21 <br> 1 <br> 305 | 24 6 000 | 24 5 children | 23 | 24 | 25 | 25 4 | 43 <br> 50 <br> 307,0 | 42 <br> 50 <br> ,00 chi | 44 50 <br> iildren | 44 50 | 42 | 47 50 | 45 50 |


| MO |  |  |  |  |  |  | M |  |  |  |  |  |  | N |  |  |  |  |  |  | N |  |  |  |  |  |  | NH |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | ત్రై | ¢ | + | 合 | ঃi |  | Ö | Nò | $\stackrel{0}{8}$ | ষ্ণ | î̀ | ه্ণ |  | Ö | Ò | ờ | $\stackrel{\text { H}}{\substack{~+~}}$ | î | ঃi | O | Ö | ત̀ ત̀ | Ò | $\stackrel{\text { di}}{\mathbf{N}}$ | î | O | Oi | Oે | તì | ¢ | + | ลิ | $\stackrel{\text { ¢ }}{ }$ |
|  | 7.6 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.3 | 8.1 | N.A. | 6.2 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 7.6 | 6.6 | N.A. | 6.8 | 6.6 | 7.2 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 7.0 | N.A. | 7.2 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 8.1 | 8.0 | 8.3 | N.A. | 6.3 | 6.5 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.8 | 7.0 | N.A. |
|  | 22 | 27 | 25 | 30 | 23 | N.A. | 8 | 16 | 14 | 13 | 18 | 7 | N.A. | 16 | 14 | 17 | 15 | 13 | 14 | N.A. | 20 | 22 | 19 | 26 | 22 | 27 | N.A. |  | 13 | 5 | 4 | 10 | 14 | N.A. |
| 6,347 | 7 birt |  |  |  |  |  |  | births |  |  |  |  |  |  | birth |  |  |  |  |  |  | birth |  |  |  |  |  | 1,00 | births |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7.2 | 7.4 | 8.5 | 7.9 | 7.5 | 7.5 | N.A. | 6.1 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 6.8 | 4.5 | 7.0 | N.A. | 7.3 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 5.4 | 6.6 | 5.6 | N.A. | 6.5 | 5.7 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 6.4 | 5.8 | N.A. | 5.7 | 3.8 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 5.6 | 5.3 | N.A. |
|  | 31 | 42 | 39 | 31 | 35 | N.A. | 12 | 22 | 32 | 26 | 1 | 28 | N.A. | 31 | 23 | 25 | 8 | 24 | 9 | N.A. | 17 | 9 | 13 | 13 | 23 | 10 | N.A. |  | 1 | 4 | 1 | 12 | 6 | N.A. |
| 590 | deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | deaths |  |  |  |  |  | 76 d | eaths |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 24 | 25 | 24 | 26 | 21 | N.A. | 33 | 28 | 23 | 24 | 31 | 25 | N.A. | 22 | 23 | 23 | 25 | 25 | 22 | N.A. | 23 | 22 | 19 | 19 | 21 | 24 | N.A. | 14 | 20 | 12 | 12 | 16 | 8 | N.A. |
|  | 33 | 38 | 30 | 36 | 22 | N.A. | 47 | 40 | 26 | 30 | 45 | 38 | N.A. | 22 | 29 | 26 | 36 | 34 | 27 | N.A. | 27 | 21 | 10 | 11 | 20 | 34 | N.A. |  | 16 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1 | N.A. |
| 226 | deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | eaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | deaths |  |  |  |  |  | 19 d | eaths |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 91 | 83 | 73 | 80 | 84 | N.A. | 98 | 50 | 100 | 104 | 104 | 87 | N.A. | 73 | 68 | 72 | 61 | 67 | 65 | N.A. | 75 | 61 | 77 | 87 | 78 | 75 | N.A. | 55 | 59 | 34 | 46 | 46 | 55 | N.A. |
|  | 46 | 38 | 29 | 36 | 38 | N.A. | 47 | 4 | 46 | 49 | 49 | 40 | N.A. | 26 | 25 | 27 | 15 | 25 | 23 | N.A. |  | 17 | 35 | 43 | 35 | 32 | N.A. |  | 14 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 10 | N.A. |
| 351 | deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | eaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | deaths |  |  |  |  |  | 53 d | eaths |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 46 | 44 | 43 | 43 | 42 | N.A. | 37 | 36 | 36 | 35 | 36 | 35 | N.A. |  | 37 | 37 | 36 | 36 | 34 | N.A. | 63 | 56 | 54 | 53 | 51 | 50 | N.A. | 23 | 21 | 20 | 18 | 18 | 18 | N.A. |
|  | 30 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 30 | N.A. | 14 | 13 | 16 | 18 | 20 | 21 | N.A. | 15 | 16 | 18 | 21 | 20 | 19 | N.A. | 44 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 39 | 40 | N.A. |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | N.A. |
| 8,611 | birth |  |  |  |  |  | 1,18 | 5 birth |  |  |  |  |  |  | birth |  |  |  |  |  |  | birth |  |  |  |  |  | 850 | births |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 12 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 7 | 9 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 16 | 10 | 12 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 4 |
|  | 41 | 33 | 30 | 20 | 27 | 15 | 9 | 7 | 18 | 39 | 37 | 16 | 41 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 15 | 13 | 4 | 10 | 46 | 30 | 43 | 39 | 45 | 50 | 47 |  | 2 | 9 | 15 | 20 | 9 | 2 |
| 20,0 | 00 tee |  |  |  |  |  |  | , 0 teen |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0 teen |  |  |  |  |  |  | , tee |  |  |  |  |  | 3,00 | teens |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 10 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 12 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 16 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 9 | 11 |  | 3 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 4 |
|  | 29 | 30 | 16 | 34 | 31 | 18 | 13 | 29 | 35 | 34 | 46 | 19 | 27 | 4 |  | 5 | 11 | 5 | 1 | 9 | 50 | 48 | 41 | 39 | 42 | 31 | 46 |  | 1 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 6 | 1 |
| 25,0 | 00 tee |  |  |  |  |  |  | O teen |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0 teen |  |  |  |  |  |  | , tee |  |  |  |  |  | 3,00 | teens |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 30 | 29 | 29 | 31 | 33 | 32 | 30 | 38 | 35 | 32 | 33 | 36 | 33 |  | 24 | 23 | 23 | 24 | 26 | 26 |  | 29 | 34 | 30 | 36 | 31 | 30 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 27 | 29 | 27 | 26 |
|  | 23 | 11 | 15 | 16 | 23 | 22 | 19 | 46 | 36 | 25 | 25 | 36 | 27 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 19 | 18 | 30 | 17 | 36 | 16 | 14 |  | 3 | 2 | 7 | 11 | 4 | 3 |
| 457,0 | ,000 ch | vildren |  |  |  |  |  | ,00 chil | idren |  |  |  |  |  | ,000 ch | ildren |  |  |  |  |  | ,000 ch | ildren |  |  |  |  | 77,00 | O child |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16 | 16 | 17 | 16 | 16 | 19 | 19 | 17 | 20 | 20 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 17 | 10 | 14 | 14 | 13 | 13 | 15 | 14 | 13 | 15 | 17 | 15 | 19 | 15 | 14 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 10 |
| 28 | 29 | 29 | 25 | 21 | 30 | 34 | 32 | 39 | 37 | 30 | 30 | 36 | 24 | 3 | 16 | 12 | 13 | 10 | 16 | 13 | 12 | 22 | 29 | 23 | 30 | 16 | 13 |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 260, | ,000 ch | hildren |  |  |  |  |  | 00 chil | dren |  |  |  |  |  | 00 chi | dren |  |  |  |  |  | , ${ }^{\text {chil }}$ | dren |  |  |  |  | 28,0 | 00 child | dren |  |  |  |  |
| 32 | 30 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 32 | 25 | 27 | 25 | 28 | 27 | 28 | 25 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 21 | 23 | 25 | 25 | 33 | 28 | 31 | 32 | 31 | 32 | 34 |  | 23 | 23 | 26 | 26 | 24 | 25 |
| 32 | 29 | 21 | 25 | 29 | 31 | 28 | 9 | 16 | 8 | 16 | 12 | 12 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 36 | 20 | 33 | 33 | 29 | 31 | 36 |  | 4 | 3 | 9 | 9 | 4 | 4 |
| 426, | ,000 ch | hildren |  |  |  |  | 51,0 | 00 chil | Idren |  |  |  |  |  | ,000 ch | ildren |  |  |  |  |  | ,000 ch | ildren |  |  |  |  | 71,0 | O0 child |  |  |  |  |  |


|  | Key Indicators |  | USA |  |  |  |  |  |  | NJ |  |  |  |  |  |  | NM |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 앗 |  | ત્ઠ ત̀ |  | ষ্ণ | ñ | - | $\stackrel{\circ}{0}$ | ઠ્ઠે | ત્તે | - | $\stackrel{\text { ¢ }}{\text { - }}$ | Nì | - | ষ্ট망 | Ö̀ | Ö | へ̀ | - | へ̂̀ | - |
|  | Percent low-birthweight babies | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 7.7 N.R. 665 bi | 7.8 <br> N.R. <br> irrths | $\begin{aligned} & 7.9 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 8.1 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 8.2 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | 7.7 28 9,3 | $7.9$ $28$ <br> 3 birtls | $\begin{aligned} & 8.0 \\ & 27 \\ & \text { hs } \end{aligned}$ | 8.1 26 | 8.3 30 | 8.2 24 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 7.9 \\ 28 \\ 50 \text { birth } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.0 \\ 27 \\ \text { hs } \end{gathered}$ | 8.5 33 | $8.1$ | $\begin{aligned} & 8.5 \\ & 33 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 6.8 N.R. 40 de | $\begin{aligned} & 7.0 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 6.8 \\ \text { N.R. } \end{gathered}$ | $6.9$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | 595 | 6.5 <br> 21 <br> death | $\begin{aligned} & 5.7 \\ & 10 \end{aligned}$ | 5.7 13 | 5.6 12 | 5.2 4 | N.A. N.A. | $\begin{aligned} & 6.6 \\ & 19 \\ & 177 \end{aligned}$ | 6.4 <br> 20 <br> deaths | $\begin{aligned} & 6.3 \\ & 17 \end{aligned}$ | 5.8 15 | $\begin{aligned} & 6.3 \\ & 20 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 6.1 \\ & 16 \end{aligned}$ | N.A. N.A. |
|  | Child death rate (deaths per 100,000 children ages 1-14) | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 22 N.R. 58 dea | $\begin{aligned} & \quad 21 \\ & \text {. N.R. } \\ & \text { aths } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 21 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 20 \\ \text { N.R. } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 20 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | 23 | 14 1 deaths | $\begin{aligned} & 17 \\ & 6 \end{aligned}$ | 15 | 14 | 14 3 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ | 20 12 116 | $\begin{gathered} 25 \\ 36 \\ \text { deaths } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 24 \\ & 34 \end{aligned}$ | 29 45 | 28 41 | 31 48 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Teen death rate (deaths per 100,000 teens ages 15-19) | $\begin{array}{r} \begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \end{array} \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 67 <br> N.R. <br> 03 dec | 68 <br> N.R. <br> aths | $66$ N.R. | $\begin{aligned} & 66 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 65 \\ \text { N.R. } \end{gathered}$ | N.A. N.A. | 48 5 272 | 44 <br> 2 <br> death | 47 <br> 4 | 42 | 49 | 45 5 | N.A. N.A. | 99 48 129 | $\begin{aligned} & 74 \\ & 33 \end{aligned}$ <br> deaths | $\begin{aligned} & 94 \\ & 42 \end{aligned}$ | 97 48 | 88 40 | 87 40 | N.A. N.A. |
|  | Teen birth rate (births per 1,000 females ages 15-19) | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2005 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ |  | 45 <br> N.R. <br> 593 bi | $\begin{aligned} & \quad 43 \\ & \text { inths } \\ & \hline \text { irths } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 42 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 41 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | 40 N.R. |  | 32 8 6,8 | $\begin{gathered} 29 \\ 8 \\ 4 \text { birth } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 27 \\ 6 \\ \text { hs } \end{gathered}$ | 26 | 24 | 23 | N.A. |  | 63 <br> 47 <br> 1 birth | $\begin{array}{r} 62 \\ 48 \\ \text { hs } \end{array}$ | 63 48 | 61 48 | 62 49 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N.A. } \\ & \text { N.A. } \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Percent of teens who are high school dropouts (ages 16-19) | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  |  | 9 <br> N.R. <br> teens | $\begin{aligned} & 8 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 8 \\ & . \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 7 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 7 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | 22, | 5 2 00 tee | ens | 4 1 | 5 | 6 | $\begin{aligned} & 5 \\ & 10 \end{aligned}$ | 16 46 12,0 | 9 23 00 tee | 15 <br> 49 <br> ns | 10 39 | 12 48 | 10 47 | $\begin{aligned} & 10 \\ & 47 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Percent of teens not attending school and not working (ages 16-19) | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ | 1,351 | 9.R. N.R. 5,00 | 9 <br> N.R. <br> teens | $\begin{aligned} & 9 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 9 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | 8 N.R. |  | 32, | 6 5 | $\begin{gathered} 7 \\ 10 \\ \text { ens } \end{gathered}$ | 5 | 12 | 9 | 7 18 | 11 35 14,0 | 11 38 00 tee | $\begin{array}{r} 12 \\ 45 \\ \text { ens } \end{array}$ | 10 34 | 12 46 | 11 45 | 12 48 |
|  | Percent of children living in families where no parent has full-time, year-round employment | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  | 31 <br> N.R. <br> 175000 | 33 <br> N.R. <br> 0 child | 33 <br> N.R. ren | $\begin{aligned} & 33 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | 34 N.R. | 33 <br> N.R. | 588 | 27 12 000 | 29 11 hildren | 27 | 28 | 28 | 28 7 | 38 <br> 46 <br> 192 | 35 42 000 ch | 38 <br> 45 <br> hildren | 39 46 | 37 43 | 41 | 38 46 |
|  | Percent of children in poverty (income below \$20,444 for a family of two adults and two children in 2006) | $\begin{array}{r} \begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \end{array} \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  | 17 <br> N.R. <br> 286,00 | 18 <br> N.R. <br> 0 child | 18 <br> N.R. <br> ren | $\begin{aligned} & 18 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | 19 | 18 <br> N.r. | 10 <br> 3 <br> 244 | 11 5 | 11 5 | 12 5 | 12 | 12 5 | 12 5 | 26 <br> 47 <br> 128, | 24 48 000 ch | 27 48 hildren | 26 48 | 28 48 | 26 | 26 48 |
| N.A. $=$ Not Available. N.R. $=$ Not Ranked. | Percent of children in single-parent families | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Rate } \\ \text { Rank } \\ 2006 \text { raw data } \end{array}$ | 31 $N$ 22 | 31 N.R. 28,00 | 31 <br> N.R. <br> 0 child | 31 <br> N.R. <br> ren | $\begin{aligned} & 31 \\ & \text { N.R. } \end{aligned}$ | 32 N.R. | 32 N.R. | 25 9 54 | 26 11 , 000 ch | 26 10 iildren | 27 10 | 25 | 28 12 | 28 12 |  | 35 45 000 ch | 39 48 <br> ild | 37 47 | 38 45 | 38 47 | 37 46 |


| NY |  |  |  |  |  |  | NC |  |  |  |  |  |  | ND |  |  |  |  |  |  | OH |  |  |  |  |  |  | OK |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | \％ | O゙ | n̂̀ | － | O웅 | 흠 | ત్రָ | \％ | Ò | Nồ | － | ö |  | ત્ઠ | ồ | O゙ | Nò | O | O. | Ö | તָ ત̀ | ò | +̈ | 合 | ঃiઠ | O. | ઠ̈ | ત̃ | $\stackrel{\stackrel{N}{0}}{ }$ | 蓉 | ñ | $\stackrel{\circ}{\circ}$ |
|  | 7.7 | 7.9 | 7.9 | 8.2 | 8.3 | N．A． | 8.8 | 8.9 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 9.2 | N．A． | 6.4 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.4 | N．A． | 7.9 | 8.0 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.5 | 8.7 | N．A． | 7.5 | 7.8 | 8.0 | 7.8 | 8.0 | 8.0 | N．A． |
|  | 26 | 24 | 22 | 28 | 27 | N．A． | 45 | 43 | 42 | 41 | 39 | 41 | N．A． | 12 |  | 5 | 6 | 7 | 5 | N．A． | 31 | 32 | 34 | 31 | 35 | 36 | N．A． |  | 27 | 27 | 21 | 22 | 21 | N．A． |
| 20，420 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 11，308 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 535 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 12，882 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 4，131 births |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 5.8 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 5.8 | N．A． | 8.6 | 8.5 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 8.8 | 8.8 | N．A． | 8.1 | 8.8 | 6.3 | 7.3 | 5.6 | 6.0 | N．A． | 7.6 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 8.3 | N．A． | 8.5 | 7.3 | 8.1 | 7.8 | 8.0 | 8.1 | N．A． |
|  | 10 | 13 | 17 | 18 | 10 | N．A． | 44 | 42 | 40 | 40 | 46 | 44 | N．A． | 37 | 45 | 17 | 29 | 12 | 15 | N．A． | 33 | 36 | 37 | 35 | 36 | 43 | N．A． | 41 | 29 | 38 | 38 | 37 | 40 | N．A． |
| 1，431 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，083 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 50 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，225 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 417 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 18 | 17 | 16 | 16 | 16 | N．A． | 24 | 22 | 23 | 22 | 21 | 21 | N．A． | 19 | 17 | 20 | 25 | 26 | 23 | N．A． | 23 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 20 | 20 | N．A． | 25 | 31 | 24 | 29 | 27 | 28 | N．A． |
|  | 9 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 | N．A． | 30 | 21 | 26 | 26 | 20 | 22 | N．A． | 10 | 7 | 13 | 36 | 36 | 31 | N．A． | 27 | 14 | 10 | 16 | 18 | 18 | N．A． | 33 | 46 | 34 | 45 | 40 | 45 | N．A． |
| 556 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 341 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 24 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 426 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 181 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 52 | 49 | 48 | 47 | 45 | N．A． | 71 | 79 | 75 | 80 | 77 | 70 | N．A． | 52 | 65 | 69 | 85 | 61 | 80 | N．A． | 58 | 58 | 59 | 57 | 64 | 61 | N．A． | 77 | 84 | 80 | 80 | 88 | 90 | N．A． |
|  | 7 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 5 | N．A． | 24 | 37 | 33 | 35 | 34 | 30 | N．A． |  | 21 | 24 | 41 | 19 | 35 | N．A． | 11 | 11 | 13 | 11 | 21 | 18 | N．A． | 33 | 40 | 37 | 35 | 40 | 45 | N．A． |
| 590 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 414 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 37 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 502 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 227 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 32 | 29 | 28 | 27 | 27 | N．A． | 59 | 55 | 52 | 49 | 49 | 48 | N．A． | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 30 | N．A． | 46 | 43 | 40 | 39 | 38 | 39 | N．A． | 60 | 58 | 58 | 56 | 56 | 54 | N．A． |
|  | 9 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 8 | N．A． | 39 | 38 | 38 | 37 | 37 | 37 | N．A． | 4 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 9 | N．A． | 25 | 27 | 25 | 24 | 23 | 26 | N．A． | 41 | 43 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | N．A． |
| 17，068 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 13，933 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 661 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 15，490 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6，685 births |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 9 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 16 | 14 | 10 | 11 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 14 | 13 | 11 | 7 | 6 | 10 | 8 |
|  | 23 | 18 | 15 | 32 | 9 | 15 | 46 | 45 | 33 | 45 | 37 | 36 | 27 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 22 |  | 9 | 15 | 13 | 9 | 10 |  | 44 | 39 | 15 | 13 | 47 | 36 |
| 63,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 36,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 36,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 16，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 10 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 11 | 11 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 11 | 12 | 7 | 11 | 9 | 10 | 9 |
|  | 29 | 22 | 29 | 27 | 19 | 18 | 35 | 38 | 30 | 34 | 34 | 31 | 27 | ， | 7 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 13 | 14 | 10 | 16 | 18 | 19 | 18 |  | 44 | 10 | 39 | 27 | 40 | 36 |
| 81,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 39，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 44，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 18，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 34 | 34 | 33 | 35 | 35 | 34 | 35 | 33 | 35 | 36 | 35 | 34 | 34 | 29 | 25 | 26 | 25 | 27 | 28 | 24 | 30 | 30 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 34 | 34 | 33 | 30 | 33 | 33 | 36 | 35 | 36 |
|  | 39 | 30 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 29 | 40 | 33 | 36 | 41 | 29 | 26 | 29 | 17 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 19 | 23 | 22 | 25 | 19 | 26 | 29 | 32 | 23 | 26 | 28 | 36 | 30 | 40 |
| 1，526，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 737，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 35,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 936，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 323，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 19 | 19 | 19 | 21 | 19 | 20 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 19 | 22 | 21 | 20 | 15 | 15 | 13 | 14 | 16 | 13 | 13 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 22 | 22 | 21 | 23 | 24 |
|  | 36 | 34 | 34 | 36 | 30 | 36 | 35 |  | 41 | 34 | 41 | 39 | 36 | 24 |  | 11 | 16 | 21 | 8 | 11 | 28 |  | 29 | 30 | 27 | 30 | 34 |  |  | 43 | 42 | 36 | 42 | 44 |
| 888，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 429，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 18,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 509，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 213，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 34 | 35 | 34 | 35 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 34 | 34 | 35 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 24 | 24 | 23 | 24 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 32 | 33 | 32 | 33 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 29 | 34 | 32 | 34 |
| 42 | 45 | 42 | 43 | 37 | 39 | 36 | 36 | 39 | 39 | 37 | 37 | 39 | 40 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 29 | 37 | 39 | 33 | 34 | 31 | 32 | 24 | 33 | 36 | 19 | 37 | 31 | 36 |
| 1，438，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 696，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 32,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 870，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 279，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |



| RI |  |  |  |  |  |  | SC |  |  |  |  |  |  | SD |  |  |  |  |  |  | TN |  |  |  |  |  |  | TX |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | ત̛̀ | \％ | ＋ | \％ | O |  |  | Ò | \％ | ＊ | へิ | o | oi |  | તָ̄ | ¢ | ＋ | \％ | $\stackrel{\circ}{\circ}$ | Oi |  | Nò ત্ণী | $\stackrel{0}{8}$ | $\stackrel{\text { d }}{\text {＋}}$ | 合 | oㅁㅁ | 웅 |  | Oે તે | ¢ | $\stackrel{\text { ® }}{\text { ¢ }}$ | へิ | ¢ |
| 7.2 | 7.3 | 7.9 | 8.5 | 8.0 | 7.8 | N．A． | 9.7 | 9.6 | 10.0 | 10.1 | 10.2 | 10.2 | N．A． | 6.2 | 6.4 | 7.2 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 6.6 | N．A． | 9.2 | 9.2 | 9.2 | 9.4 | 9.2 | 9.5 | N．A． | 7.4 | 7.6 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 8.0 | 8.3 | N．A． |
| 20 |  | 24 | 33 | 22 | 19 | N．A． | 47 | 47 | 48 | 48 | 47 | 47 | N．A． | 8 | 9 | 17 | 10 | 12 | 7 | N．A． | 46 |  | 45 | 45 | 42 | 43 | N．A． | 22 |  |  | 22 | 22 | 27 | N．A |
| 985 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5，885 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 754 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 7，748 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 31，956 births |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6.3 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 6.7 | 5.3 | 6.5 | N．A． | 8.7 | 8.9 | 9.3 | 8.3 | 9.3 | 9.4 | N．A． | 5.5 | 7.4 | 6.5 | 6.7 | 8.2 | 7.2 | N．A． | 9.1 | 8.7 | 9.4 | 9.3 | 8.6 | 8.9 | N．A． | 5.7 | 5.9 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 6.3 | 6.6 | N．A． |
| 14 | 23 | 25 | 24 | 8 | 19 | N．A． | 45 | 46 | 47 | 42 | 48 | 47 | N．A． | 6 | 31 | 21 | 24 | 39 | 29 | N．A． | 47 | 44 | 48 | 47 | 43 | 45 | N．A． | 9 | 13 | 19 | 22 | 20 | 21 | N．A． |
| 82 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 543 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 83 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 724 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2，537 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17 | 15 | 14 | 14 | 11 | 20 | N．A． | 25 | 26 | 27 | 25 | 25 | 25 | N．A． | 35 | 33 | 31 | 36 | 39 | 29 | N．A． | 28 | 23 | 25 | 25 | 23 | 24 | N．A． | 24 | 24 | 23 | 24 | 23 | 21 | N．A． |
| 7 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 18 | N．A． | 33 | 38 | 42 | 36 | 34 | 38 | N．A． | 49 | 47 | 47 | 48 | 50 | 46 | N．A． | 43 | 29 | 38 | 36 | 29 | 34 | N．A． | 30 | 33 | 26 | 30 | 29 | 22 | N．A． |
| 37 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 200 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 42 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 254 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，043 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 52 | 48 | 52 | 65 | 54 | 39 | N．A． | 86 | 87 | 93 | 82 | 86 | 84 | N．A． | 78 | 66 | 94 | 82 | 80 | 96 | N．A． | 90 | 83 | 94 | 76 | 96 | 79 | N．A． | 76 | 70 | 74 | 72 | 66 | 66 | N．A． |
| 6 | 3 | 7 | 20 | 12 | 2 | N．A． | 41 |  | 41 | 38 | 39 | 38 | N．A． | 35 | 24 | 42 | 38 | 36 | 47 | N．A． | 43 | 39 | 42 | 32 | 45 | 34 | N．A． | 30 | 28 | 30 | 27 | 24 | 24 | N．A． |
| 29 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 251 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 57 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 321 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，118 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 34 | 36 | 36 | 31 | 33 | 31 | N．A． | 58 | 56 | 53 | 51 | 52 | 51 | N．A． | 38 | 38 | 38 | 35 | 38 | 38 | N．A． | 59 | 57 | 54 | 53 | 52 | 55 | N．A． | 69 | 66 | 64 | 63 | 63 | 62 | N．A． |
| 10 | 13 | 16 | 10 | 15 | 12 | N．A． | 38 | 39 | 39 | 39 | 40 | 42 | N．A． | 15 | 17 | 21 | 18 | 23 | 24 | N．A． | 39 | 42 | 40 | 41 | 40 | 45 | N．A． | 49 | 49 | 49 | 48 | 50 | 49 | N．A． |
| 1，117 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 7，478 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，082 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 10，785 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 51，180 births |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 14 | 9 | 11 | 7 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 11 | 8 | 6 | 14 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 7 |
| 22 | 23 | 9 | 15 | 37 | 27 | 27 | 42 |  | 39 | 15 | 41 | 36 | 36 | 12 |  | 18 | 15 | 3 | 16 | 27 | 30 |  | 33 | 30 | 45 | 27 | 15 | 42 | 37 | 33 | 37 | 37 | 27 | 27 |
| 5，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 20，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 20，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 105，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7 | 8 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 12 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 8 | 6 | 11 | 9 | 9 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 9 | 11 | 10 | 12 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 9 |
| 13 | 14 | 5 | 29 | 27 | 19 | 18 | 43 | 22 | 30 | 16 | 34 | 40 | 43 | 6 | 5 | 22 | 16 | 3 | 19 | 9 | 35 | 22 | 30 | 39 | 42 | 45 | 36 | 35 | 29 | 45 | 34 | 34 | 31 | 36 |
| 5，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 27，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 29，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 128，000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 34 | 32 | 35 | 33 | 37 | 36 | 32 | 31 | 33 | 36 | 36 | 35 | 36 | 36 | 21 | 21 | 24 | 24 | 25 | 30 | 29 | 32 | 34 | 34 | 33 | 35 | 36 | 36 | 32 | 32 | 33 | 33 | 35 | 35 | 34 |
| 35 | 30 | 36 | 28 | 43 | 36 | 22 | 23 | 33 | 42 | 41 | 29 | 36 | 40 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 14 | 13 | 29 | 39 | 30 | 28 | 29 | 36 | 40 | 29 | 30 | 26 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 29 |
| 77，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 369,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 55，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 526，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2，213，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16 | 18 | 15 | 17 | 21 | 19 | 15 | 19 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 23 | 23 | 22 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 18 | 17 | 20 | 21 | 20 | 20 | 21 | 21 | 23 | 22 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 23 | 25 | 24 |
| 28 | 33 | 20 | 29 | 36 | 30 | 16 | 35 |  |  | 34 | 42 | 42 | 40 | 19 |  | 12 | 16 | 18 | 26 | 24 | 40 |  | 37 | 40 | 36 | 39 | 41 | 43 | 43 | 43 | 43 | 42 | 44 | 44 |
| 35,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 226，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 32,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 322,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，527，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 32 | 34 | 33 | 32 | 39 | 33 | 35 | 35 | 37 | 36 | 38 | 40 | 38 | 40 | 23 | 21 | 24 | 22 | 27 | 28 | 27 | 33 | 33 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 35 | 31 | 30 | 29 | 30 | 32 | 32 | 33 |
| 32 | 41 | 39 | 33 | 47 | 37 | 40 | 44 | 47 | 47 | 48 | 48 | 47 | 48 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 12 | 12 | 9 | 36 | 39 | 36 | 37 | 37 | 43 | 40 | 29 | 29 |  | 25 | 33 | 31 | 32 |
| 80,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 379,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 49，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 473，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1，983，000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |



| VA |  |  |  |  |  |  | WA |  |  |  |  |  |  | WV |  |  |  |  |  |  | WI |  |  |  |  |  |  | WY |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 앙 | Ö | Nờ | on | $\begin{aligned} & \text { H } \\ & \text { Oi } \end{aligned}$ | $\underset{\sim}{i n}$ | O- | 응 | ō | Nờ | ô | $\underset{\sim}{\text { tr }}$ | Nồ | O- | O | ప్రి心 | No | ồ | $\underset{\sim}{\text { H }}$ | Nồ | O- | O | ō | No | Nò | +্ত | nồ | O | O | تे | Noì | ô | $\underset{\sim}{\text { tr }}$ | へٌ | - |
| 7.9 | 7.9 | 7.9 | 8.2 | 8.3 | 8.2 | N.A. | 5.6 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 6.0 | 6.2 | 6.1 | N.A. | 8.3 | 8.5 | 9.0 | 8.6 | 9.3 | 9.6 | N.A. | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 7.0 | N.A. | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.4 | 8.9 | 8.6 | 8.6 | N.A. |
| 31 | 28 | 24 | 29 | 30 | 24 | N.A. | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | N.A. | 38 | 39 | 42 | 36 | 43 | 46 | N.A. | 13 | 14 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 14 | N.A. |  |  | 36 | 39 | 37 | 35 | N.A. |
| 8,573 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5,041 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1,990 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 4,977 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 621 births |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6.9 | 7.6 | 7.4 | 7.7 | 7.5 | 7.5 | N.A. | 5.2 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.1 | N.A. | 7.6 | 7.2 | 9.1 | 7.3 | 7.6 | 8.1 | N.A. | 6.6 | 7.1 | 6.9 | 6.5 | 6.0 | 6.6 | N.A. | 6.7 | 5.9 | 6.7 | 5.8 | 8.8 | 6.8 | N.A. |
| 26 | 35 | 30 | 35 | 31 | 35 | N.A. | 3 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 2 | N.A. | 33 | 27 | 45 | 29 | 34 | 40 | N.A. | 19 | 26 | 24 | 20 | 17 | 21 | N.A. |  | 13 | 23 | 15 | 46 | 25 | N.A. |
| 781 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 421 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 169 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 469 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 49 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20 | 18 | 20 | 21 | 18 | 19 | N.A. | 19 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 16 | 16 | N.A. | 30 | 21 | 24 | 24 | 28 | 26 | N.A. | 20 | 21 | 20 | 20 | 17 | 20 | N.A. | 27 | 29 | 34 | 37 | 20 | 20 | N.A. |
| 12 | 9 | 13 | 20 | 12 | 15 | N.A. | 10 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 6 | 6 | N.A. |  | 19 | 34 | 30 | 41 | 42 | N.A. | 12 | 19 | 13 | 16 | 9 | 18 | N.A. |  |  | 48 | 49 | 18 | 18 | N.A. |
| 270 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 183 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 75 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 199 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 17 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 67 | 60 | 64 | 62 | 59 | 57 | N.A. | 60 | 56 | 58 | 54 | 57 | 53 | N.A. | 88 | 75 | 103 | 90 | 94 | 87 | N.A. | 66 | 64 | 62 | 70 | 57 | 64 | N.A. | 81 | 89 | 77 | 85 | 74 | 103 | N.A. |
| 22 | 16 | 18 | 18 | 16 | 13 | N.A. | 12 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 13 | 9 | N.A. |  | 35 | 50 | 46 | 43 | 40 | N.A. |  | 20 | 15 | 24 | 13 | 21 | N.A. |  |  | 35 | 41 | 31 | 49 | N.A. |
| 303 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 237 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 101 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 259 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  | 39 deaths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 41 | 40 | 38 | 36 | 35 | 34 | N.A. | 39 | 36 | 33 | 32 | 31 | 31 | N.A. | 47 | 46 | 46 | 45 | 44 | 43 | N.A. | 35 | 34 | 32 | 31 | 30 | 30 | N.A. | 42 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 43 | 43 | N.A. |
| 20 | 22 | 21 | 21 | 19 | 19 | N.A. | 18 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 12 | 12 | N.A. | 28 | 30 | 34 | 35 | 33 | 32 | N.A. | 13 | 12 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 | N.A. | 22 | 21 | 25 | 29 | 31 | 32 | N.A. |
| 8,778 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6,746 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2,450 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6,011 births |  |  |  |  |  |  | 795 births |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 10 | 11 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 7 |
| 17 | 7 | 18 | 4 | 20 | 9 | 10 | 17 | 23 | 18 | 10 | 20 | 16 | 15 | 12 | 23 | 18 | 39 | 20 | 36 | 36 | 5 | 14 | 9 | 1 | 20 | 9 | 10 | 22 | 37 | 9 | 4 | 20 | 27 | 27 |
| 23,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 23,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 8,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 16,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 7 |  | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 6 |
| 13 | 14 | 22 | 6 | 18 | 9 | 9 | 20 | 22 | 22 | 34 | 27 | 31 | 18 | 35 | 38 | 41 | 39 | 34 | 45 | 43 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 1 | 12 | 9 | 9 |  |  | 5 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 9 |
| 27,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 26,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 9,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 19,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2,000 teens |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 29 | 28 | 27 | 31 | 33 | 38 | 35 | 38 | 36 | 34 | 40 | 39 | 38 | 37 | 36 | 39 | 39 | 27 | 29 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 28 | 33 | 28 | 30 | 28 | 32 | 29 | 33 |
| 11 | 12 | 6 | 7 | 11 | 6 | 5 | 23 | 33 | 45 | 36 | 45 | 36 | 29 | 48 | 47 | 45 | 44 | 36 | 46 | 47 | 11 | 18 | 15 | 17 | 14 | 14 | 7 | 32 | 16 | 15 | 13 | 19 | 11 | 27 |
| 493,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 523,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 151,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 373,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 40,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 13 | 12 | 14 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 12 | 16 | 14 | 15 | 14 | 17 | 15 | 15 | 26 | 23 | 25 | 25 | 24 | 26 | 25 | 12 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 13 | 14 | 12 | 14 | 11 | 12 |
| 12 | 9 | 12 | 5 | 10 | 8 | 5 | 28 | 16 | 20 | 16 | 23 | 16 | 16 |  | 46 | 47 | 47 | 45 | 47 | 47 | 8 | 16 | 12 | 16 | 14 | 11 | 16 | 24 |  | 12 | 5 | 14 | 2 | 5 |
| 216,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 231,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 96,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 192,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 14,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 28 | 28 | 28 | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 | 28 | 27 | 27 | 29 | 30 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 28 | 25 | 22 | 29 | 25 | 27 | 27 | 27 |
| 18 | 20 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 16 | 18 | 18 | 16 | 15 | 19 | 25 | 12 | 18 | 24 | 20 | 21 | 32 | 20 | 21 | 23 | 18 | 20 | 17 | 10 | 16 | 16 | 12 | 9 | 3 | 21 | 7 | 12 | 8 | 9 |
| 496,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 419,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 111,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 349,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  | 31,000 children |  |  |  |  |  |  |

The 2008 KIDS COUNT Data Book is the 19th annual profile of child well-being produced by the Annie E. Casey Foundation. However, indicators used in the Data Books have changed over time, making year-to-year comparisons of state ranks problematic. This Appendix provides Overall Ranks for 2000 through 2006 for each state using a consistent set of indicators-namely, those used to derive the rank reported in the 2008 KIDS COUNT Data Book. This Appendix is the best source of information to see whether a particular state improved in ranking over the past few years.

Note that state ranks in 2006 are based on data from 2005 for five measures and data from 2006 for the other five measures. In other words, data for the Percent LowBirthweight Babies, Infant Mortality Rate, Child Death Rate, Teen Death Rate, and Teen Birth Rate lag one year behind the other measures.

| 2000 | AL | AK | AZ | AR | CA | co | cт | DE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 48 | 30 | 40 | 46 | 20 | 22 | 11 | 26 |
| 2001 | 48 | 38 | 39 | 46 | 22 | 26 | 7 | 37 |
| 2002 | 48 | 33 | 43 | 45 | 18 | 22 | 7 | 36 |
| 2003 | 48 | 36 | 41 | 44 | 17 | 27 | 11 | 31 |
| 2004 | 43 | 35 | 37 | 45 | 18 | 25 | 3 | 29 |
| 2005 | 48 | 38 | 36 | 45 | 19 | 23 | 3 | 35 |
| 2006 | 47 | 31 | 39 | 45 | 22 | 28 | 4 | 33 |
| 2000 | MT | NE | NV | NH | NJ | NM | NY | NC |
|  | 21 | 10 | 39 | 1 | 9 | 45 | 24 | 43 |
| 2001 | 32 | 13 | 31 | 1 | 5 | 43 | 25 | 45 |
| 2002 | 29 | 10 | 34 | 1 | 5 | 47 | 19 | 41 |
| 2003 | 34 | 12 | 32 | 1 | 4 | 46 | 22 | 40 |
| 2004 | 34 | 8 | 36 | 1 | 7 | 48 | 22 | 41 |
| 2005 | 29 | 10 | 33 | 2 | 9 | 47 | 18 | 39 |
| 2006 | 29 | 9 | 36 | 1 | 6 | 48 | 20 | 38 |


| FL | GA | HI | ID | IL | IN | 14 | KS | KY | LA | ME | MD | MA | MI | MN | MS | MO |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 35 | 44 | 14 | 25 | 29 | 32 | 6 | 17 | 37 | 49 | 5 | 31 | 8 | 28 | 2 | 50 | 34 | 2000 |
| 33 | 42 | 21 | 23 | 29 | 30 | 6 | 15 | 36 | 49 | 8 | 19 | 3 | 27 | 2 | 50 | 34 | 2001 |
| 35 | 44 | 23 | 25 | 30 | 31 | 9 | 20 | 39 | 49 | 15 | 27 | 3 | 24 | 2 | 50 | 32 | 2002 |
| 35 | 39 | 24 | 16 | 28 | 30 | 9 | 15 | 42 | 49 | 7 | 21 | 6 | 26 | 3 | 50 | 33 | 2003 |
| 33 | 44 | 21 | 20 | 24 | 32 | 5 | 12 | 42 | 49 | 11 | 23 | 10 | 27 | 4 | 50 | 30 | 2004 |
| 32 | 41 | 11 | 22 | 26 | 31 | 7 | 16 | 40 | 49 | 15 | 24 | 5 | 27 | 1 | 50 | 34 | 2005 |
| 35 | 40 | 13 | 14 | 24 | 34 | 8 | 18 | 41 | 49 | 16 | 19 | 3 | 27 | 2 | 50 | 32 | 2006 |


| ND | OH | OK | OR | PA | RI | SC | SD | TN | TX | UT | VT | VA | WA | WV | WI | WY |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 7 | 27 | 41 | 23 | 18 | 15 | 47 | 16 | 42 | 36 | 4 | 3 | 19 | 13 | 38 | 12 | 33 |

More complete definitions and more
detailed listings of data sources
are available on the KIDS COUNT website at www.kidscount.org

## 4th Grade Students Who Scored At or Above

 Proficient Math Level: 2007 is the percentage of 4th grade public school students who reached either the Proficient or the Advanced level in mathematics, as measured by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), which is conducted by the U.S. Department of Education SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics.4th Grade Students Who Scored At or Above Proficient Reading Level: 2007 is the percentage of 4 th grade public school students who reached either the Proficient or the Advanced level in reading, as measured by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), which is conducted by the U.S. Department of Education. SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics.

## 8th Grade Students Who Scored At or Above

 Proficient Math Level: 2007 is the percentage of 8th grade public school students who reached either the Proficient or the Advanced level in mathematics, as measured by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), which is conducted by the U.S. Department of Education. SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics.8th Grade Students Who Scored At or Above Proficient Reading Level: $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ is the percentage of 8th grade public school students who reached either the Proficient or the Advanced level in reading, as measured by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), which is conducted by the U.S. Department of Education. SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics.

Child Death Rate (deaths per 100,000 children ages 1-14): 2005 is the number of deaths to children between ages 1 and 14, from all causes, per 100,000 children in this age range. The data are reported by place of residence, not place of death SOURCES: Death Statistics: U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. Population Statistics: U.S. Census Bureau

Children in Extreme Poverty (income below 50\% of poverty level): 2006 is the percentage of children under age 18 who live in families with incomes below 50 percent of the U.S. poverty threshold, as defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. The federal poverty definition consists of a series of thresholds based on family size and composition. In calendar year 2006, a family of two adults and two children were below 50 percent of the poverty level if their annual income fell below $\$ 10,222$. SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey.

Children in Low-Income Families (income below 200\% of poverty level): 2006 is the percentage of children under age 18 who live in families with incomes below 200 percent of the U.S. poverty threshold, as defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. In calendar year 2006, a family of two adults and two children were considered low income if their annual income fell below $\$ 40,888$.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey.

Children in Low-Income Families That Spend More Than 30\% of Their Income on Housing: 2006 is the percentage of children under age 18 in low-income families where the family spent more than 30 percent of their gross monthly income on rent, mortgage payments, taxes, insurance, and/or related housing expenses. Low-income families are those with incomes below 200 percent of the U.S. poverty threshold, as defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. The federal poverty definition consists of a series of thresholds based on family size and composition. In calendar year 2006, a family of two adults and two children fell in this category if their annual income fell below $\$ 40,888$.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey.

## Estimated Daily Count of Detained and

 Committed Youth in Custody: 2006 is the number of youth charged with, or court-adjudicated for, an offense and residing in a public or private facility on February 22, 2006, resulting from contact with the justice system. Their ages can range from age 10 to the upper age of court jurisdiction for that state. Counts reflect state of offense. SOURCE: National Center for Juvenile Justice, special analysis of data from the 2006 Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement.
## Infant Mortality Rate (deaths per $\mathbf{1 , 0 0 0}$ live

births): $\mathbf{2 0 0 5}$ is the number of deaths occurring to infants under 1 year of age per 1,000 live births The data are reported by place of residence, not place of death.
SOURCE: U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics.

Juvenile Violent Crime Arrest Rate (arrests per 100,000 youth ages 10-17): 2005 is the number of arrests per 100,000 youth ages 10 to 17 for violent offenses, including homicide, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. In some jurisdictions, data were adjusted to account for underreporting. Thus, our figures will not match FBI or state or local law enforcement agency data. Rates reflect state of offense. Illinois and District of Columbia data were suppressed because the reporting coverage estimate was less than 50 percent.
SOURCE: National Center for Juvenile Justice, special analysis of data from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program.

Median Income of Families With Children: 2006
is the median annual income for families with related children under age 18 living in the household. "Related children" include the householder's (head of the household) children by birth, marriage, or adoption; as well as other persons under age 18 (such as nieces or nephews) who are related to the householder and living in the household. The median income is the dollar amount that divides the income distribution into two equal groups-half with income above the median, half with income below it.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, American
Community Survey.
Number of Children: 2006 are estimates of the total resident population under age 18 and ages 10 to 17 as of July 1, 2006, including Armed Forces personnel stationed in the area and their dependents.
sOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, State
Characteristics Population Estimates File.

Number of Children Without Health Insurance:
2005 is the number of children under age 18 who were not covered by health insurance at any point during the year. The figures shown here are 3-year averages of data from 2004 through 2006. We label these as 2005 estimates because 2005 is the midpoint of the 3-year period.
sOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey.

Overall Rank for each state was obtained in the following manner. First, we converted the 2006 (or 2005, depending on the indicator) state numerical values for each of the 10 key indicators into standard scores. We then summed those standard scores to create a total standard score for each of the 50 states. Finally, we ranked the states on the basis of their total standard score in sequential order from highest/best (1) to lowest/ worst (50). Standard scores were derived by subtracting the mean score from the observed score and dividing the amount by the standard deviation for that distribution of scores. All measures were given the same weight in calculating the total standard score.

Percent Change Over Time Analysis was computed by comparing the 2006 (or 2005, depending on the indicator) data for each of the 10 key indicators with the data for 2000. To calculate percent change, we subtracted the value for 2000 from the value for 2005/2006 and then divided that quantity by the value for 2000 . The results are multiplied by 100 for readability. The percent change was calculated on rounded data, and the "percent change" figure has been rounded to the nearest whole number

Percent Low-Birthweight Babies: 2005 is the percentage of live births weighing less than 2,500 grams ( 5.5 pounds). The data are reported by place of mother's residence, not place of birth. SOURCE: U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics.

## Percent of Children in Immigrant Families: 2006

is the number of children who are foreign born or who live with at least one foreign-born parent. SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey.

## Percent of Children in Poverty (income below

$\mathbf{\$ 2 0 , 4 4 4}$ for a family of two adults and two children in 2006): 2006 is the percentage of children under age 18 who live in families with incomes below 100 percent of the U.S. poverty threshold, as defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. The federal poverty definition consists of a series of thresholds based on family size and composition and is updated every year to account for inflation. In calendar year 2006, a family of two adults and two children fell in the "poverty" category if their annual income fell below $\$ 20,444$. Poverty status is not determined for people living in group quarters, such as military barracks, prisons, and other institutional quarters, or for unrelated individuals under age 15 (such as foster children). The data are based on income received in the 12 months prior to the survey.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, American
Community Survey.

Percent of Children in Single-Parent Families: 2006 is the percentage of children under age 18 who live with their own single parent, either in a family or subfamily. In this definition, single-parent families may include cohabiting couples and do not include children living with married stepparents.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey.

Percent of Children Living in Families Where No Parent Has Full-Time, Year-Round Employment: 2006 is the share of all children under age 18 living in families where no parent has regular, full-time employment. For children living in single-parent families, this means that the resident parent did not work at least 35 hours per week, at least 50 weeks in the 12 months prior to the survey. For children living in married-couple families, this means that neither parent worked at least 35 hours per week, at least 50 weeks in the 12 months prior to the survey. Children living with neither parent also were listed as not having secure parental employment because those children are likely to be economically vulnerable. SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey.

## Percent of Children With Special Health Care

 Needs: 2005-2006 is defined by the Maternal and Child Health Bureau (MCHB) as the percentage of children under age 18 who are at increased risk of a chronic physical, developmental, behavioral, or emotional condition and who also require health and related services of a type or amount beyond that required by children generally.SOURCE: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, Maternal and Child Health Bureau.

Percent of Children Without Health Insurance:
2005 is the percentage of children under age 18 who were not covered by health insurance at any point during the year. The figures shown here are 3 -year averages of data from 2004 through 2006. We label these as 2005 estimates because 2005 is the midpoint of the 3 -year period.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey.

Percent of Teens Not Attending School and Not Working (ages 16-19): 2006 is the percentage of teenagers between ages 16 and 19 who are not enrolled in school (full- or part-time) and not employed (full- or part-time). This measure is sometimes referred to as "Idle Teens" or "Disconnected Youth." Inclusion of the group quarters population in the 2006 ACS could have a noticeable impact on the universe population for this age group. Therefore, the 2006 and 2005 ACS estimates might not be fully comparable.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey.

Percent of Teens Who Are High School Dropouts (ages 16-19): 2006 is the percentage of teenagers between ages 16 and 19 who are not enrolled in school and are not high school graduates. Those who have a GED or equivalent are included as high school graduates in this measure. The measure used here is defined as a "status dropout" rate. Inclusion of the group quarters population in the 2006 ACS could have a noticeable impact on the universe population for this age group. Therefore, the 2006 and 2005 ACS estimates might not be fully comparable.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, American
Community Survey.

## Percent of Youth in Custody for Non-Violent

 Offenses: 2006 is the percentage of detained or committed youth arrested for non-violent offenses, which are all offenses other than criminal homicide, violent sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated assault. Detained or committed youth are those charged with, or court-adjudicated for, an offense and residing in a public or private facility on February 22, 2006. Their ages can range from age 10 to the upper age of court jurisdiction for that state. Rates reflect state of offense SOURCE: National Center for Juvenile Justice, special analysis of data from the 2006 Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement.Race and Hispanic Origin of Youth (ages 10-17): 2006 are estimates of the total resident population ages 10 to 17 as of July 1, 2006, including Armed Forces personnel stationed in the area. The categories provided are mutually exclusive for the largest racial and ethnic groups, as currently measured by the U.S. Census Bureau. In order to provide mutually exclusive groupings, racial categories used here ("White," "Black/African American," "American Indian/Alaskan Native," "Asian and Pacific Islander," and "More than one race") do not include anyone who indicated that they were Hispanic or Latino. Those persons who did consider themselves Hispanic or Latino were included in the "Hispanic/Latino" category. For purposes of this report, Asians, Native Hawaiians, and Other Pacific Islanders were grouped into one category because of small numbers in some states. SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, State
Characteristics Population Estimates File.

## Rate of Detained and Committed Youth in

 Custody (per 100,000 youth ages 10-15): 2006 is the number of detained and committed youth ages 10 to 15 per 100,000 youth in this age group. Detained or committed youth are those who have been charged with, or court-adjudicated for, an offense and were in residential placement on February 22, 2006. Residential placement includes public and private placement facilities. Rates reflect state of offense. SOURCE: National Center for Juvenile Justice, special analysis of data from the 2006 Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement.Ratio of Rates of Youth of Color to White Youth in Custody: 2006 is the ratio of the following two rates: (1) the rate of detained and committed youth of color per 100,000 youth and (2) the rate of detained and committed non-Hispanic white youth per 100,000 youth. The ratio denotes the proportion of youth of color offenders relative to non-Hispanic white youth offenders. They can be as young as age 10 and as old as the upper age of court jurisdiction for that state. Detained or committed youth are those who have been charged with, or court-adjudicated for, an offense and were in residential placement on February 22, 2006. Residential placement includes public and private placement facilities. Youth of color include black, Hispanic, American Indian, Asian, Pacific Islander, and other race. Rates reflect state of offense. SOURCE: Annie E. Casey Foundation, analysis of the National Center for Juvenile Justice's special analysis of data from the 2006 Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement.

Teen Birth Rate (births per 1,000 females ages 15-19): 2005 is the number of births to teenagers between ages 15 and 19 per 1,000 females in this age group. Data reflect the mother's place of residence, rather than the place of the birth. SOURCES: Birth Statistics: U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. Population Statistics: U.S. Census Bureau.

Teen Death Rate (deaths per 100,000 teens ages 15-19): 2005 is the number of deaths from all causes to teens between ages 15 and 19 , per 100,000 teens in this age group. The data are reported by place of residence, not the place where the death occurred.
SOURCES: Death Statistics: U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. Population Statistics: U.S. Census Bureau.

[^56]Over the past several years, we have developed a set of criteria to select the statistical indicators published in the national KIDS COUNT Data Book for the purposes of measuring change over time and ranking the states. The criteria are designed to meet our twin goals of using only the highest quality data and communicating clearly and concisely. The criteria are described below.

## 1. The statistical indicator must be from a

reliable source. All of the indicator data used in this book come from U.S. government agencies. Most of the data have already been published or released to the public in some other form before we use them. We work with a small circle of data experts to examine and re-examine the quality of the data used in the KIDS COUNT Data Book each year.

## 2. The statistical indicator must be available and

 consistent over time. Changes in methodologies, practice, or policies may affect year-to-year comparability. Program and administrative data are particularly vulnerable to changes in policies and/ or program administration, resulting in data that are not comparable across states or over time.
## 3. The statistical indicator must be available and

 consistent for all states. In practice, this means data collected by the federal government or some other national organization. Much of the data collected by states may be accurate and reliable and may be useful for assessing changes over time in a single state, but unless all of the states follow the same data collection and reporting procedures, the data are likely to be inconsistent across states. Without data for every state, we would not be able to construct an overall composite index of child well-being.4. The statistical indicator should reflect a salient outcome or measure of well-being. We focus on outcome measures rather than programmatic or service data (such as dollars spent on education or welfare costs), which are not always related to the actual well-being of children. This focus reflects our ultimate aim of improving child wellbeing, regardless of the policies or programs used to achieve this goal.
5. The statistical indicator must be easily understandable to the public. We are trying to reach an educated lay public, not academic scholars or researchers. Measures that are too complex or esoteric cannot be communicated effectively.
6. The statistical indicators we use must have a relatively unambiguous interpretation. If the value of an indicator changes over time, we want to be sure there is widespread agreement that this is a good thing (or a bad thing) for kids.

## 7. There should be a high probability that the

 measure will continue to be produced in the near future. We want to establish a series of indicators that can be produced year after year to track trends in the well-being of children in each state. Therefore, we are reluctant to use data from a one-time survey, even though it may provide good information about kids.
## The KIDS COUNT State Network

The Annie E. Casey Foundation provides funding and technical assistance for a national network of KIDS COUNT projects in every state, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. These projects, listed on the following pages, measure and report on the status of children at the state and local levels. They use the data to inform public debates and encourage public action to improve the lives of children.

The state KIDS COUNT projects publish a range of data-driven materials-state data books, special reports, issue briefs, and fact sheets-that help policymakers and citizens identify the needs of children and families and develop appropriate responses to address these needs. Much of the local-level data collected by the state KIDS COUNT grantees is available at www.kidscount.org/cliks.

Please visit www.kidscount.org for more information about the network of state KIDS COUNT grantees, including mailing addresses.

| Alabama | Linda Tilly |
| :--- | :--- |
| VOICES for Alabama's Children | Executive Director <br> (334) 213-2410 ext. 106 <br> ltilly@alavoices.org <br> www.alavoices.org |
| Klaska | Virgene Hanna <br> Project Director <br> (907) 786-5431 |
|  | anvh@uaa.alaska.edu <br> www.kidscount.alaska.edu |
| Crizona Alaska | Dana Wolfe Naimark <br> President and CEO |
| (602) 266-0707 |  |
| dnaimark@azchildren.org |  |


| Connecticut | Judith Carroll | Idaho | Linda Jensen |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Connecticut Association | Director, CT KIDS COUNT Project | Mountain States Group | KIDS COUNT Director |
| for Human Services | (860) 951-2212 ext. 240 |  | (208) 336-5533 ext. 246 |
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|  | www.cahs.org |  | www.idahokidscount.org |
| Delaware | Terry Schooley | Illinois | Melissa Baker |
| University of Delaware | Director, KIDS COUNT in Delaware | Voices for Illinois Children | KIDS COUNT Director |
|  | (302) 831-4966 |  | (312) 516-5554 |
|  | terrys@udel.edu |  | mbaker@voices 4 kids.org |
|  | www.dekidscount.org |  | www.voices4kids.org |
| District of Columbia | Kinaya Sokoya | Indiana | Gabrielle Campo |
| DC Children's Trust Fund | Executive Director | Indiana Youth Institute | Program Manager |
|  | (202) 434-8766 |  | (317) 396-2717 |
|  | ksokoya@dcctf.org |  | gcampo@iyi.org |
|  | www.dckidscount.org |  | www.iyi.org |
| Florida | Susan Weitzel | lowa | Michael Crawford |
| Center for the Study | Director | Child \& Family Policy Center | Senior Associate |
| of Children's Futures | (813) 974-7411 |  | (515) 280-9027 |
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|  | www.floridakidscount.org |  | www.cfpciowa.org |
| Georgia | Taifa Butler | Kansas | Gary Brunk |
| Georgia Family Connection | Director, Public Affairs and Policy | Kansas Action for Children | President \& Chief Executive Officer |
| Partnership, Inc. | (404) 527-7394 ext. 136 |  | (785) 232-0550 |
|  | taifa@gafcp.org |  | brunk@kac.org |
|  | www.gafcp.org |  | www.kac.org |
| Hawaii | Marika Ripke | Kentucky | Tara Grieshop-Goodwin |
| Center on the Family | KIDS COUNT Director | Kentucky Youth Advocates, Inc. | KIDS COUNT Coordinator |
|  | (808) 956-6394 |  | (502) 895-8167 ext. 118 |
|  | marika@hawaii.edu |  | tgrieshop@kyyouth.org |
|  | www.uhfamily.hawaii.edu |  | www.kyyouth.org |


| Louisiana | Teresa Falgoust | Mississippi | Linda Southward |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Agenda for Children | KIDS COUNT Coordinator | Family \& Children Research Unit | MS KIDS COUNT Director |
|  | (504) 586-8509 ext. 117 |  | (662) 325-0851 |
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|  | www.agendaforchildren.org |  | www.ssrc.msstate.edu/mskidscount |
| Maine | Mary Milam | Missouri | Sheila Bader |
| Maine Children's Alliance | KIDS COUNT Director | Citizens for Missouri's Children | Interim Executive Director |
|  | (207) 623-1868 ext. 206 |  | (314) 647-2003 |
|  | mmilam@mekids.org |  | sheilabader@mokids.org |
|  | www.mekids.org |  | www.mokids.org |
| Maryland | Matthew Joseph | Montana | Daphne Herling |
| Advocates for Children \& Youth, Inc. | Executive Director | Bureau of Business | Director |
|  | (410) 547-9200 ext. 3009 | \& Economic Research | (406) 243-5614 |
|  | mjoseph@acy.org |  | daphne.herling@business.umt.edu |
|  | www.acy.org |  | www.bber.umt.edu |
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| Massachusetts Citizens for Children | KIDS COUNT Project Director | Voices for Children in Nebraska | Research Coordinator |
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|  | benita@masskids.org |  | kidscount@voicesforchildren.com |
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| Michigan | Jane Zehnder-Merrell | Nevada | R. Keith Schwer |
| Michigan League for Human Services | KIDS COUNT Project Director | Center for Business | Director |
|  | (517) 487-5436 | and Economic Research | (702) 895-3191 |
|  | janez@michleagueforhumansvs.org |  | keith.schwer@gmail.com |
|  | www.milhs.org |  | http://kidscount.unlv.edu |
| Minnesota | Andi Egbert | New Hampshire | Ellen Fineberg |
| Children's Defense Fund—Minnesota | Research Director | Children's Alliance | Executive Director |
|  | (651) 855-1184 | of New Hampshire | (603) 225-2264 |
|  | egbert@cdf-mn.org |  | efineberg@childrennh.org |
|  | www.cdf-mn.org |  | www.childrennh.org |


| New Jersey <br> Association for Children of New Jersey | Cecilia Traini <br> NJ KIDS COUNT Coordinator <br> (973) 643-3876 <br> ctraini@acnj.org <br> www.acnj.org | Oklahoma <br> Oklahoma Institute for Child Advocacy | Anne Roberts <br> Executive Director (405) 236-5437 ext. 101 aroberts@oica.org www.oica.org |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| New Mexico <br> New Mexico Voices for Children | Lisa Adams-Shafer KIDS COUNT Program Director (505) 244-9505 ext. 34 ladamsshafer@nmvoices.org www.nmvoices.org | Oregon <br> Children First for Oregon | Cathy Kaufmann <br> Policy \& Communications Director <br> (503) 236-9754 <br> cathy@cffo.org <br> www.cffo.org |
| New York <br> New York State Council on Children \& Families | Mary DeMasi <br> NYS KIDS COUNT Project Director <br> (518) 474-6038 <br> mary.demasi@ccf.state.ny.us www.ccf.state.ny.us | Pennsylvania <br> Pennsylvania Partnerships for Children | Joan Benso <br> President and CEO <br> (717) 236-5680 <br> president@papartnerships.org <br> www.papartnerships.org |
| North Carolina <br> Action for Children North Carolina | Alexandra Sirota KIDS COUNT Project Director (919) 834-6623 ext. 225 alexandra@ncchild.org www.ncchild.org | Puerto Rico <br> National Council of La Raza | Nayda Rivera-Hernandez <br> Senior Research Analyst <br> (787) 641-0546 <br> nrivera@nclr.org <br> www.nclr.org |
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| Ohio <br> Children's Defense Fund Ohio | Barbara Turpin KIDS COUNT Project Director (614) 221-2244 bturpin@cdfohio.org www.childrensdefense.org | South Carolina <br> South Carolina Budget <br> \& Control Board | A. Baron Holmes KIDS COUNT Project Director (803) 734-2291 baron.holmes@ors.sc.gov www.sckidscount.org |


| South Dakota | Carole Cochran | Virginia | John Morgan |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
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|  | kidscount@usd.edu |  | john@vakids.org |
|  | www.sdkidscount.org |  | www.vakids.org |
| Tennessee | Pam Brown | Washington | Lori Pfingst |
| Tennessee Commission | Director, KIDS COUNT Project | Human Services Policy Center | Assistant Director |
| on Children \& Youth | (615) 532-1571 |  | (206) 616-1506 |
|  | pam.k.brown@state.tn.us |  | pfingst@u.washington.edu |
|  | www.tennessee.gov/tccy |  | www.hspc.org |
| Texas | Frances Deviney | West Virginia | Margie Hale |
| Center for Public Policy Priorities | Texas KIDS COUNT Director | West Virginia KIds count Fund | Executive Director |
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|  | www.cppp.org/kidscount.php |  | www.wvkidscountfund.org |
| U.S. Virgin Islands | Dee Baecher-Brown | Wisconsin | M. Martha Cranley |
| CFVI, Inc. | President | Wisconsin Council | KIDS COUNT Coordinator |
|  | (340) 774-6031 | on Children \& Families | (608) 284-0580 ext. 321 |
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|  | www.cfvi.net |  | www.wccf.org |
| Utah | Terry Haven | Wyoming | Marc Homer |
| Voices for Utah Children | KIDS COUNT Director | Wyoming Children's Action Alliance | KIDS COUNT Coordinator |
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|  | www.utahchildren.org |  | www.wykids.org |
| Vermont | Beth Burgess |  |  |
| Voices for Vermont's Children | Research Coordinator |  |  |
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|  | www.voicesforvermontschildren.org |  |  |

The Annie E. Casey Foundation
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410.547.6624 fax
www.aecf.org

The Annie E. Casey Foundation is a private charitable organization dedicated to helping build better futures for disadvantaged children in the United States. It was established in 1948 by Jim Casey, one of the founders of UPS, and his siblings, who named the Foundation in honor of their mother. The primary mission of the Foundation is to foster public policies, humanservice reforms, and community supports that more effectively meet the needs of today's vulnerable children and families. In pursuit of this goal, the Foundation makes grants that help states, cities, and communities fashion more innovative, cost-effective responses to these needs.

KIDS COUNT, a project of the Annie E. Casey Foundation, is a national and state-by-state effort to track the status of children in the United States. By providing policymakers and citizens with benchmarks of child well-being, KIDS COUNT seeks to enrich local, state, and national discussions concerning ways to secure better futures for all children. At the national level, the principal activity of the initiative is the publication of the annual KIDS COUNT Data Book, which uses the best available data to measure the educational, social, economic, and physical well-being of children. The Foundation also funds a nationwide network of state-level KIDS COUNT projects that provide a more detailed, community-by-community picture of the condition of children.


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[^0]:    For this measure, the data for
    Non-Hispanic Whites, Blacks/ African Americans, Asians and Pacific Islanders, and American Indians and Alaskan Natives are for persons who selected only one race.

[^1]:    For more information on
    teen death, visit the Indicator
    Briefs and Definitions sections
    at www.kidscount.org/datacenter.

[^2]:    For more information on
    teen birth, visit the Indicator
    Briefs and Definitions sections
    at www.kidscount.org/datacenter.

[^3]:    For more information on
    children in single-parent
    families, visit the Indicator
    Briefs and Definitions sections
    at www.kidscount.org/datacenter.

[^4]:    WIM Patterned bars indicate national change. $\square$ Solid bars indicate state change.

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[^54]:    WII Patterned bars indicate national change. $\square$ Solid bars indicate state change.

[^55]:    N.A. $=$ Not Available.
    N.R. $=$ Not Ranked.

[^56]:    Over the past few years, we have
    produced several KIDS COUN
    Working Papers focused on
    methodology. These are available
    on the KIDS COUNT website
    at www.kidscount.org. For
    additional information on
    characteristics of good indicators
    of child well-being, see Key
    Indicators of Child and Youth
    Well-Being: Completing the
    Picture, 2008, Brett V. Brown (Ed.), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New York, NY

